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The modernist fables that underlie the developmentalist states of the Middle 
East and North Africa (MENA) have only recently begun to attract the atten-
tion of scholars in their own right. As French and British colonial fantasies 
of recovering the supposed agricultural productivity of Roman North 
Africa have given way to the similarly delusional dreams of experts who have 
sought to modernize postcolonial states in the region, the subject of their 
underlying environmental imaginaries has come to the fore.1 It is the consid-
erable merit of the studies in this volume to document the continuities in the 
environmental imaginaries that have shaped the modernization projects of 
both colonial and postcolonial states over the past two centuries.
 Colonial writers believed that the Middle Eastern environment suf-
fered irreversible degradation after classical antiquity. Different authors 
ascribed the alleged decline to different causes, including the goat, the 
Bedouin, and Islam. The real culprit, according to Theodore Wertime, may 
well have been ancient metallurgy, which was enormously inefficient.2 Ar-
cheological evidence from around the Mediterranean tends to support this 
finding. According to a major European Union–funded study, the principal 
wave of deforestation in the Mediterranean coincided with the onset of the 
Bronze Age.3 The same study finds that the Mediterranean environment 
was essentially stable (with oscillations) from the Roman period until the 
nineteenth century.
 Colonial understandings of the environmental history of the MENA 
region were distorted by orientalist assumptions. It is the aim of the essays 
in this book to explore just how and why they mattered. Having said this, 
it is important to recognize that human-induced environmental change 
was not the monopoly of modern actors. The Middle Eastern environment 
itself was shaped and reshaped by long-term historical processes. Neither 
the huge canal systems in the Tigris/Euphrates valley nor the artificial 
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oases in the deserts and plateaus were necessary for human survival. 
Rulers made choices. The environmental costs, as always, were borne by 
later generations. Thus the question: Are modern engineers and techno-
crats the heirs of the pharaohs? Or is there something that distinguishes 
them from ancient technologists?4
 Here we need to see the imperial dreams of Cromer and Lyautey 
(proconsuls of empire in Egypt and Morocco respectively) and those of 
postcolonial experts as the products of their world historical context: 
the age of fossil fuels (1800 ce–present).5 The age of fossil fuels reflected 
the enormous multiplication of the quantity of energy available to humans 
with the coming of steam power and electricity. In this respect the mate-
rial realities that shaped modern dreams of power differed fundamentally 
from those that shaped the world of the engineers and statebuilders of 
classical antiquity and the Islamic empires that followed them.
 Premodern people operated under the constraints of the solar energy 
regime (to 1800 ce) in which human and animal power constituted the 
principal sources of energy, along with wood energy. (Water and wind 
power in this period generated a small percentage of the total energy then 
available.) In an effort to dramatize the huge difference between the energy 
available in classical antiquity and that available in modern times, consider 
this thought experiment. According to Vaclav Smil, the total energy ex-
pended by the tens of thousands of slaves who constructed the Great Pyra-
mid is roughly equivalent to energy expended by a single moderate-sized 
bulldozer.6 This is not to belittle the achievements of classical engineers in 
any respect. It is simply to point out the energetic limits of the world in 
which they existed. The rerouting of rivers in ancient Mesopotamia and 
the construction of the pyramids still command our awe.
 The environmental orientalism of the planners and engineers of the 
colonial and postcolonial era thus reflects the fundamentally different ener-
getic context of modern times (even if the energetic equations of the colonial 
and postcolonial eras were themselves significantly different). The colonial 
period largely coincided with the age of coal (1750–1950), whereas the post-
colonial period (1950–present) was shaped by petroleum and natural gas. 
However, colonial engineers and experts were still somewhat constrained by 
the energy dynamics of the solar energy age. Whereas the Suez Canal (1869) 
and the first Aswan dam (1902) were constructed by corvée labor, the Nasser 
High Dam was constructed by modern earthmoving equipment. Dreams of 
empire were enabled by the changing energetic contexts.
 If energy regimes shaped what engineers and experts could accom-
plish, they also distanced them from understanding the consequences of 
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their interventions. In the rain-fed agricultural systems of the solar energy 
regime (most of human history), the consequences of faulty engineering 
were soon exposed. The fact that deforestation of the hills soon led to 
floods in the plains was soon understood. Most complex societies devised 
hedges against the Malthusian scissors of drought, famine, and disease. 
Ambitious projects like the Grand Canal had huge energy price tags, and 
were therefore rare, and well scouted in advance.
 In the fossil fuel era, the illusion of omnipotence pertained. Forests 
could be felled, river courses diverted, giant dams constructed, and the 
energetic costs were seen as manageable. Petroleum and natural gas, along 
with greed and orientalist visions, made it all possible. The inevitable exter-
nalities (unprecedented flooding, landscape degradation, and pollution) 
were rarely foreseen. Here’s the bottom line: what made environmental 
orientalism and the “rule of experts” possible were the new energetic con-
ditions of modern times.7 The production of environmental imaginaries 
(capitalism and the modern state as well) grew out of this epochal trans-
formation in human energy regimes.
 Imperial dreams such as the Aswan High Dam, hubristic though they 
are, were not solely the manifestation of human vanity and greed. Nor were 
they in any simple way the result of seeing the world through orientalist 
glasses, though both were certainly involved. They also stemmed from the 
dramatic transformation in human demography of modern times. In the 
face of ever-rising populations, engineers and technocrats, both indigenous 
and expatriate, sought solutions for societies otherwise hard-pressed by 
the huge increase in numbers. Without the Aswan High Dam, Egypt would 
have experienced the devastating 1980s Sahel famine.8
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Introduction
Imperialism, Orientalism, and the 
Environment in the Middle East
History, Policy, Power, and Practice
Diana K. Davis
REPRESENTATIONS OF the Middle East nearly inevitably include deso-
late scenes of empty and parched deserts, punctuated, perhaps, with a 
lonely string of camels, a verdant but isolated oasis, or a beach with large 
dunes of golden sand, sometimes with a pyramid, an oil derrick, or a mina-
ret in the background. We see and read about such imagery, around the 
world, in tourist advertisements, in films, in the news media, and even in 
scholarly writing about the region. The environment figures very large in 
the majority of these visual and written representations. Inherent in this 
imagery is the fact that much of the Middle East and North Africa, a largely 
desert region, has been considered ecologically marginal since at least the 
late nineteenth century. More often than not, these lands have been de-
fined as degraded by human action over many centuries.
 Recent research, however, has shown instead that these regions are not 
desertified disasters despite their frequent portrayal as such.1 In fact, the 
peoples of the Middle East and North Africa have lived and thrived for mil-
lennia, successfully coping with the common environmental conditions of 
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high temperatures and low rainfall of 
their arid and semiarid environments. 
The environment in many parts of the 
Middle East and North Africa has been 
carefully and painstakingly transformed 
to improve human life for much of the 
last five to seven thousand years and 
longer. The sophisticated irrigation and 
water-control systems developed in the 
region provide just one example of such 
environmental management.2
 With the rise of Anglo-European imperial power in the region, though, 
in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, an environmental imagi-
nary began to be constructed that frequently portrayed the Middle East and 
North Africa as being on the edge of ecological viability or as a degraded 
landscape facing imminent disaster.3 Because the local inhabitants were 
most often blamed for the environmental degradation, by deforestation, 
overgrazing, or overirrigation, for example, this environmental imaginary 
allowed the telling of stories, or narratives, that facilitated imperial goals in 
the name of “improvement” and, later, of environmental “protection.”
 I have detailed elsewhere how this Western environmental imaginary 
spawned an environmental narrative of presumed degradation constructed 
by the French to engender dramatic economic, social, political, and envi-
ronmental changes in North Africa that successfully promoted their colo-
nial project during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.4 Closely 
related environmental imaginaries of the Middle East and North Africa, 
as Shaul Cohen has demonstrated, allowed the development of a narra-
tive of deforestation in the Levant that has facilitated the appropriation 
of rural land by Jewish settlers to Palestine, in the name of reforestation, 
since the late nineteenth century.5 Deforestation narratives have been par-
ticularly strong in the Levant region since the nineteenth century, where 
some of the most emotional accounts of forest destruction have hinged 
Figure 0.1. “A Lookout into the Desert.” This 
undated postcard illustrates typical scenes of 
the Middle East from the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries. Original postcard: 
“EGYPT—A Lookout into the Desert,” by 
photographers Lehnert and Landrock. From 
the collection of Dr. Paula Sanders, Rice Uni-
versity. Reproduced by permission.
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on the presumed widespread destruction of the Lebanese cedar forests il-
lustrated in the cover image by Louis-François Cassas.6 Similar narratives 
of overgrazing and desertification were used during the British Mandate 
in Palestine to justify forestry policies as well as laws aimed at controlling 
nomads, such as the 1942 Bedouin control ordinance, in the name of curb-
ing overgrazing.7 Such environmental imaginaries, once constructed, can 
be extremely tenacious and have surprisingly widespread effects.
 By “environmental imaginary,” I mean the constellation of ideas that 
groups of humans develop about a given landscape, usually local or re-
gional, that commonly includes assessments about that environment as 
well as how it came to be in its current state. This use of imaginary draws 
more on the conceptualization of the “social imaginary” than on other 
uses of the term in psychological or philosophical studies.8 Social groups 
may develop an environmental imaginary, for instance, by living and 
working in a common place. Because environmental imaginaries nearly 
always contain ideas about how the environment reached its current 
state, though, narratives of environmental change, environmental his-
tories, are intimately linked with environmental imaginaries.9 Therefore, 
such stories, or narratives, about environmental change, both inform 
environmental imaginaries and develop as a result of environmental 
imaginaries. Neither the imaginary nor the narrative(s) concerning the 
environment is static. Underlying each is a congeries of power relations 
that may shift and change to varying degrees depending on the time and 
place. Who tells the story of environmental change and what it means for 
the present and future can determine who wins and who loses when that 
imaginary is operationalized in the form of, for example, agricultural 
policies, “reforestation” projects, or environmental and economic devel-
opment plans.10
 This becomes particularly important in imperial and colonial settings. 
“While environmental imaginaries stem from material and social practices 
in [particular] natural settings,”11 when they are developed about “faraway” 
places, they necessarily are informed by environmental representations 
constructed by others. Those constructing the knowledge that informed 
the environmental imaginary “back home” during the colonial period 
were, most of the time, new to the region being described and catalogued.12 
It is not too surprising then, that much of what was written and visually 
rendered about foreign environments, information that informed Anglo-
European environmental imaginaries, represented the environment most 
often as alien, exotic, fantastic, or “abnormal,” and frequently as degraded 
in some way.13
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 Much of the early Western representation of the Middle East and 
North Africa environment, in fact, might be interpreted as a form of en-
vironmental orientalism in that the environment was narrated by those 
who became the imperial powers, primarily Britain and France, as a 
“strange and defective” environment compared to Europe’s “normal and 
productive” environment.14 The consequent need to “improve,” “restore,” 
“normalize,” or “repair” the environment provided powerful justifications 
for innumerable imperial projects, from building irrigation systems to 
reforestation activities to the bombing of “unruly” tribes to the sedenta-
rization of nomads as a measure to prevent “overgrazing.” The perceived 
extreme aridity and the constraints that this was seen to place on “normal” 
agricultural production fueled an intense interest in hydraulic manage-
ment by the British and the French. Determined to boost production of 
economically profitable crops such as cotton, a great deal of energy and 
resources was spent on dams, canals, and other technologies to improve 
and spread irrigation infrastructures in most of the Middle East and North 
Africa.15 This has left a legacy for hydraulic management perhaps greater 
than any other form of environmental management (such as forestry or 
range management) in the region that is reflected in the majority of chap-
ters in this volume that treat water in some way. Many of these imperial 
environmental narratives, especially of deforestation and overgrazing, in-
formed the discipline of ecology as it was developing in the late nineteenth 
and early twentieth centuries, and thus several of the narratives became 
institutionalized in ecological science despite their questionable accuracy.16 
It is perhaps because of this cloak of technological and scientific author-
ity that environmental orientalism in the Middle East and North Africa 
has never been, to the best of my knowledge, interrogated by postcolonial 
scholars and others in a systematic way for the hidden relations of power 
rooted in its very specific forms of knowledge production.
 Since the publication in 1978 of Edward Said’s influential book Ori-
entalism, scholars have demonstrated, in varied and sometimes contested 
ways, how the “orient” of the Middle East and North Africa has been repre-
sented and what the results of such representations have been.17 Many dif-
ferent kinds of representations of the Middle East and North Africa have 
been critically analyzed, including texts written by poets, novelists, and 
travel writers, and many different kinds of visual renditions of the region 
and its peoples, especially photography and painting, and contemporary 
multimedia. Startlingly few of these analyses, however, have explored the 
Middle East and North African environment itself, and how it has been 
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Mitchell’s research on Egypt and particularly his analysis of the country 
as an “object of development.”18 Several parts of his book analyze how the 
Egyptian environment has been represented, for what reasons, and for 
whose benefit. Mitchell’s is one of the only critical analyses of a Middle 
East and North African environment that takes seriously the important 
and far-reaching effects of environmental representation and narrative on 
policy, power, and practice both in the past and today.19
 The authors in this book thus make a significant contribution by 
considering many of the social, political, technological, economic, and 
ecological implications of environmental imaginaries of the Middle East 
and North Africa over the long durée as well as in more recent, post-
colonial settings. Together, they cover the last three centuries in a wide 
array of Middle East and North African countries and regions, today called 
Egypt, Iraq, Israel, the Maghreb (Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia), Palestine, and 
Turkey. Although not the focus of any single chapter, Lebanon, Libya, and 
Syria are also discussed by several of the authors.
 Mitchell’s work on Egypt has shown how international development 
actors such as USAID (United States Agency for International Develop-
ment) and many in the Egyptian government bureaucracy in the last half 
of the twentieth century drew on the long-standing Western imaginary of 
Egypt as a marginal environment with limited resources, dependent on the 
Nile. The evocatively “narrow ribbon” of fertile land along the Nile, he ar-
gues, is nearly always juxtaposed with an apparent crisis of overpopulation. 
Such an imaginary is used to justify plans for immediate action in the sec-
tors of agricultural and economic reform even as it naturalizes and depo-
liticizes serious problems of social inequality and poverty that may then be 
more easily and profitably ignored. Mitchell termed this framing of Egypt’s 
economic development “a problem of geography versus demography.”20
 At the turn of the century, during the period of the British protector-
ate, a similar framing took place based on the Anglo-European environ-
mental imaginary of Egypt. Jennifer Derr shows in her chapter that the 
British came to Egypt with certain conceptions of the environment and the 
powers of technology in the form of irrigation infrastructures that guided 
their actions and, ultimately, the very shape of the environment along 
the Nile. Whereas “overpopulation” was not a strong motivation for their 
development of irrigation works in colonial Egypt, the production of cot-
ton was. Derr argues, though, that the drive to increase cotton production 
was not the only motivation for the building of the Aswan dam in 1902. 
She demonstrates that the British held a “technocratic imagining” of the 
Egyptian environment that was deeply influenced by their belief that this 
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desiccated, marginal environment had been astoundingly more productive 
during the biblical period, “the time of Joseph.”
 British efforts to try to regain this historical glory, assuming that more 
advanced irrigation and agricultural systems existed during biblical times, 
and eliding waterworks undertaken during the Ottoman period, underlay 
much of the rationale to build the dam and develop perennial irrigation 
in Egypt. In his chapter, though, Alan Mikhail shows that the Ottoman 
period was actually quite important in Egypt’s development. He suggests 
that Egyptian peasants and the Ottoman state were deeply and personally 
engaged in a “responsible management” of the Nile and associated irriga-
tion structures based on a commonly held cooperative vision of the envi-
ronment in the eighteenth century. His work argues that the “microlevel” 
negotiations over and communal efforts to dredge irrigation canals were 
largely successful in maintaining a productive agricultural system. By con-
trast, the negative effects that the operationalization of the British colonial 
imaginary had on the environment, in the form of waterlogged soils and 
rising salinity, and on the Egyptian farmers, many of whom suffered loss of 
property and the transformation effectively into sharecroppers, were largely 
unanticipated.21 Nonetheless, Derr concludes in her chapter, this British en-
vironmental imaginary underlay the transformation of the very geography 
of Egypt’s land, water, economy, and social relations in long-lasting ways.
 Land reclamation, making uncultivable land cultivable, in Egypt is 
perhaps as old as irrigation technology itself. Reclamation of land during 
the British colonial period was part and parcel of the expansion of irriga-
tion. In her chapter, Jeannie Sowers focuses on Egyptian land reclamation 
to show how dominant state narratives of the environment developed 
in the second half of the twentieth century only to be increasingly chal-
lenged recently by disparate groups including those in agribusiness, civil 
society, and the environmental sciences. She dates the now ubiquitous 
neo-Malthusian narrative of overpopulation in the narrow Nile valley 
to the interwar period and charts the reconstructions of environmental 
imaginaries under postwar Egyptian regimes. During the Nasser period, 
the British environmental imaginary, which focused on irrigation and land 
reclamation for the entire Nile river basin, was partly reconfigured into 
a project of national sovereignty and state populism. In doing this, the 
Nasser regime promoted an intensification of land reclamation, as populist 
rhetoric abounded that called for a new contract with the spatially con-
strained peasantry.
 Originally focused on the outskirts of the Nile Valley, land reclamation 
visions under Nasser, Sowers shows, spread to Egypt’s southwestern desert, 
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designated the “New Valley,” also known as Toshka. Drawing on colonial 
tropes of how spreading irrigation technologies would create a clean and 
productive citizenry, early land reclamation plans were put into practice 
during Nasser’s rule on a small scale with irrigation water pumped from 
underground aquifers. Land reclamation was seized with renewed energy 
under Mubarak, who aimed not only to raise modern organic produce in 
the “pristine desert environment” of the Toshka valley, but also to develop 
the new, clean model Egyptian citizen while enticing private agribusiness to 
Egypt’s agricultural sector. Sowers illustrates that state environmental nar-
ratives in the postcolonial period recombined elements of Anglo-European 
environmental imaginaries with the ideologies of nationalism and populism. 
Equally important, she demonstrates that the environmental imaginaries and 
narratives of less powerful, nonstate, groups can successfully challenge these 
hegemonic discourses in unexpected ways. She sketches how agribusiness 
managers have developed new narratives of land reclamation, motivated by 
Egypt’s changing political economy, that critique the regime’s uncertain land 
tenure policies and unpredictable policy interventions. Moreover, she explains 
how narratives of environmental decline, coupled with criticisms of arbitrary 
decision-making, have allowed environmentalists, journalists, and some pub-
lic intellectuals to claim that the Toshka project represented not the successes, 
but rather the shortcomings, of Mubarak’s authoritarian regime.
 British environmental imaginaries and their transformations also form 
the subject of Priya Satia’s chapter on Iraq during and after the First World 
War. Satia details how the British environmental imaginary of “Arabia,” as 
the region was called then, changed over time facilitating a new techno-
logical vision of development and new colonial policies.22 The imaginary 
was informed by established orientalist notions and biblical interpretations 
but also, importantly, by British misgivings resulting from their trials in the 
South African War and their experiences during World War I. Satia argues 
that the British Arabian imaginary was transformed from an early one of 
the region as a utopia to a more sober view that it was a barren, fallen Eden 
to the later interpretation that it was in need of restoration with British 
imperial knowledge—so that Arabia would once again become the produc-
tive cradle of civilization, a resurrected Babylonia. Such changes in how the 
environment was conceived allowed the fusion of development and sur-
veillance in the form of aerial policing and shelling to bring “peace and 
prosperity” in ways that have been previously unrecognized.
 For the British arriving in Arabia, Satia illustrates that the environ-
ment appeared “extraterrestrial” in its strangeness, “infinitely mysterious,” 
more like the face of the moon than the earth, and, it seemed to them, 
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unknowable. At first seen mostly as a desert paradise free from the defects 
of British industrial urban life, within a short time this environment was 
being condemned as a chaotic wasteland, ruined by the Ottomans, that 
needed to be reclaimed with the aid of British technology and expertise. 
This technical vision of Iraq included irrigation improvements derived 
from the British experience in India, but, more important to Satia’s argu-
ment, it included the development and refinement of aerial surveillance. 
Romantic associations between the fighting tactics of Arab nomads and the 
airplane’s quick abilities provided an interpretation of the airplane as the 
perfect tool to survey the “unmappable nomad terrain” of Mesopotamia. 
The British used this new tool after the war as they took mandatary control 
of the region to subdue the “unruly tribes” with bombardment in order 
to allow the “development” of Iraq to proceed. Deeply ingrained views 
shaped by environmental determinism, though, led to portrayals of the 
tribes as tough inhabitants of a harsh environment that could tolerate ran-
dom acts of violence in ways that others could not. Thus, Satia, concludes, 
was brutality justified in the name of technocratic development that had 
to overcome, in the British Arabian imaginary, a difficult and unknowable 
desert environment and people, a socioecological state of exception that 
haunts our world today.23
 Nearly a century earlier, in North Africa, the French similarly justified 
many colonial policies for dealing with the local populations based in large 
part on their environmental imaginary of the Maghreb. The widespread 
Anglo-European perception of the North African environment in the early 
nineteenth century was one of great fertility that had lapsed under negligent 
Ottoman administration. Soon after the French conquered Algeria in 1830, 
though, they developed a new colonial environmental narrative that blamed 
the local inhabitants, particularly the nomads, for apparently deforesting 
and desertifying the region over the last several hundred years since the 
“Arab invasions.” This colonial narrative, Diana Davis argues in her chap-
ter, was based on the erroneous belief that during the Roman period North 
Africa had been more fertile and much more heavily forested than when 
the French arrived in Algeria. She shows that most French settlers in Alge-
ria, and later in Tunisia and Morocco, developed an identity that claimed 
Roman heritage. Moreover, many of these settlers vehemently believed that 
they had to restore the environment to its former Roman glory with refores-
tation projects and agricultural improvements in order to prove themselves 
the heirs of Rome. That is, their identity hinged in important ways on re-
storing the environment, which they saw as an environment of “self,” to its 
rightful state. This contrasts with the exotic and “abnormal” environmental 
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imaginaries most other imperial/colonial powers constructed of their over-
seas territories. Davis suggests, furthermore, that the perceived need to re-
store the environment to its mythical former fertility also informed certain 
notions of French imperial and, to a certain degree, national identity, espe-
cially in the early twentieth century in ways not previously considered. Their 
colonial environmental history of North Africa allowed many of the French 
to identify themselves as heroes who had restored the ruined environment 
and proved themselves the true heirs of Rome.
 In his chapter, George Trumbull charts what he terms the reimagin-
ing of the Sahara by the French in the era of decolonization, a crucial but 
overlooked component of the economic history of the great desert. Re-
lated, in part, to the environmental narratives described by Davis, Trum-
bull explains that the French vision of the Sahara as a sea of sand, as a 
place danger, of intractable thirst and frequently death, dominated in the 
nineteenth century. Although there was interest in trying to increase both 
water supplies and economic activities in the desert during that time, little 
was achieved. By the mid-twentieth century, though, the French imaginary 
of the Sahara was transformed, according to Trumbull, and reconceived 
as a utilitarian space, as they sought to economically develop the desert 
through mining and petroleum extraction during a period of national cri-
sis. By this time, large amounts of subterranean water had been discovered, 
and this newfound resource generated dreams of populating the Sahara 
with workers and managers complete with cottages and gardens growing 
roses. He calls this a transformation of the environmental representation 
of the great desert one that is essentially a “passage from menace to man-
agement.” In this way, the Sahara, in the French mind, was reconfigured 
for mastery that could prove the grandeur of France even as it was losing 
the battle to control the rest of Algeria. Some even dreamed of eliminating 
the desert altogether, believing that enough irrigation and planting could 
change the climate itself, revealing the widespread underlying belief that 
deserts are “unnatural” aberrations. As Trumbull notes, the local peoples 
who had lived successfully in the Sahara for generations were ignored, as 
was their knowledge of water supplies and environmental management. 
The Algerians, however, had their own imaginary of their environment, in-
cluding the desert. This is implied in the words of the famous nineteenth-
century Algerian freedom fighter, (Abd al-Qâdir, as quoted by Trumbull, “If 
you knew the secrets of the desert, you [the French] would think like me; 
but you are ignorant of them.”
 The chapters discussed up to this point all focus primarily on Western, 
Anglo-European environmental imaginaries of the Middle East and North 
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Africa, how and why they were formed and transformed, and how they 
affected a wide array of subjectivities, policies, and practices. As the ex-
ample from contemporary Egypt shows, successive Egyptian regimes have 
invoked various elements of colonial environmental imaginaries in order 
to further state power and private profit in a variety of sectors including 
agriculture. The chapter by Sowers and that by Trumbull, though, provide 
glimpses of the different environmental imaginaries of more local, non-
Western groups in the Middle East and North Africa in the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries. Do these visions constitute an alternative to what has 
been suggested here as “environmental orientalism”? If they do, what are 
the implications and are they significant? By examining the narratives of 
farmers, government officials, extension agents, and political groups, in 
several Middle Eastern and North African countries, the remaining chap-
ters in the volume provide examples with which we might begin to try to 
explore these questions further.24
 Leila Harris analyzes multiple local narratives of environmental change 
in contemporary southeastern Turkey in order to compare the stories of 
scientists, local, small-scale farmers, and agricultural extension agents. She 
argues that both divergent and convergent narratives, or “story lines,” are 
able to reveal underlying environmental imaginaries. Significantly, Har-
ris shows how important it is to consider such narratives in the context 
of detailed histories of sociopolitical and economic change affecting the 
region at the local, national, and international levels. We find a common 
faith in technoscience shared by all the actors in this example that is widely 
believed to be able to increase the productivity of already good land, rather 
than as a “fix” for previously ruined land. This might be surprising in the 
light of the common Anglo-European imaginary of a degraded Middle 
Eastern and North African environment. As Harris explains, though, it is 
not surprising when one understands the long-standing treatment of the 
Kurds in the region, who aspire to attain “development” on a level with 
the rest of Turkey, or when one understands the desire of the Turkish 
state to be perceived as “modern” by the West to facilitate goals such as 
entry into the European Union. These indigenous voices, marshaling their 
own environmental visions and understandings, offer a “stark contrast to 
general crisis narratives” of resource degradation with foundations in the 
Anglo-European environmental imaginary. For environmental plans to 
succeed, for “sustainable” development to be possible, Harris concludes, 
these voices must be heard and heeded.
 Competing “hydro-imaginaries” of the Jordan River basin form the 
subject of Samer Alatout’s chapter on the construction of the political 
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geography of the river and its lands in the 1950s, just after the creation 
of the state of Israel. Alatout shows very clearly how three different envi-
ronmental imaginaries of the river basin—American, Arab, and Israeli—
fostered three different narratives of hydrological reality with related 
prescriptive policies that in turn legitimized three very different political 
geographies of the region. The Americans employed a naturalizing and 
depoliticizing watershed perspective of the river and its basin that gener-
ated a cooperative planning approach in order to create a strong coalition 
of states able to rebuff anticipated Soviet incursions in the region, thus 
privileging U.S. foreign policy early in the cold war era. The plan of the 
Arab states drew on Arab nationalism and a kind of moral economy of 
water that gave importance to the sources of the Jordan waters, which, 
in turn, justified a pan-Arab politico-environmental approach excluding 
Israel. In its effort to define the Jordan River as a national resource for its 
development, the Israeli state employed an imaginary that was built on a 
highly efficient technonature in which the highest agricultural profit using 
the best technology justified who received water and, important since they 
were eager to pump river water to the Negev desert, where it was delivered. 
The details of the three different narratives analyzed by Alatout provide 
striking examples of how and why different and competing environmental 
imaginaries, hegemonic and local, can be extremely important in national 
and international politics, economics, development, and foreign relations.
 The Palestinian environmental imaginary, as Alatout noted, was ne-
glected in the 1950s water negotiations. This “indigenous” imaginary forms 
a primary subject of analysis, however, for Shaul Cohen in his chapter com-
paring the environmental imaginaries of Palestinians and Israelis in the 
context of nationalism(s) and environmentalism. He shares with Davis an 
interest in how visions of the environment, and how they have changed over 
time, inflect notions of social identity, national and otherwise. Cohen con-
cludes that, for the moment, environmentalism is taking a backseat to other 
much more pressing issues for both the Israelis and Palestinians, such as 
security and national development. He provides, however, revealing details 
on the formulation and deployment of these two competing environmental 
imaginaries. As Cohen details, the Israelis have appropriated much of the 
Anglo-European environmental imaginary of a ruined landscape in need 
of restoration. In this case, the Arabs living under Ottoman administration, 
the Palestinians, are held responsible for degrading the environment, and 
therefore, it is argued, the Israelis are justified in owning the land so as to 
restore its “lost and rightful fertility.” For the Palestinians, in contrast, the 
vision of the environment hinges more on how their former “Palestinian 
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Eden” has been lost and degraded by the creation of Israel, while claiming 
that they are better stewards of the land than are the Israelis. Both sides thus 
wear the “mantle of the victim,” and both form notions of identity with 
claims of superior environmental knowledge and care. They share, then, 
what amount to “nationalist narratives of the environment” and the goal of 
environmental protection. Indeed, as Cohen explains, it was hoped that en-
vironmental protection would help forge Israeli/Palestinian cooperation in 
the optimistic time following the Oslo accords of 1993 that might help lead 
to peace. Instead, resources and energy on both sides have gone into other, 
more urgent, sectors, namely security, while environmental protection has 
been mostly deferred.
 As these three chapters illustrate, alternative, often nationalist, envi-
ronmental imaginaries of the Middle East and North Africa have indeed 
adapted and reconfigured, to a greater or lesser degree, the Anglo-European 
preconceptions of “environmental orientalism.” Their development, like 
their deployment, is dependent on specific historical contexts that must 
be considered when analyzing them and their implications. It must also 
be taken into account, though, that a great deal of “scientific research” on 
the environment in the Middle East and North Africa has been conducted 
by Anglo-Europeans and others steeped in the Western environmental 
imaginary of a ruined landscape. The inaccurate narrative of degradation, 
alongside a valorization of technological fixes, has been incorporated into 
the educational and research systems of the postcolonial Middle East and 
North Africa to a significant degree, just as it has in the global North. As 
some of the chapters in this book show, many people born and raised in 
the region do subscribe to Anglo-European environmental imaginaries to 
varying degrees. What we can’t yet answer, but hopefully future research 
will, is how many people in the region have internalized such environmen-
tal imaginaries, to what degree, and with what results.
 The example of the United Arab Emirates (UAE) provides an in-
teresting opportunity to think about some of the potential implications 
of these questions. If many people in the Middle East and North Africa 
held some sort of common identity as the inhabitants of a degraded or 
desertified environment, what would be the social, political, and economic 
ramifications? The UAE, a federation of seven sheikhdoms on the Gulf 
coast of the Saudi Arabian peninsula, formerly called the Trucial States, 
gained its independence in 1971 after 120 years of British protection. Since 
independence, primarily under the leadership of its first president, Sheikh 
Zayed bin Sultan Al Nayhan (1918–2004), the UAE has maintained an of-
ficial campaign to “roll back the desert,” which constitutes 80 percent of 
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its territory. It has, for example, planted more than one hundred million 
trees and created many parks and “green spaces.”25 In Abu Dhabi, the larg-
est state, the rate of afforestation since 1980 is an astounding 26 percent 
annually.26 In addition, UAE agriculture has been greatly expanded, and 
the sectors of agriculture, afforestation, and parks creation account for at 
least 80 percent of all water consumption.27 This intensive effort to green 
the Emirates, however, has created problems of pollution from fertilizers 
and the overuse of groundwater—over 80 percent of total groundwater has 
already been withdrawn, much of it nonrenewable fossil aquifer water.28 
Desalinization is increasingly being relied on, a technology that is hugely 
energy-intensive and that emits large amounts of CO2 and hot water det-
rimental to marine life. As of 2008, desalinated water provided most of the 
municipal (nonagricultural) water supplies, and treated sewage is increas-
ingly being used to irrigate landscaping.29
 In other sectors, such as real estate development, nature has also been 
“improved,” as in the case of the human-generated archipelago of three 
hundred islands called “the world,” which contains individual islands with 
expensive private villas, or the manipulations of the creek Khor Dubai to 
create a wildlife-filled lagoon with seven artificial islands in the middle of 
the planned “Business Bay” financial center.30 The Palazzo Versace Hotel in 
Dubai has apparently built (or is planning to build) what is claimed to be 
the world’s first refrigerated beach to complement their “chilled public la-
goon pool.”31 In Dubai developers have also built the “largest indoor snow 
park in the world” with five ski runs and conifers apparently growing in the 
winter wonderland.32 The resort has been open since December 2005, and 
in November 2009 they developed the technology to make it snow indoors 
during the day when people are actually skiing, thus bringing “a unique 
sight and environment to people who haven’t been to the mountains of 
Europe.”33 The long-term outcome, though, may include the collapse of 
such mega-projects in Dubai and the rest of the UAE that appear unsus-
tainable if current energy and water consumption trends continue.
 Scholars who have studied these phenomena in the UAE tend to at-
tribute the desire to “green” the emirates partly to the idea that within 
Islamic culture paradise is conceived as a green garden, partly to efforts to 
legitimize state power and boost nation-building, partly to elite desires to 
appear to be a “modern” state, and partly to government and commercial 
interests in attracting Western business and tourism.34 What is less well 
accounted for, however, is the effect of Anglo-European environmental 
imaginaries of a degraded or marginal environment that can be made “bet-
ter” and more “normal” with more vegetation, more water, and “cooling” of 
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the torrid desert sands. The Anglo-European environment in conjunction 
with Western models of consumption and leisure are implicitly and explic-
itly held up as the ideal to attain. This was expressed well by one Emerati 
woman at Ski Dubai not long after it had opened. At the end of a ski run, 
with a big smile on her face, she proclaimed proudly, “Now it is Europe 
here too.”35 In this case, though, unlike many others, blame has not been 
attributed, in any of the official narratives, to a particular human group for 
ruining the environment. President Zayed said, for instance, that “a man 
without resources cannot change a country and so is not to be blamed 
for it. This was the case when our ancestors could not do anything.”36 In 
other parts of the Middle East and North Africa, however, as the chapters 
in this volume attest, this same imaginary has produced repressive policies, 
including forced sedentarization and relocation for groups deemed to be 
environmentally destructive, such as nomads. Critically interrogating the 
environmental imaginaries of the Middle East and North Africa, as this 
volume has begun to do, holds promise for future research that may be 
able to inform more environmentally sustainable and socially equitable 
development in the region.
Figure 0.2. Inside Ski Dubai, where it is kept cold enough to produce snow while out-
side temperatures soar above 100 degrees Fahrenheit. Photo by Keirn OConnor, posted 
to Wikimedia Commons: http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Ski_Dubai_Chair.jpg. 
Licensed for sharing, copying, and distributing.
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cember 2008, online at http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/environment 
/article5338099.ece, last accessed 4 November 2010.
32. For information, photos, and virtual tours, see http://www.skidubai.
com/ski-dubai/resort, last accessed 2 March 2010. It is not clear whether the 
trees are real or ornamental.
33. See anonymous article “Let It Snow at Ski Dubai,” Ski Dubai website, 
http://www.skidxb.com/news/news-2.aspx, last accessed 2 March 2010.
34. For examples, see Ryan and Stewart, “Eco-Tourism,” and Ouis, “Greening.”
35. Quote from a story on the BBC World News television broadcast, 16 
February 2006.
36. Quote from the introductory material of the Zayed Bin Sultan Al Na-
hayan Charitable and Humanitarian Foundation, http://www.zayedfoundation 
.com/home.aspx, last accessed 26 February 2010.
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C h a p t e r  1
“A Rebellion of Technology”
Development, Policing, and the British Arabian Imaginary
Priya Satia
WE HAVE inherited two contrasting images of Iraq. It is, on the one hand, 
the fertile crescent, the everlastingly prolific river valley, the very cradle of 
civilization; and, on the other, the archetypal wasteland, a barren desert 
of glaring sun and bleak horizons testifying at once to man’s and nature’s 
cruelty, a forbidding carapace concealing a curselike bounty of fossil fuel. 
Iraq is the quintessential environmental imaginary, its river-snaked deserts 
a symbol of the intimacy of human creativity and destruction. It is the 
consummate stage for history as morality play.
 This dual image, in the minds of policymakers both local and distant, 
has crucially shaped Iraq’s history, not least the fate of those rivers and 
deserts, up to the devastation wrought by the unholy alliance of today’s 
unending war and drought. In this chapter, I want to explore just how Iraq 
became the site of such dramatic environmental imagining and how, in the 
early twentieth century, British fascination with nature’s strange counte-
nance there ironically produced a colonial state with a narrowly technical 
vision. After examining early British imaginings of “Arabia”1 as a desert 
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utopia free from the ugliness of industrial life, I will show how the pres-
sures of the Great War cast that imaginary in a more forbidding light—the 
barren Iraq. As technology’s tarnished aura began to dazzle once again, 
British personnel in Iraq began to dream of a restored cradle of civiliza-
tion—the prolific Iraq. When British rule officially began in 1919, these im-
ages of a desert utopia and regenerated Babylonia together inspired a new 
application of technology, also understood in a developmental vein: aerial 
control. In this twist of colonial fate, we find the “rebellion of technology” 
that Walter Benjamin saw as the essence of “imperialistic war”: “Instead 
of draining rivers, society directs a human stream into a bed of trenches; 
instead of dropping seeds from airplanes, it drops incendiary bombs over 
cities.”2 In Iraq, a toxic brew of environmental imaginaries fueled technol-
ogy’s rebellion.
 Behind those imaginaries were historically specific British cultural 
needs. It was not merely orientalism that shaped prewar British imaginings 
of a desert utopia but the particular cultural anxieties of the early twen-
tieth century, when the trials of the South African War convinced many 
Britons that their bourgeois nation had strayed from the path of true glory. 
Edwardian Britons saw in Arabia a kind of extraterrestrial utopia happily 
impervious to modern technology and government. In the crucible of the 
next war, however, British cultural anxieties shifted radically and the indul-
gent prewar view morphed into a Faustian determination to remake the 
region, to reconnect this dreamland with the real world and make it a new 
kind of utopia, a resurrected Babylonia. The British empire strove to prove 
to the world that it could overrule the verdict of the Western front, that 
it could show that technology and empire were still constructive forces, 
benign and effective instruments of global improvement.
 In their determination to retrieve this desert imaginary from the bar-
barous illegibility to which the Ottomans had supposedly condemned it, 
the British eventually took to the sky. Particularly after the Iraqi rebellion of 
1920, the airplane became the linchpin of British efforts to at once develop 
and police Iraq—indeed, to collapse those two objectives into a single vision. 
The airplane seemed to them capable of subjecting what they conceived of 
as a flat, featureless terrain to panoptic surveillance, while at once restor-
ing its ancient position as the commercial crossroads of the world. It was in 
Iraq that the bomber was first packaged as the vehicle of peace;3 there, that 
political language took permanent refuge in euphemism, so that, as George 
Orwell noted, “Defenseless villages are bombarded from the air, the inhabit-
ants driven out into the countryside, the cattle machine-gunned, the huts set 
on fire with incendiary bullets: this is called pacification.”4
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 In short, this story reveals the intimate connection between the history 
of the modern discourse and practices of development and surveillance, 
between the welfare state and the warfare state.5 Security—economic, so-
cial, military, political—was the new coin of the imperial realm after World 
War I; and it was in the British mandate of Iraq that it was minted. The 
critical point here is that the technologies of development and security 
share common military-industrial and cultural roots. The modern no-
tion of development did not begin, as is usually assumed, as a primarily 
post–World War II phenomenon in Africa, but earlier, in World War I–era 
Iraq where it underwrote fresh imperial conquest.6 Staking out the land 
of two rivers as a material object was as much a development effort as a 
military one, emerging out of a joint effort to create a particular kind of 
battlefield and to rebuild an ancient granary that might redeem the tech-
nological undoing of civilization during that war. It was only in a fallen 
Eden that the British could articulate a vision of development that did not 
threaten the preservationist ethos that emerged from the wartime critique 
of technology as essentially destructive—even when that vision of “devel-
opment” took the form of aerial policing. The collection of environmental 
imaginaries of Iraq meant that, there, development could be framed as 
preservation, as a restoration of the country’s lost greatness.
Good Desert, Bad Technology
The story starts at the turn of the twentieth century, when Mosul, Basra, 
and Baghdad, three humble provinces of the Ottoman Empire, began to 
engage the attention of British imperial planners with a new intensity. 
Their traditional ally astride the land route to India, the Ottoman Empire, 
had begun to rumble from within as provincial movements for autonomy 
gathered strength. Even more troubling, Germany had begun to rival British 
influence inside the empire, particularly in the stretch from Baghdad to the 
Gulf. In this context, the British government began to plan for the possible 
demise of their long sick friend at the edge of Europe. And this meant 
knowing something about the vast stretch of Asia that they knew quaintly 
as “Arabia,” and which acquired the new name “Middle East” in the course 
of the scholarly and diplomatic conversation they launched.
 Long enchantment with the universally adored childhood tales from 
the Arabian Nights and the Bible radically shaped British efforts to increase 
knowledge about Middle Eastern politics. To the agents, officers, and schol-
ars assigned with the task, Arabia inspired imaginative pleasure above all 
else; once they gained entry to the notoriously forbidden region, they could 
scarcely perceive a real place in real time.7 As an environmental imaginary, 
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it was positively extraterrestrial, simply “uncanny,” in the words of the 
naturalist and agent of the Directorate of Military Operations, Douglas 
Carruthers. He felt “suddenly transplanted to the . . . moon.”8 Just when oc-
cultists were making astral journeys to barren planets with winged guides, 
British travelers in Arabia found themselves beyond the pale of the planet 
they called home.9 It was, to the great relief of those nostalgic for the days of 
pioneer-style Victorian exploration, “Still Unknown.”10 And, most impor-
tant, essentially unknowable: its apparent featurelessness and natural phe-
nomena such as mirage, dust storms, and shifting riverbeds and sand dunes 
made it so protean and deceptive to the British eye that Britons deemed it 
a cartographic impossibility.11 Whatever its actual topographical reality, it 
remained for them something of a desert idyll, “very much the same every-
where.”12 The journalist Meredith Townsend recognized early on that most 
Englishmen, “filled . . . with the ‘idea’ of Arabia,” tended to exaggerate the 
region’s aridity.13 As Peter Brent puts it, Arabia had become “neither more 
nor less than the desert. . . . The landscape had become everything.”14 British 
observers often thought of this separate desert universe as a space out of 
time as much as off the map, a place where they could “step straight from 
this modern age of bustle and chicanery into an era of elemental condi-
tions . . . back into the pages of history to mediaeval times.”15
 On the whole, then, as an environment, Arabia was not, to British 
observers, empirically knowable or fully real. It was beyond “the longest 
arm of the law,”16 a place so “infinitely mysterious . . . misty and unreal, 
incomprehensible . . . unfathomable,” it could not yield facts but might 
restore faith.17 If travel to this otherworldly place numbed the senses, it did 
allow one to “see, hear, feel, outside the senses.”18 Indeed, this was its very 
attraction to the sort of officer and traveler who ventured there, finding 
in intelligence suitably patriotic cover for an escape from Western science, 
which had begun to produce an unsettling sense of human insignificance 
and inexorable cosmic entropy.19 Arabia was a biblical land, a place for 
miraculous conviction, visionary prophets, and extremes of experience.20 
It was not, to them, the kind of place you could discipline in the way that 
European environments were increasingly being disciplined. And this 
was a good thing in the eyes of many Edwardians anxious about Euro-
pean decadence. Mark Sykes, then an honorary attaché at the embassy in 
Constantinople, praised the poetic Arabs for having no place in “civilised 
community”—defined contemptuously as “a community living in towns 
and in houses, suffering from infectious and contagious diseases, travelling 
in railway trains, able to read and write, possessing drinking shops, reading 
newspapers, surrounded by a hundred unnecessary luxuries, possessing 
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rich and poor, slums and palaces, and convinced that their state is the most 
edifying in the world.”21 It was a place that had escaped the affective and 
aesthetic sacrifices demanded by “progress”: Townsend’s influential Asia 
and Europe (1901) mused,
Imagine a clan which prefers sand to mould, poverty to labour, 
solitary reflection to the busy hubbub of the mart, which will 
not earn enough to clothe itself, never invented so much as 
a lucifer match, and would consider newspaper-reading a dis-
graceful waste of time. Is it not horrible, that such a race should 
be? more horrible, that it should survive all others? most hor-
rible of all, that it should produce, among other trifles, the 
Psalms and the Gospels, the Koran and the epic of Antar?22
Arabia was a place that not only did not need development but proved the 
bankruptcy of the very concept. Such notions, so dramatically shaped by 
the cultural anxieties of the Edwardian moment in which the British began 
to think intently about the region of modern-day Iraq, were quickly put 
to the test when Britain went to war against the Ottoman Empire in 1914.
Bad Desert, Good Technology
The Mesopotamia campaign began as a small, Government-of-India 
operation for the defense of Indian frontiers and British interests in the 
Persian Gulf.23 However, once at the Gulf, Indian Army Force D began to 
rapidly advance north along the Tigris and Euphrates rivers in a charac-
teristic effort to shore up what it already held. Baghdad quickly became 
its object, not least because its fabled past ensured that everyone at home 
had heard of it: “It was the Arabian nights.”24 For Britons, the campaign 
might have remained a picturesque subplot of the war’s grand narrative 
but for a monumental failure in the midst of its surge upriver: A reverse at 
Ctesiphon forced the troops under General Charles Townshend to retreat 
to Kut, where they were besieged through the winter of 1915–16. After more 
than twenty thousand troops were lost in botched rescue attempts, nine 
thousand soldiers and thousands of noncombatants surrendered to the 
Turks in April 1916—“the British Army’s greatest humiliation in the First 
World War.”25 The London War Office took control of the campaign, and 
Parliament launched an inquiry. In its report of June 1917, the Mesopota-
mia Commission censured the Indian army and government for their rash 
and ill-advised decision to advance on Baghdad and their inadequate pro-
visioning of the force, particularly with respect to transport and medical 
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facilities.26 Meanwhile the force, supplied by a reformed Indian govern-
ment and led by a new commander, captured Baghdad in October 1917, 
an event hailed as “the most triumphant piece of strategy . . . since war 
started.”27 The troops continued north until they routed the Turks near 
Mosul in October 1918.
 The Indian government’s central role in this drama was the product of 
yet another environmental imaginary: the official perception of the land 
of two rivers as a geographical and political extension of the vast barren 
and tribal world of the North West Frontier.28 Hence the Indian govern-
ment’s initially dilatory attitude toward transport and other provisions; 
frontier wars were by definition exercises in resourcefulness and economy. 
The notion was powerful enough to structure observation on the ground: 
the popular war correspondent Edmund Candler insisted, “The physical 
features of the country are familiar to our Indian troops,” adding, “The 
villages resemble those of the Punjab or the North-West Frontier.”29 The 
Mesopotamia Commission’s report belatedly enlightened the Indian 
authorities that the “climatic and military” conditions of the frontier and 
Mesopotamia were in fact “very different.”30
 To be sure, Mesopotamia’s ties with India were also real: Administra-
tively, the London and Indian governments overlapped in Mesopotamia.31 
The Persian Gulf was the “maritime frontier of the Indian Empire on the 
west,” in Curzon’s formulation.32 Trade, Shia pilgrimage, and the Oudh 
Bequest (which channeled millions of rupees from India to the holy cit-
ies through British mediation) also ensured close ties between India and 
Iraq.33 Moreover, during the war, the Raj reached into all aspects of military 
life in Mesopotamia, extending the fiction of Mesopotamian contiguity.34 
Summary incorporation of Mesopotamia into the Indian geographical 
imaginary did not require much of a conceptual leap.
 This frontier vision strengthened the British view of Mesopotamia as 
a storybook land, an essentially unreal place. As the tragedy of the Western 
front unfolded, the Mesopotamian campaign promised the adventure and 
heroism of old-fashioned imperial adventure. “In exile from the world,” they 
could fight “war as we used to imagine it”; Mesopotamia proved that “in the 
right place war even to-day can be a romance.”35 References to the Arabian 
Nights were on everyone’s lips.36 Mesopotamia promised “release” from the 
killing fields of France into fabled locales,37 the “land of Holy Writ.”38 In let-
ters and memoirs, soldiers described being “immensely moved by the close 
contact” with the Garden of Eden, Ezra’s tomb, the Tower of Babel, Ur of the 
Chaldees, and other Old Testament sites.39 They felt transported to a divine 
land where miraculous natural phenomena were daily occurrences. There, 
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a war correspondent wrote, “you live the story of the Bible, and you do not 
wonder in the least if it is true; you know it is.”40
 But the narrative of imperial adventure also triggered a subtle shift-
ing of the image of an Arabian escape from technology. In the script of 
imperial conquest, Mesopotamia was cast in the role of a colonial heart 
of darkness: a “treeless waste of swamp and desert,” “bleak emptiness to 
conquer,” in Candler’s unminced words.41 A soldier put it pertly: “Adam 
and Eve might well have been excused in such a country.” “Mesopotamia 
welcomes no man,” he concluded.42 Its freedom from the technological 
burdens of modern life, which had made it a refuge for Edwardians, now 
made it a no-man’s-land in its very essence. Its mirages, sandstorms, and 
limitless horizons seemed to overwhelm technology’s meager purchase on 
the country: Camels resembled “huge dissipated compasses” and floating 
ships, infantry became sheep, a motor car became a “few filmy lines,” and 
wagons merely black dots.43 Visual signaling was almost useless in “a fairy-
land that danced and glimmered.”44 Soldiers struggled to observe their fire 
and discern its results.45 The country remained unmapped for much of the 
war, largely because British surveyors found it impossible to map. Official 
intelligence summaries and private reports described rivers that shifted 
course daily, unnavigable marshes, and homes and villages whose locations 
were fleeting at best. Overnight, the ground could change from a land to a 
naval battlefield.46 Mesopotamia was fundamentally remote, “far away from 
home, civilization, and comfort,” in the rueful words of one naval captain.47 
Technology could only improve a land so far from England, so close to God, 
especially after the disaster at Kut, when “the conditions of France were re-
peated in Mesopotamia.”48 As the campaign went badly wrong, the more 
treacherous aspects of its biblical ecology gained ground in British repre-
sentations. “We were in a country of excess, where the elements are never 
moderate or in humour,” wrote Candler, “and there was something almost 
Biblical in the way the deities of this ancient land conspired to punish us . . . 
malice in the sky and soil . . . heat and drought; hunger and thirst and flies; 
damp and cold, fever and ague, flood, hurricane and rain.” At the actual site 
of the Great Flood, these punishments seemed like a “Biblical visitation.”49
 “No-man’s-land,” the war’s most evocative spatial symbol, represented 
technology’s desolation of nature into the heart of darkness in France.50 
But technology maintained a positive image in Mesopotamia, which was 
depicted as a vast, autarkic wasteland, a fallen Eden disconnected from the 
world and its economy that the British had come to rescue from Ottoman 
tyranny. This environmental imaginary excused the military failures. The 
difficulty of using modern boats on the narrow and tortuous rivers north 
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of Al Qurnah was put down to the “idiosyncrasies of the Tigris” rather than 
design errors.51 The Mesopotamia Commission Report echoed that while 
“a river is generally regarded as an admirable line of communication,” the 
Tigris was in a class all its own. It was, in the memorable words of the com-
mander-in-chief, “a very fickle lady who never sleeps two nights running 
in the same bed.”52 Basra, unlike Indian and Egyptian ports, was “only an 
anchorage . . . and beyond—a swamp.” Basra Intelligence catalogued these 
“Physical and Climatic Difficulties of the Mesopotamian Theatre of War,” 
explaining that, “in Iraq all military problems . . . are affected by climate 
and physical conditions to an extent rarely met with in any theatre of war.” 
The Mesopotamia Commission’s report likewise opened with a section on 
the challenges posed by the country’s “Physical and Climatic Peculiari-
ties.”53 The “bad desert” imaginary utterly dominated the postmortem on 
the military difficulties.
 Military failure in Mesopotamia was considered the fault of Mesopo-
tamia, not of British military prowess or modern equipment. Rather than 
lament that technology had paralyzed military activity, those involved in 
the Mesopotamian campaign lamented that military technology was either 
in too short supply or too sophisticated for their backward theater.54 The 
Indian government had failed to provide wire-cutters, water-carts, rockets, 
mosquito nets, periscopes—the stuff of “war carried on under modern 
conditions.”55 In France, Candler noted, the wounded were whisked away 
in “smooth motor ambulance wagons” and provided “every saving device 
that Science can lend,” while in Mesopotamia, “all was chaos.” The cam-
paign’s mobility was a mark of backwardness, frustrating both efficient 
medical service as well as “the business of range-finding and registering, so 
easy in the stationary conditions on the Western front,” however fruitless 
the ability in those conditions.56 Modern warfare had come to mean the 
mobile supply of an army immobilized in a clearly demarcated battlefield. 
With hindsight, Mesopotamia’s early mobility appeared a travesty of mod-
ern warfare rather than an escape from it; the country, and consequently 
the campaign, was simply not developed enough.
 The force’s successes after Kut strengthened faith in technology as en-
abling rather than paralyzing. The trench warfare following the siege was 
the campaign’s rite of passage to a modernity no longer diminished by its 
colonial quality; after the War Office takeover and the Indian government’s 
technological transfers, “bloody, remorseless trench fighting . . . was a thing 
of the past.” Armed with all the paraphernalia of modern warfare, they now 
waged “war as it should be waged, with the spirit of movement in it, the 
new scenes a background to the drama of battle.”57 At Ctesiphon, a naval 
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officer mused on the great armies and historic figures that “had passed 
this way before the coming of men in khaki, with their aeroplanes and 
wireless.”58 Defying the wisdom from France, that “modern warfare” had 
rendered long advances impossible without “a certain calculated sacrifice 
which is generally prohibitive,” here the British were modern and yet highly 
mobile.59 The ad hoc solutions to the practical problems posed by Mesopo-
tamian topography marked the campaign as uniquely inventive, similarly 
heralding a warfare of the future: “All the five arms of the Force—the Navy, 
Cavalry, Infantry, Artillery, and Flying Corps—were working together in 
a way that was new in war,” enthused Candler.60 The campaign suggested 
that trench warfare was not the last stop of modern warfare, that stalemate 
could end, and that war might still be a productive enterprise. If technol-
ogy’s dark side was exposed in France, a new aspect of it was unveiled in 
Iraq: in the hands of “experts,” it could resurrect a military campaign and, 
at once, a devastated civilization. Thus, during the war, British imaginings 
about Mesopotamia as a romantic, otherworldly, autarkic land underwrote 
a positive image of technology at a moment when technology’s image was 
cracking elsewhere. Those imaginings staked out Mesopotamia as the con-
summate site of modern technological development.
Reclaiming the Cradle of Civilization
And so, India sent iron, steel, and timber for the construction of river 
embankments, wharves, docks, bridges; also dredgers for canal construc-
tion; railroad and electrical plant; telegraphic and telephonic equipment; 
engines; vehicles; boats; machinery; labor; and experts. Basra became 
a “a hive of industry.”61 In August 1917, days before his famous declara-
tion that the British government was in favor of responsible government 
in India, Edwin Montagu described to Parliament how Indian resources 
“were gradually changing the appearance of the country and eradicating 
the blight of Turkish misrule.”62
 With the constructive vision of technology erected in the environmen-
tal imaginary of a wasteland, the campaign soon claimed redemption of 
the cradle of civilization as its true calling. The abject failure at Kut had 
raised the stakes of the campaign. Mesopotamia was represented less as 
a miserable backwater, a mere “side-show,” and more as the place where 
war could find meaning, less an escape from industrialism than the prov-
ing ground for industry and empire. By “reclaim[ing] a wilderness” and 
“rebuild[ing] a civilization after many years of anarchy and desolation” for 
“a new country and a new people, “the force determined to give meaning 
to the sacrifices of British soldiers, explained one officer. Theirs was the 
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blessed task of revitalizing not just any civilization but one of “mysterious 
and divine” origins. Gertrude Bell, then a powerful force in the British civil 
administration, confessed feeling “rather like the Creator.”63 In a terrain 
hallowed by its past and by the sacrifice of British lives, Britons constructed 
a new imperial identity that could even explain away the, retrospectively 
charming, missteps that had landed them in such a Great War in the first 
place. A sailor wrote in 1917:
We Britons spend our lives in making blunders, and give our 
lives to retrieve them. But . . . the dawn has come, and with it 
the confident assurance that in this new burden of Empire—the 
task of restoring Mesopotamia to her former prosperity—the 
generations to come will gain inspiration from the long chroni-
cle of heroic deeds which make up the story of her deliverance. 
The lives of Britain’s sons have not been sacrificed in vain.
The British were the bearers of a new “dawn” for Iraqis—and for Britons.64
 Whereas the Indian government saw the region as an indivisible 
part of its domain, many in Britain saw it as a fallen frontier of the West; 
indeed many Arabists, who had long romanticized Arabs as a naturally 
free and democratic people akin to the “freeborn Englishman,” fought 
bitterly against the Indianization of the nascent colony.65 Rather than 
“unchanging,” wartime representations stressed that this bit of the East 
had metamorphosed from a locus of secular power and worldly riches 
tightly bound to Hellenistic-Christian culture to a “sordid relic.” “When 
European Christendom looks to-day at the desolation of these lands,” 
wrote the historian Edwyn Bevan, “it is looking at a lost piece of itself.” 
Technology promised to precipitously reconnect Mesopotamia with the 
rest of the world after Kut revealed how dangerous its utopic autarky was. 
Restoring Mesopotamia’s position along the great artery of commercial 
traffic was a development goal born of military failure. The object of the 
campaign was nothing less than a “regenerated Babylonia, in which the 
ancient streams reflect once more mighty structures of men and gardens 
like Paradise, and in the streets of whose cities traffickers from all the earth 
once more meet.” Man would once again be “master of the great waters,” 
prophesied Bevan, and the wanton destruction wrought by feckless and 
savage imperial tyrants since the Mongol invasion brought to an end. The 
British would resurrect an older imperial tradition of improvement, the 
tradition of the Persians, Seleucids, Parthians, Sassanides, and the Saracen 
caliphs.66 British personnel dreamt of Mesopotamia’s restored position 
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as a supplier of cotton and wheat.67 The conviction that they could not 
possibly worsen such a derelict land made the steady grind of imperial 
administration especially reassuring.68 These were by no means idiosyn-
cratic or private views; in Parliament, Robert Cecil, assistant secretary 
of state for foreign affairs, earnestly praised the “very satisfactory progress 
. . . being made . . . in redeeming [Mesopotamia] from the state of ruin 
into which it had fallen under the Turks.”69
 In short, developing Mesopotamia was hailed as an act of restoration, 
not transformation, a refitting of the ancient land with modern technology 
that would enable it to resume its traditional role in a modern world. And 
so we witness the birth of yet another environmental imaginary, a vision 
of a restored cradle of civilization. Technologies such as dams, aircraft, 
and roads would not only produce battlefields from Mesopotamia’s dis-
ordered landscape but also produce Mesopotamia itself as a geographical 
and political object. They would both improve the fabulous and terrible 
country and bring it within the realm of the knowable, within the pale of 
the economy that development sought to make.
 The project of reclaiming Mesopotamia and rejoining it to a prosper-
ous West seemed to some to invest the entire war with meaning. In an 
essay much circulated among the troops, Bell described how, once again, 
the ancient markets of Iraq would thrive and would “add immeasurably 
to the wealth of a universe wasted by war,” besides providing new fields 
for European industry.70 “Nowhere, in the war-shattered universe,” she 
held, “can we begin more speedily to make good the immense losses sus-
tained by humanity.” Candler too found it “comforting to think that the 
war which had let loose destruction in Europe was bringing new life to 
Mesopotamia.”71 And in this global salvation lay the salvation of the British 
Empire. An officer confided to a fellow combatant,
All this show of ours out here is . . . a beginning of something 
that will materialise a hundred or two hundred or a thousand 
years hence. We are the great irrigating nation and that’s why 
we’re here now. . . . We’ll fix this land up . . . and move the 
wheels of a new humanity. Pray God, yes—a new humanity! 
One that doesn’t stuff itself silly with whisky and beef and beer 
and die of apoplexy and high explosives.72
Mesopotamia proved that the British could still civilize, if they had lost 
civilization itself. General A. G. Wauchope saw in the advance on Baghdad 
the apotheosis of the British imperial dream:
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Watching these columns of Englishmen and Highlanders, of 
Hindus, Gurkhas and bearded Sikhs advancing [within sight 
of the Median Wall], one felt the conviction that this struggle 
was being fought for the sake of principles more lofty, for ends 
more permanent, for aims less fugitive, for issues of higher ser-
vice to the cause of humanity, than those that had animated the 
innumerable and bloody conflicts of the past. 73
The cultural resonances of the cradle of civilization and the land of the 
Bible infused his imperial ideal with even greater moral fire. The fall of 
Baghdad in 1917 inspired wonder and hope: it was no ordinary city, but, 
many pointed out, a place “famous for the men and armies that had crossed 
it.”74 By crossing it, the British too had achieved epoch-making imperial 
greatness; far from bankrupt, the empire had finally arrived.
 To Britons in Mesopotamia, their efforts provided a fitting rebuke 
to the growing number of anti-imperialists at home and abroad. “British 
seed” would make the desert “bloom as the rose,” an officer announced to 
those “fluent decriers of their own country” who called empire “a thing of 
pitiless blood and iron.”75 As in Egypt and Punjab, explained Mark Sykes 
in an official note, here too the British imperial ideal was “not . . . conquest 
but . . . redemption.”76 The imaginary of a developed Mesopotamia offered 
proof of the strangely selfless and attractive nature of British imperialism: 
“Truly we are a remarkable people,” Bell mused. “We save from destruction 
remnants of oppressed nations, laboriously and expensively giving them 
sanitary accommodation, teaching their children, respecting their faiths,” 
yet remain cursed by subjects, who, nevertheless, “when left to themselves 
. . . flock to our standards. . . . It’s the sort of thing that happens under the 
British flag—don’t ask us why.” British occupation was thus exempt from 
the sins ordinarily associated with such a regime. Montagu pointedly re-
marked in Parliament, “It was interesting to compare British occupation in 
Mesopotamia with German occupation in Belgium. (Hear, hear.)” Survey-
ing “the sound and colour of the reviving world,” Bell felt she was “really 
part of Mesopotamia and not part of an army of occupation.”77 Moreover, 
the prodigious Indian effort for Mesopotamia proved, according to an ex-
ultant parliamentary paper, that even Indians knew Britain ruled them for 
their good, and not for exploitation.78
 This mix of heady rhetoric and mundane technocratic activity was 
typical of a moment in the formation of British imperial identity when, as 
Robert Colls has put it, “The traditions of an ancient realm were held aloft 
to signify Englishness to the world, while behind all that it was understood 
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that modern men ran the business.”79 The return of a king to the Baghdad 
of Haroun was one thing, “but,” one sentimental American noted a decade 
after the war,
in the shadows beside the dais stand men in green-brown uni-
forms—blue-eyed men of a tribe that [earlier] had no stand-
ing in Arabia. . . . Angles they call these men, and they are not 
like the other conquerors who flowed into Iraq with sword and 
torch in the days whose record may be read in the ash piles 
along the Tigris. They are children—fussy children—eternally 
worried over the removal of rubbish, the “improvement” of roads 
and bridges that for hundreds of years served our ancestors . . . 
the disciplining of the police force and what not.
Efficient as these imperial professionals were, they were not Orwell’s 
famously lamented dull “clerks” of the 1920s, the “well-meaning, over-
civilized men, in dark suits,” prefiguring his nightmare vision of bureau-
cracy. The sentimental American concluded, “The flying carpet of the 
Cairo air-mail has come to rest in the landing field beyond Hinaidi and 
a sergeant is inspecting its hot motors. . . . Who can say that romance is 
dead in a spot such as this . . . ?”80 These new joiners were rather “young 
men of spirit,” looking for adventure in the postwar world, inspired by 
the recuperative vision of technology in the Middle East. So warmly did 
the light of hope glow in Mesopotamia in the dimly lit postwar world that 
soldiers at a loose end sought transfer there to find an assuredly construc-
tive role. James Mann, an aspiring political officer (who would be killed 
in the rebellion later that year), reasoned with his mother, “If one takes 
the Civil Service, or the Bar, or Literature, or Politics, or even the Labour 
movement, what can one do that is constructive? Here on the other hand I 
am constructing the whole time.”81
 Thus, British officials, journalists, and politicians claimed a special 
status for the new colony—it was the site for imperial expiation through 
technocratic development. Of course, there were early enthusiasts of devel-
opment in other parts of the empire as well, but Iraq’s special relevance as a 
site for articulation of this vision of empire was guaranteed by representa-
tions of it as the fallen cradle of civilization where development would hail 
a new age of miracles. In India, by contrast, signs of wartime moderniza-
tion were most often viewed as a violation of the colony’s romantic aura, 
betokening social, cultural, and political chaos.82 The idea of developing 
Iraq did not raise the preservationist fears of rapid economic change 
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upsetting indigenous social and political order that otherwise tended to 
undermine the fulfillment of visionary wartime plans for colonial develop-
ment.83 Although in practice development focused on activities, such as the 
settlement of tribes and provision of transportation, that would make Iraq 
a supplier of raw materials for industrial Britain rather than an industrial 
nation in its own right, there even this limited notion of colonial develop-
ment implied something grander. There, the ability to produce primary 
goods was not the mark of backwardness but of the country’s resurgence 
as a glorious imperial entrepôt. Proponents of Iraq’s development claimed 
more exalted goals than Joseph Chamberlain had at the turn of the cen-
tury when as colonial secretary he had unsuccessfully pushed investment 
of state funds for colonial development.
 Certainly, the very existence of British-Indian technical expertise in 
transforming nature was predicated on past exercises in imperial develop-
ment, such as the river projects in India and Egypt.84 Indeed, like Egypt, 
Mesopotamia was constituted as a geographical and political entity centered 
on the basic developmental “problem” of an ancient river system ringed by 
desert and a backward population.85 But the wartime development of Iraq 
differed from these antecedents—and from, say, state management of pov-
erty in Britain—in the totality of its ambition, in its positing of an entire 
proto-nation-state as its object.86 It was in wartime Mesopotamia that the 
“technoscience” Timothy Mitchell has described first evolved on a national 
scale to “improve the defects of nature, to transform peasant agriculture, 
to repair the ills of society, and to fix the economy.”87
 Much of the early hope was ultimately disappointed after the war. In 
1919, Britain demanded that the new League of Nations award them the 
mandate to rule Iraq as compensation for British sacrifices for the coun-
try’s development,88 reconfiguring a war of conquest as an international 
development effort. (The geographical sleight-of-hand that blurred Meso-
potamia into India helped justify [even disguise] this imperial addition as 
yet another frontier annexation shoring up the territory already held.) The 
Iraqis, of course, never bought the mandate scheme; to them, it was a flimsy 
semantic disguise for colonial rule, and from 1920 to 1932 when they finally 
joined the League as a nominally independent nation, they continually 
forced the British to rename and reframe their relationship. Meanwhile, 
many of the developmental projects the British undertook (mainly, after 
all, to serve the needs of the army) were quickly abandoned, partly because 
of financial stringency and partly because, after the Iraqi rebellion of 1920, 
air control more or less hijacked the development discourse—anticolonial 
rebellion triggering the “rebellion of technology.”89
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Watching the Cradle Rock
The airplane ultimately emerged as the joint focus of developmental and 
disciplinary discourses about Iraq in this period. Aircraft were ubiquitous 
in Mesopotamia after Kut. As a new technology with their own otherworldly 
mystique, they became intimately associated with the Mesopotamian site of 
exception. As a 1921 cabinet paper put it, “Great as was the development of 
air power in the war on the western front, it was mainly concerned with 
aerial action against enemy aircraft and co-operation with other arms. . . . 
In more distant theatres, however, such as Palestine, Mesopotamia and East 
Africa the war has proved that the air has capabilities of its own.”90 Why did 
this most quintessentially modern technology strike British officials as so 
peculiarly suited to the romantic wasteland of Mesopotamia?
 British Arabists were fervent proponents of airpower. To them, it, like 
the innovative deceptions and irregular warfare it supported, were par-
ticularly suited to a Middle Eastern environment. Attracted to Arabia as 
a medieval utopia, they saw in the airplane a means of restoring chivalry 
and vitality to modern warfare.91 Airpower also seemed to offer a means 
of overcoming the information problems posed by an unmapped desert; 
a bird’s-eye view promised vision beyond the mirages, sandstorms, and 
horizonlessness that bedeviled two-dimensional observation. Picturing 
Mesopotamia as a uniformly featureless terrain, a sort of giant aerial field, 
Figure 1.1. Flying Over the Desert at Sunset, Mesopotamia. 1919. By Sydney W. Carline. 
The romance of desert flight as envisioned by a popular artist just after World War I. 
Reproduced with the permission of the Imperial War Museum, London, UK.
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political officers pined, “Oh for some aeroplanes. If there was a country in 
the whole world eminently suited to these machines this one is: Flat flat as 
your hand.”92 Since “in Mesopotamian battles, little can be trusted that is 
seen,” explained General Wauchope, “commanders are bound to rely on 
reports by aeroplane, messengers, and telephones.”93 Aerial photography 
reached its highest development in Mesopotamia, as did air signalling.94
 Underlying this burgeoning new military science was a sense that air-
craft were existentially suited to this region. Over the austere terrain of 
the biblical deserts flight seemed to reach new heights of sublimity and 
even divinity.95 British Arabists perceived a basic congruence between the 
liberty of action of the aircraft and the desert warrior, both operating in 
empty, unmapped, magical spaces. T. E. Lawrence, who had searched in 
Bedouin warfare for an alternative to the anonymous mass slaughter of the 
Western front, prophesied, “What the Arabs did yesterday the Air Forces 
may do to-morrow. And in the same way—yet more swiftly.” Both could 
move beyond mere concentration of force and replace it with “an intan-
gibly ubiquitous distribution of force—pressing everywhere yet assailable 
nowhere.”96 He joined the Royal Air Force in 1922, seeing in it the same 
sort of literary potential as the desert sublime.97 His views were echoed 
by other Arabists and in the RAF.98 “There appears to be a sort of natural 
fellow-feeling between these nomad Arabs and the Air Force,” remarked 
Robert Brooke-Popham, the RAF’s director of research. “Perhaps both feel 
that they are at times in conflict with the vast elemental forces of nature.”99 
The “desert with all its mysterious fascination” had “an unreal atmospheric 
quality comparable with the sky. Perhaps,” pondered a wing-commander, 
“this is why people call it ‘The Blue.’ ”100
 Within this discourse about aircraft as a nomad technology ideally 
suited to rendering a nomad terrain legible lurked an awareness of their 
uses in controlling that terrain.101 By annihilating the distances that other-
wise kept nomadic tribes beyond the reach of any state’s scrutiny, aircraft 
seemed to possess “enormous political possibilities”: When the Mesopota-
mian tribes the British liberated “[got] out of hand and require[d] a lesson,” 
officials found that “an aerial raid with bombs and machine guns often 
has an overwhelming and sometimes an instantaneous effect in inducing 
submission.”102 Such experiments revealed to the Cabinet aircraft’s uses in 
the “attack and dispersal of considerable bodies of ground troops.”103
 Those lessons were put to use immediately after the war in 1919 when 
aircraft and bombs were employed against unrest all over the Eastern em-
pire. But notions of Iraq’s peculiar suitability made it the only colony where 
airpower became a permanent instrument of imperial administration and 
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policing.104 The RAF officially took over in October 1922, although it had 
become the dominant military force from the rebellion. It commanded 
eight squadrons of fighters and light bombers, four armored-car units, and 
several thousand Iraq Levies. Army garrisons were gradually reduced to 
protect only the nine RAF bases equipped with wireless telegraphy. The 
short range of most available aircraft made advanced landing grounds and 
emergency fuel and bomb dumps crucial to the system. The RAF patrolled 
the country from a network of bases, bombarding villages and tribes as 
needed to put down unrest and subversive activities. Air action was used 
against Turkish and Najdi raiders into Iraq (at a time when frontiers were 
a work in progress) as well as Kurdish and Arab rebellions within Iraq 
proper.105 It was in Iraq that the British first practiced, if never perfected, 
the technology of bombardment; there that they first attempted to fully 
theorize the value of airpower as an independent arm of the military. 
Reasons of cost and topography mattered, of course, but it was cultural 
imaginings about the place of airpower in the cradle of civilization that 
made Iraq, rather than any other place, the first site of “air control.”106
 British Arabists, unsurprisingly, were enthusiastic supporters of the 
scheme. Lawrence dated his conviction that “aircraft could rule the desert” 
to the war.107 He, Arnold Wilson (the civil commissioner in Iraq), and other 
Arabist officials were important influences on Winston Churchill, postwar 
secretary of war and air. In 1921, as colonial secretary, Churchill inducted 
Lawrence and his colleagues from the Middle Eastern wars, Reader Bul-
lard, Hubert Young, and Richard Meinertzhagen, into a new Middle East 
Department, where they deemed Mesopotamia peculiarly suitable for air 
operations, better than Europe, for aesthetic as much as topographical 
reasons—the power of the environmental imaginary: Mesopotamia’s pre-
sumed flatness promised many landing grounds, little cover to insurgents, 
and the possibility of “radiating” British power throughout the country 
from a handful of fittingly spartan bases, while the reality of its varied and 
protean topography, when acknowledged, was held to offer ideal training 
for the RAF, exposing it to every sort of terrain—mountains in Kurdistan, 
marshes in the south, riverain territory in between, and so forth. Air ac-
tion was deemed inappropriate for police action in the densely populated 
urban environments of Britain, Ireland, and even Palestine.108 Lawrence 
insisted, “The system is not capable of universal application.”109
 But the imaginary was, after all, imaginary: Despite the promise of 
omniscience, the regime was plagued by reports of pilot disorientation, 
visibility problems, and instances “of quite inexplicable failures to identify 
such objects as columns of Armoured cars . . . and even whole sections of 
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bedouin tribes on the move.”110 Aircraft often bombed the wrong targets.111 
Insurgents found cover in watercourses, hillocks, and other features of the 
allegedly “featureless” landscape.112 Even assessing the effect of bombing 
operations was “largely a matter of guesswork.”113
 However, in an infamously deceptive land, all this inaccuracy, indeed 
information itself, was deemed of little consequence: Arnold Wilson ex-
plained that complaints about RAF observation failures were necessarily 
exaggerated, as was all information in the country, not least because the 
mirage prevented anyone from judging the accuracy of a pilot on high. 
Second, in the end, the accuracy issue was moot, since aircraft were meant 
to be everywhere at once, “conveying a silent warning.” This “moral effect” 
of patrolling aircraft “which can drop Bombs whenever necessary would 
effectually check disturbances.”114 Even destruction of “property” did not 
matter as it might in an advanced civilization, given the austerity of tribal 
existence, a condition imagined to extend to all Iraqis.115 Richard Mein-
ertzhagen, wartime intelligence chief now at the Colonial Office, assured 
his colleagues in Iraq, “Bombs dropped on men in the open seldom have 
much effect beyond fright,” and advised dropping the matter of results as 
aerial observation of casualties was “always misleading.”116
 Moreover, the experts assured, desert inhabitants in a biblical land 
expected harsh existence; they could tolerate random acts of violence in 
a way that others could not.117 In 1932, at the disarmament conference in 
Geneva, the British High Commissioner in Iraq assured his colleagues 
that unlike the outrages inevitably committed by ground troops, “bomb-
ing from the air is regarded almost as an act of God.”118 Lawrence likewise 
strove to explain the “impersonally fateful” nature of air bombing from an 
Arab’s point of view: “It is not punishment, but a misfortune from heaven 
striking the community.”119 The perception of environmental excesses that 
had inspired an effort to join this biblical land to the modern world in 
the name of civilization simultaneously underwrote the notion that it 
could tolerate a level of brutality no other place could, also in the name of 
civilization.
 This cavalier attitude rendered casualties entirely, well, casual: “If the 
Civil Commissioner is going on to Mosul,” read a General Headquarters 
telegram to Wilson, “will he be so kind as to drop a bomb on Batas”—the 
sort of kindness he apparently never objected to.120 So, despite innumerable 
reported errors, the air control experiment was pronounced entirely suc-
cessful in “this kind of turbulent country.”121 From Iraq, air control spread 
to Palestine, Transjordan, and elsewhere, albeit in modified version.122 In its 
Iraqi cocoon, the RAF was safe from criticism of its accuracy, protected by 
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the British imaginary of a place so otherworldly it was beyond empirical 
verification. Current historiography has remained captive to this imagi-
nary, claiming air control actually worked in desert regions as opposed to 
India, East Africa, and so on, because deserts have “clearly defined, com-
pletely visible targets and little possibility of cover.”123
 The misperception proved horrifically costly in Iraqi lives. “Recalci-
trant” tribes, which included not only those attacking British communi-
cations and personnel but also those refusing to pay taxes, were bombed 
into submission. Entire villages were bombed for “general recalcitrance” 
(refusal to submit to government), harboring wanted rebel leaders, and 
evading the high rates of British taxation.124 In Iraq, the RAF found valida-
tion as a service and experience that it applied more notoriously in World 
War II. In short, the environmental imaginary of land so barren that 
bombardment could not possibly worsen it was crucial to the history of 
bombardment as a military strategy. The vindication of air control grew 
out of racism but also long-circulating imaginings of a land miraculously 
exempt from the this-worldliness that constrained human activity in other 
parts of the world. Arabia’s legendary otherworldliness made it fit to bear 
the unearthly destruction wreaked by bombers. The environmental imagi-
nary of Iraq was the foundation of Britons’ understanding of the moral 
world of Arabia as radically distinct from their own. The “most extraor-
dinary and romantic” world of the RAF in Iraq compounded the sense of 
being in a place apart, only tenuously linked to “civilisation.” The regime’s 
miraculous wireless infrastructure and rumors of Lawrence’s presence 
only fed the Arabian mystique.125 Thus, Arabia offered the air staff a means 
of selling the new warfare to the public by exhibiting it in a fabulous land, 
a world apart, where the destruction wrought by bombardment was sub-
merged in the desert sublime.126 British officials may have found Arabia 
extraterrestrial, but it was their technological innovations that ultimately 
produced the surreal world of random bombardment in which Iraqis were 
condemned to live, literally removing Iraq beyond the reach of secular and 
humanitarian law.
 Crucially, this policing regime was understood in the same develop-
mental vein as the wartime infrastructure projects. Air control, its defend-
ers argued, facilitated greater understanding between administrators and 
Iraqis by enabling British personnel to roam without fear (and, inciden-
tally, gather the intelligence that would guide future bombardments).127 
Moreover, airpower’s supreme role in the country had made Baghdad the 
“Clapham Junction of the air,” at last fulfilling that noble dream of remak-
ing an ancient cosmopolitan crossroads.128 Far from disruptive, aircraft 
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were a fitting gesture to the agelessness of the Orient, enthused the Times, 
recalling the sorcerers who, once upon a time, had made Sindbad the Sailor 
turn airman on the back of a great bird. Motorcars too were like “snorting 
land monsters which rush across the deserts.” “Naturally, the inhabitants 
take these things as a matter of course,” assured the paper, for “the age of 
miracles has happily returned, and we may see strange Arabian nights in the 
coming years.”129 Clio would return as Baghdad’s lingering aura of mystery 
was “violated by the whirring wheels . . . of trains, of cars, of aeroplanes.”130 
Aircraft also exercised a more traditional civilizing effect by demonstrat-
ing the advanced state of British civilization. The famous furrow ploughed 
across the desert to guide pilots to Baghdad was lauded as a feat of British 
ingenuity. The “romance” of desert flight derived from the “demonstration 
of the power of modern inventions which are able to conquer vast open 
spaces of the world, as yet little known to civilised man”—technology re-
mained the handmaiden of progress.131 The air afforded a lofty view from 
which to observe the effects of the new loftier imperialism, to witness, in 
the words of the Illustrated London News, “adoring Asia kindle and hugely 
bloom.”132 (It also fittingly revealed the otherwise invisible traces left by 
their ancient imperial forebears.) Aerial surveillance and disciplining fit 
neatly into this vision of liberal empire in the sky. Flying over the desert, 
Hubert Young of the Foreign Office, “felt that a new era had dawned, and 
that with the goodwill of His Majesty’s Government and the powerful help 
of the Royal Air Force the Arabs of Iraq would undoubtedly win their in-
dependence at last.”133
 If these arguments did not convince, others claimed a dose of repres-
sion would pave the way to gentler improvements. A wing commander 
argued irresistibly, “The cheaper the form of control the more money for 
roads and development and the sooner it will be no longer necessary to 
use armed forces to do with explosives what should be done by police-
men and sticks.”134 Although some, like George Buchanan, wartime head 
of river conservation, considered the abandonment of wartime projects 
“a tragedy of heroism, suffering, wasted lives, and wasted effort,”135 others 
saw in air control the salvation of the wartime hopes for a global payoff 
from the Mesopotamian adventure. The development of the geographical 
center of the world’s most ancient and most modern traffic routes would 
“safeguard humanity from famines, wars, and social revolution,” insisted 
postwar stalwarts.136 The press and politicians continued to urge develop-
ment of Iraqi resources on the premise that “a country once so rich may 
surely be made rich again by modern methods,” stubbornly anticipating 
“some recompense for the great sacrifices we made in the Great War.”137
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 Thus, the Middle East, “the Land of the RAF,” became as essential to 
British preeminence in airpower as airpower was to Britain’s ability to 
control the Middle East. After the so-called independence of Iraq in 1932, 
the RAF kept key elements of Iraqi defense—aircraft, wireless, armored 
cars, intelligence sources—out of the hands of the nascent Iraqi army.138 
For them, Iraq’s independence was decidedly “more apparent than real.”139 
Squadrons were reduced gradually, but the country was reoccupied during 
the Second World War, and the RAF departed only in 1958.
IN BRITAIN, the early-twentieth-century imaginary of Mesopotamia 
inspired an understanding of colonialism as a vehicle for technocratic 
developmentalism. But encompassed within that concept were modern 
tactics of violent surveillance. Benjamin might have diagnosed a rebellion 
of technology, but this story suggests development and policing are two 
sides of the same technocratic coin, the joint ends of the modern welfare/
warfare state, sharing common military-industrial roots. Frantz Fanon 
noted this more sinister face of development long ago: “Raftways across 
the bush, the draining of swamps and a native population which is non-
existent politically and economically are in fact one and the same thing.”140 
This is not, of course, to suggest that development offers no desirable end 
but to highlight its more sinister political uses in the hands, particularly, of 
autocratic states and global institutions. Environmental imaginaries have 
been critical to the creation of what Edmund Burke called “geographical 
morality,” the notion that the peculiarities of place license departure from 
universalist principles of law and humanity for exceptional technologies 
and rules. The environmental imaginary is what has made Iraq an appar-
ently permanent state of exception in official minds.
 In the British episode lie the roots of the Iraqi state’s long fetishizing 
of technological solutions to political and social problems, including Sad-
dam Hussein’s simultaneously developmentalist and punitive obsessions 
with draining the southern marshes. Restoration of those wetlands has 
remained a low priority for the post-2003 occupying governments of Iraq, 
who, like the British earlier, have diverted technocratic expertise to a truly 
Orwellian pacification effort, unleashing an environmental emergency 
with dire consequences for human and wildlife in the region. There is, on 
the one hand, the detritus of war—unexploded mines and shells, many 
laced with carcinogenic radioactive chemicals—and, on the other, the sew-
age, oil, and other hazardous waste released into the air, soil, and water by 
bombed-out infrastructure and industrial plants. Hanging over the whole 
disaster is a desperate lack of water.141
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 As Timothy Mitchell has noted, the supposed abject aridity, mineral 
wealth, and lack of natural national cohesion of the entire region of the 
Middle East pose the canonical developmental problem.142 Certainly, our 
environmental imaginary of Iraq in particular has evolved. We have, for in-
stance, broken the old habit of blurring it into India—although President 
Bush nearly resurrected it with his certainty that Afghanistan’s Al Qaeda 
was in Iraq—and oil figures more prominently than grain in images of 
Iraq’s share of global wealth. But the image of an autarkic, hermetic desert 
that forbids modern ideas and goods continues to tempt those dreaming 
of a regenerated Babylonia, and the years of sanctions and occupation 
in pursuit of that imperial folly have helped make the image of autarky 
something of a reality. With drones overhead, Iraq is once again the site of 
a first in the history of aerial technology. Like the British army decades ago, 
today’s American occupiers speak a development language that constitutes 
itself as a neutral form of knowledge standing apart from its object, Iraq, 
despite their own role in producing its current devastation.
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Restoring Roman Nature
French Identity and North African Environmental History
Diana K. Davis
FRENCH COLONIAL occupation and expansion across North Africa 
in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries were closely connected with a 
widespread belief that the French were the heirs of Rome. Although the 
importance of the Roman legacy for several French colonial actions has 
been recognized, for example in the military, the agricultural sector, and 
identity formation among the French living in North Africa, the sig-
nificance of its impact for thinking about the relationship between the 
environment and identity has not been widely explored. This essay sug-
gests that the imperative of restoring what was incorrectly perceived as 
a deforested and desertified environment to its mythical former fertility 
under Roman administration became, for certain segments of the French 
population, an integral part of notions of French imperial and, to a certain 
degree, national identity.
 The belief that the environment, assumed to have been ruined by the 
“natives,” had to be restored was especially widespread among the French 
colonists in Algeria and later in Tunisia and Morocco, as well as in the co-
lonial lobby in the metropole. For many, the allegedly degraded landscape 
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threatened to defeat the colonial project and to debase European civiliza-
tion in the Maghreb. The restoration of the environment through massive 
reforestation and other environmental improvement projects was seen as 
crucial to the survival of the French and other Europeans in North Africa. 
It was commonly argued, for instance, that since Roman civilization could 
not have flourished if North Africa had not had a forest cover of at least 
30 percent, the French must reforest the region. Equally important, agri-
culture must be improved with French methods in order to re-create the 
granary of Rome. European experiences with nature in other parts of the 
world, experiences that were generally efforts to tame a wild and threaten-
ing “foreign” nature, stand in stark contrast to the French project of restor-
ing the “natural” landscape, a landscape of “self,” to its former fertility and 
glory, and thereby proving themselves the true heirs of Rome.
Ferocious Colonial Nature
Analyses of European experiences with non-European natures around 
the world agree that the vast majority of these encounters produced de-
scriptions of the landscape that classified the biophysical environment as 
exotic. That is, compared to European landscapes familiar to the writers 
(explorers, colonists, missionaries, etc.), newly discovered lands contained 
plants, animals, and land forms that were unfamiliar and therefore clas-
sified as “other” compared to the “normal” European landscape of “self.” 
Such a binary, categorizing European nature as normal, temperate nature 
and non-European natures as exotic and decidedly “other” or abnormal, 
helped define Europeans’ sense of self at a crucial time. As Derek Gregory 
has explained, “Writing tropical nature as ‘other’ thus conveyed ‘its discur-
sive differentiation from home and the familiar,’ and in doing so helped to 
establish the ‘superiority’ of the domestic over the exotic.”1 This categoriza-
tion also facilitated notions of “improvement” that were used throughout 
the colonized world to justify European intervention.2
 In some parts of the world, such as the tropical Pacific islands and cer-
tain parts of the Americas and Africa, the exoticness of the landscape was 
sometimes portrayed as attractive, luxuriant, and fertile, especially early in 
imperial encounters.3 In fact, it was frequently the “very ‘otherness’ of these 
lands which has made them appear so compelling, especially as a testing 
ground for imperial energy and imagination.”4 As Europeans gained years 
of experience in foreign lands, however, those perceptions tended to change, 
and representations of exotic landscapes became increasingly negative.
 The historian Nancy Stepan has called this “the darkening of the sub-
lime tropics,” a phenomenon she illustrates with Alexander von Humboldt’s 
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and other European’s representations of the Americas over time.5 She and 
the historian David Arnold both attribute a large part of this change in 
European attitudes toward, and representations of, tropical nature to the 
problems of fighting the endemic diseases of these regions, many of them 
new to European medical knowledge.6 This went hand in hand with fears 
of moral and physical degeneration and with the debasement of European 
civilization in these exotic lands.
 It is perhaps in the colonial settings of the nineteenth century that the 
portrayal of exotic nature by Europeans as negative and defective (wild, 
gigantesque, ferocious, diseased, barren, etc.) became most pronounced. 
This occurred not only in the “tropical world” as defined by the tropics of 
Cancer and Capricorn, but also nearly anywhere that the environment was 
warm and did not resemble Europe, including India, Africa, and much of 
South America and Asia.7
 For the British in India, nature was never seen as edenic, for example, but 
rather as a series of exotic, difficult, and diseased environments that required 
forceful management. According to British representations, in some areas 
irrigation canals were required, in others drainage works were needed, in 
still others the defiled forest needed to be replanted, and nearly everywhere 
agriculture had to be “improved.” The perceived strangeness and inadequacy 
of the Indian environment and its peoples justified British imperial inter-
vention in countless ways even before the nineteenth century.8
 Over the course of the nineteenth century, southern Africa was subject 
to European (primarily British) representations of nature that wove a story 
that also justified a European colonial presence. This narrative of a previ-
ously fertile, indeed somewhat edenic but exotic land, placed blame on the 
indigenous inhabitants, the Tswana, for deforesting and otherwise ruining 
the environment. In the eyes of some influential colonial actors such as 
John Croumbie Brown, the official colonial botanist, the local peoples had 
been such bad stewards of the land that they were being punished by God 
with drought.9 This narrative, and variations on it, facilitated many impor-
tant colonial goals in southern Africa during the nineteenth century, from 
justifying reforestation and other forestry measures to agricultural and soil 
conservation interventions in the name of stopping erosion.10
 At the other end of the continent, in French North Africa, however, a 
different story, with a different representation of nature, was crafted early 
in the nineteenth century. Although it shared with the British narratives a 
strong tendency to blame the indigenous populations for perceived envi-
ronmental ruin, it made the unique claim that the landscape was not exotic 
or “other” but rather that nature in North Africa represented a landscape of 
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Gallo-Roman “self.” This narrative proclaimed that the French, as the heirs 
of Rome, had the duty and the honor of restoring the ruined North African 
environment to its former glorious fertility under Roman administration. 
The environment, however, was not as badly degraded, deforested, or de-
sertified as so widely claimed during the colonial period.11 Nonetheless, 
once constructed early in the occupation, this story served a wide variety 
of purposes promoting the French colonial venture for nearly 150 years.
Nature and Narratives in French North Africa:  
The Heirs of Rome
When the French conquered Algiers in 1830, their information about North 
Africa and its environment was limited despite its proximity to France. The 
French, like most Europeans of the time, believed that North Africa was 
a region of legendary natural fertility that had flourished in the past and 
had constituted the granary of Rome. This story, based nearly entirely on 
readings of classical texts by the Greeks and Romans, included the belief 
that North Africa was the most fertile region in the world and that it had 
been heavily forested during Roman times.12 The new, colonial, addition 
to this story was that the environment of North Africa had been despoiled 
since the golden years of Roman imperial administration by the ravening 
hordes of nomads and their livestock that had deforested, overgrazed, and 
desertified the land since the eleventh-century Arab “Hillalian invasion.”
 Within two decades of the French occupation of Algeria, this story 
of the previously lush and fertile North African landscape being ruined 
by the indigenous Algerians, especially nomads, had taken shape. In 1847, 
the year before Algeria was made an official province of France, it was elo-
quently articulated by a member of the government-sponsored commis-
sion for the scientific exploration of Algeria: “This land, once the object of 
intensive cultivation, was neither deforested nor depopulated as today; it 
was the abundant granary of Rome.”13 This medical doctor, M. Périer, also 
spelled out a sentiment that would become increasingly widespread over 
the course of the French colonial period in North Africa: that the French 
were the legitimate heirs of Rome in all her imperial glory. He proclaimed 
that “it is therefore our responsibility to raise Algeria from her fallen state, 
and to return her to her past [Roman] glory.”14
 This narrative was used widely from the mid-nineteenth century not 
only to justify but also to motivate the development and implementation of 
economic, environmental, legal, and social policies in France’s southernmost 
province. The primary results of the utilization of this declensionist environ-
mental narrative were the appropriation of forest, agricultural, and grazing 
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lands for the French state and the colonists, the transformation of subsistence 
production into capitalist production, and social control of the indigenous 
North Africans, especially the nomads and forest dwellers, all in the name of 
environmental protection. The local Algerians lost nearly all their forests and 
most of the best agricultural and grazing lands as a result. Many were forced 
into dire levels of poverty, and the social disruption caused was profound.15
 This story and its related policies were widely applied with minor 
variations to the protectorates of Tunisia and Morocco when they were 
conquered in 1881 and 1912 respectively, with similarly negative effects on 
the local populations. In Morocco, for instance, the young recruits in the 
indigenous affairs service were taught that “France is the legitimate succes-
sor of Rome. . . . The great Roman people of whom we are the heirs con-
quered this region well before the Arabs.”16 The instructor for this course, 
Jean Colin, after explaining that the “natives” had ruined the environment, 
encouraged his recruits by promising, “like Rome, we will again expand 
the cultivable area, dry out the swampy regions, and transform them into 
fertile plains,” since it was the duty of France to revive the Roman oeuvre.17 
This they did with a fair amount of success.18
 What is profoundly different about the French colonial environmental 
history of the Maghreb, compared to most other European environmental 
histories of their imperial territories, is that the French considered North 
Africa a landscape of “self” because they believed themselves the heirs of 
Rome. The Maghreb was not considered a foreign or dangerous landscape 
Map 2.1. The Maghreb. Modified after multiple sources. Created by Maria Lane, 2006. 
Reproduced with permission.
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in the way that the tropical jungles of South America, central Africa, or 
southeast Asia frequently were. In describing Algeria in 1847, a French artil-
lery captain, M. de Mont Rond, for example, explained that North Africa 
was not like the barbaric territories: “There were no lands inhabited by 
savages among whom a stranger would surely find death; there was no 
gigantic river similar to the Amazon that crossed south America.”19 Indeed, 
the landscape of North Africa contained familiar vegetation—quite simi-
lar to that of southern France—just not quite enough of it. In the French 
imaginary, with enough reforestation, enlarged agricultural production, 
and careful tending in the form of banning fires and curbing grazing, the 
North African landscape—even the Sahara desert—would once again be-
come the granary of empire, this time France’s empire.
 Thus one of the ways the French thought they could fulfill their Roman 
and imperial legacy was to “restore” the North African landscape to its for-
mer glory and fertility with large reforestation and other environmental and 
agricultural improvement projects. Many even believed they could restore 
a more humid and salubrious climate through reforestation—indeed that 
they had to in order to preserve French civilization. One influential colonist 
and adviser to the Algerian government, for example, Dr. Paulin Trolard, 
exhorting his countrymen to plant trees everywhere, promised that if “we 
decide to fight until our climate is transformed [by reforestation], it will 
be wealth, it will be life, it will be Algeria returned to its original [Roman] 
fertility: it will be Algeria becoming the granary of France!”20 Failure to un-
dertake such measures of environmental restoration, warned Dr. Trolard, 
would result in dire consequences. He explained in typically alarmist style 
that, if nothing were done, “the Sahara, this hearth of evil, stretches its arms 
towards us every day; it will soon enclose us, suffocate us, annihilate us!”21
 For the French living in Algeria, it took only a few decades for the vision 
of restoring the allegedly ruined environment to Roman prosperity and fer-
tility to become a key part of their colonial identity. This is a primary reason 
the landscape was not portrayed as exotic, but rather as Gallo-Roman “self.” 
France’s long history of invoking Roman heritage made this easy.
France and Rome: The Politics of National and Imperial Identity
Long before France developed any sense of “national identity,” at least since 
the reign of Louis XIV (1643–1715), ties had been drawn between France 
and Rome. Before the mid-seventeenth century the nobility in France gen-
erally had claimed descent from the Germans, whereas the peasants were 
thought to be the descendants of Gallo-Romans.22 During the last half of 
the seventeenth century, under the administration of Louis XIV and his 
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court, a program took shape “to make France an empire in the image of 
ancient Rome.”23 For Louis XIV, adopting Roman symbols of power, from 
dressing up in period costumes to landscaping the gardens at Versailles to 
evoke Rome, was a way to increase his own power and, hopefully, to create 
his own empire.
 Fascination with the Roman empire continued into the eighteenth 
century, and study of their classical texts, along with those of ancient 
Greece, formed a substantial part of the education of elites in France dur-
ing the period leading up to the revolution of 1789.24 During the postrevo-
lutionary period, many republicans, as Mike Heffernan has explained, “saw 
revolutionary France as the modern re-incarnation of the ancient Roman 
republic. . . . As such, modern enlightened France had a right and a duty 
to re-establish the traditions and values of the ancients in their former 
heartlands.”25 The French expeditions shortly thereafter to Italy, Egypt, 
and Greece were all inspired, to a certain degree, by the growing belief in 
France that the French were the heirs of Rome and its former empire. With 
the 1798 Napoleonic expedition to Egypt, the association between France 
and Rome as imperial powers in Africa was forged.26
 By the early to mid-nineteenth century, the period most often identi-
fied as that during which “national identities” began to be formed, the no-
tion that France was the heir of the Roman empire was firmly established.27 
Jules Michelet, a revered spokesperson for France, who conceived of the 
country as a person, held this view. In his widely read and highly influen-
tial 1846 book The People, Michelet proclaimed that “we are the Romans 
of Rome, and the Frenchmen of France.”28 It is not surprising, then, that 
the French began early in their occupation of North Africa to proclaim 
a Roman legacy there. Claiming a glorious Roman past for North Africa 
served the goals of many in France and the Maghreb particularly well.
 The Roman experience was analyzed for guidance about how to 
conquer and colonize the region, and, more important, the fact that the 
Romans had succeeded in colonizing North Africa was held up as a pri-
mary justification for French colonization. Only three years after capturing 
Algiers, the king of France, for example, encouraged the troops in Algeria, 
in 1833, to “finish the conquest and return to civilization this shore of the 
Mediterranean surrendered, since the destruction of the Roman empire, to 
anarchy and barbarism.”29
 The French military deliberately modeled itself in several ways on 
the Roman experience in North Africa during the early years of conquest 
and expansion in Algeria. General Bugeaud, for instance, based on his 
reading of Roman texts, implemented new warfare tactics such as mobile 
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columns.30 Roman texts also provided advice on how to administer a colony 
in North Africa, including how to proceed with agricultural development 
and how to better deal with the “natives.”31 One of the primary rationales 
for sedentarizing the nomads, for example, was the claim that the Romans 
had successfully done so and that it had created conditions of security and 
prosperity that France should emulate.32 The many Roman ruins that dot-
ted the landscape were not only a testimonial to the successful Roman past 
and French future in North Africa, but also, in many cases, provided very 
real material benefits for the French in the form of functioning cisterns, 
roads, and aqueducts.33
 Historians have explained that invoking the story that the French were 
the true heirs of Rome in North Africa also served an important ideologi-
cal function that further solidified French hegemony. Patricia Lorcin ar-
gues that “the substitution of a remote Western [Roman] past for a recent 
Islamic one and the institutionalization of Algeria as spatially French were 
important steps in marginalizing the presence and culture of the Arabs and 
Berbers.”34 Moreover, in the words of Yves Lacoste, “turning the Arabs into 
invaders was one way of legitimizing the ‘French presence,’” and it “pro-
vided a historical basis for turning Arabs and Berbers against each other.”35
Figure 2.1. Arch of Trajan and Capitoline temple, Roman Imperial Period, Timgad, 
Algeria, Gerard Degeorge. The Bridgeman Art Library International. Reproduced by 
permission.
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 Since the French colonial environmental narrative blamed the indigenous 
Algerians, and especially the nomads, for ruining the North African environ-
ment, the local populations were thus condemned on two levels: for being il-
legitimate invaders of what was portrayed as long-standing French (Roman) 
territory and for destroying what had been a lush and fertile environment. 
This narrative construction provided powerful ammunition for the French 
in Algeria to morally and legally dispossess the Algerians (and later the 
Tunisians and Moroccans) of their property, to confiscate their forests, to 
undermine their livelihoods, and to govern and “civilize” them.
 Although this story was well developed by the mid-nineteenth century 
and widely accepted in Algeria and within the pro-colonial lobby in France, 
it did not gain wider French support until later in the century. The French 
deputy, Amédée Desjobert, summed up the sentiment of many anticolo-
nialists in France when he stated in 1846 that “we have established that we 
cannot colonize [in Algeria] as did the Greeks and Romans.”36 Support for 
colonialism in general had been low in France during the first half of the 
nineteenth century. It may have reached a nadir in the early 1880s when an 
anticolonial backlash in France to Prime Minister Jules Ferry’s procolonial 
actions brought down his government.37
 An important turning point in popular sentiment toward colonial-
ism occurred three years later, however, with the 1889 colonial exposition 
in Paris, which generated much interest in French overseas adventures. 
Will Swearingen explains that after the 1889 exposition, “French pride and 
patriotism, smarting since the 1870–1871 [Franco-Prussian] war, sensed a 
healthy outlet in colonialism.”38 Within just a few years, many organiza-
tions supporting colonization had been formed, including the Committee 
for French Africa (1890), the “colonial group” in both the French Cham-
ber of Deputies and the French Senate (1892), the French Colonial Union 
(1893) composed of more than four hundred French companies with colo-
nial interests, and the Colonial League (1907).39 Many others followed over 
the next several years. It was not until the interwar years, however, that a 
slim majority of average French citizens could be said to support French 
colonialism and to take pride in a “greater France.”40
 Another change has been identified that bears directly on the recep-
tion of this colonial narrative in France around the turn of the century. 
The geographer Vidal de la Blache put forth the idea that a key compo-
nent of national identity in France derived from the diversity of people 
being able to “master the environments where they settled.”41 Mastering 
the French environment and having hard-working people who were mem-
bers not only of their different provincial towns and regions but also and 
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equally members of the French nation gave France her national identity. 
This interpretation “seduced public opinion in the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries” in France and was widely influential.42
 All these ideas—that France was the heir of imperial Rome, that the 
North African environment had been deforested and degraded since the end 
of the Roman empire, that colonial expansion was necessary and “good,” and 
that mastering the environment was an imperative of being French—com-
bined in French North Africa to create a kind of French imperial identity that 
hinged in part on restoring the environment to its former Roman lushness 
and fertility through reforestation and agricultural improvements. As Alge-
ria, Tunisia, and Morocco were arguably viewed into the 1950s as France’s 
most successful colonial ventures, many invested a great deal in this vision.43 
It helped feed both French colonial identity in the Maghreb territories and 
certain notions of imperial and national identity in France.
 The height of these sentiments was reached in the 1930s and was ex-
pressed in the 1930 celebrations of the centenary of the conquest of Alge-
ria as well as at the 1931 colonial exposition in Paris. Although the French 
government organized and directed the huge propaganda effort in the 
1930 celebrations to garner popular support for Algeria, it was, in part, suc-
cessful.44 There were myriad iterations of proud French claims to Roman 
heritage in North Africa in centenary publications and in the popular 
press. Various newspapers and magazines proclaimed that, in the Maghreb, 
“France is the heir of Rome and is superior to her [Rome].”45
 The six-volume History of French Colonies and the Expansion of France 
in the World began to be published in Paris for a French audience in 1929 
with the second volume, on Algeria, appearing in 1930. It shared many 
similarities with the propaganda of the 1930 Algerian centenary. The au-
thor of the volume on Algeria, Augustin Bernard, a widely published expert 
on North Africa, included many passages describing Algeria as the former 
granary of Rome whose environment had been ruined by the “natives.” 
He explained, however, that “France had recovered the work of Rome in 
the same spirit as its predecessor.”46 Moreover, he proudly proclaimed that 
“France had, more than the Romans themselves, made immense progress 
with Algerian agriculture, extended the cultivated area, incorporated the 
best of the existing agricultural plants and introduced new ones.”47 He con-
cluded that “thanks to the diffusion of the French language, vehicle of our 
ideas, the Algerian people that are being formed are truly ours, they are the 
young shoot from the old Gallo-Roman trunk.”48 This was vital since, in the 
words of this respected professor, “our final goal, conforming to our ideal 
of yesterday and today, to the ideal of Richelieu and of Louis XIV as well 
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as of the French Revolution, is the foundation of a France overseas, where 
our language and our civilization will be revived.”49 Bernard believed that 
France had succeeded in attaining these goals in Algeria. He concluded 
with pride in his 1937 volume on Northwest Africa for Vidal de la Blache’s 
fifteen-part Universal Geography, that, indeed, France had succeeded in all 
three of its North African territories just “as did the Romans.”50
Restoring Roman Nature: Fulfilling the Vision
This French environmental imaginary of North Africa was not just rheto-
ric or polemic—it had very real effects on both the physical environment 
of the territories and on a variety of laws, policies, and development plans 
across the region. Its acceptance and utilization are visible in many of these 
laws and policies, and especially in the multiple changes enacted on the 
North African landscape in the realms of agriculture and forestry.
 Prior to the 1880s, the French colonial environmental narrative was 
used nearly exclusively within colonial Algeria to effect changes sought ei-
ther by the colonists or the Algerian government. This narrative informed 
important legal changes, made in the name of environmental protection, 
during the period, including the land use laws of 1838, 1846, 1863, and 1873, 
and the forestry law of 1874. All of these laws favored French and European 
colonists and the colonial state over indigenous Algerians and resulted 
in the loss of property and use-rights to a wide array of landscapes from 
forests to fields to pastures previously used for subsistence by rural Algeri-
ans.51 This trend would continue throughout the period of French rule in 
the Maghreb, and similar results were obtained in Tunisia and Morocco.
 During the 1880s, after pro-colonial rule had been firmly established in 
Algeria, the colonial environmental narrative of North Africa began to be-
come more apparent in France itself. It was at its most obvious, perhaps, in 
the many fearful discussions and debates of deforestation and the need for 
reforestation in Algeria. Heavily influenced by the ubiquitous story of the 
deforestation of the North African environment by the “natives,” and the 
need to restore it to its Roman fertility, fruitfulness, and forestedness, con-
cerned French colonists took their cause to Paris. Influential groups such 
as the Ligue du Reboisement de l’Algérie (Algerian reforestation league) 
used the narrative to lobby continuously and persuasively for reforestation 
in Algeria, an activity that required both money and political willpower. 
Powerful political figures like parliamentarian (and later minister) Eugène 
Étienne were sympathetic to their cause.
 By 1883, signs that the colonial environmental vision was being taken 
seriously in France were becoming increasingly apparent. That year, the 
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minister of agriculture in Paris, persuaded in part by the reforestation ar-
guments of Dr. Trolard, president of the Ligue du Reboisement, decreed a 
new policy that provided tree seedlings to Algerian colonists at no charge.52 
In 1886, the concerns about deforestation and debates over forestry in Al-
geria captured enough concern in France that an Algerian forestry group 
was formed in the French senate.53 Throughout the 1870s, 1880s, and into 
the early 1890s, the budget for the Algerian forest service was increased 
as were personnel. The number of fines for forest infractions multiplied 
precipitously. The power of the forest service grew so great that, in the 
words of one historian, it became “a veritable state within a state” and ran 
roughshod over the local Algerians.54
 The most far-reaching change enacted by the French government in 
Paris to be based on the French colonial environmental imaginary was 
the 1903 Algerian Forest Code.55 Building on decades of vocal concern by 
foresters and others in Algeria that massive deforestation had occurred 
since Roman times, this punitive and restrictive new law placed a special 
emphasis on reforestation. The chief forest inspector, Henri Lefebvre, had 
lamented only three years before this, in 1900, the destruction of the thick 
forests of antiquity and proposed that a close examination of geologic 
maps could provide the vision for “the reconstitution of the forests of 
Algeria from the Roman period.”56 Two decades before this, forest inspec-
tor Reynard had voiced similar concerns, including even the arid south of 
Alger province. He claimed that this region “was at an earlier time highly 
populated: many Roman ruins cover the country. . . . The rivers there have 
gradually diminished with general deforestation. This idea is corroborated 
by the numerous traces of ancient forests.”57 Like the vast majority of for-
esters working in or visiting Algeria from France, Reynard believed that 
the forests must be restored because, since the Roman period, the local 
Algerians, especially the nomads, had burned and overgrazed and thus had 
“created the sand dunes where all vegetation has disappeared.”58 The direc-
tor of forestry in France, Louis Tassy, had expressed similar concerns in his 
1872 report on Algerian forests.59
 In addition to codifying several disparate decrees promulgated earlier 
in the colonial period dealing with conserving existing forests by criminal-
izing forest fires, grazing, growing, and gathering on forest land, the 1903 
forest law reflected ubiquitous concerns about deforestation and desicca-
tion. It facilitated the expropriation of land nearly anywhere, even sand 
dunes, for reforestation perimeters in the name of environmental protec-
tion for the public good.60 This was because written into the law was the 
incorrect belief, drawn from the colonial environmental narrative, that 
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deforestation necessarily caused climatic deterioration and desiccation, 
and that planting trees would “bring back the rains.”
 A series of six bylaws were added to the 1903 law in June 1904 that 
spelled out how the 1903 forest law would be applied. One of the conclu-
sions of the report commissioned to formulate the bylaws was that Algeria 
should be at least 30 percent forested whereas it was only 10 percent for-
ested and therefore approximately five million hectares urgently needed 
to be reforested.61 Within a year of the passing of the Algerian forest law, 
reforestation perimeters began to be declared. To organize this important 
work, a special reforestation service was created in 1908.62 By the 1930s, 
408,000 hectares had been placed under nineteen different reforestation 
perimeters.63 This was in addition to the nearly 2.5 million hectares of Al-
gerian forest, roughly 75 percent of total forest, owned by the state at this 
time.64 By the early 1950s, 7.5 million hectares had been identified as poten-
tial reforestation perimeters and more than two million hectares actually 
had been demarcated reforestation perimeters.65
 The 1903 forest law and the less comprehensive laws that preceded 
it, along with the powerful land laws of 1846, 1863 and 1873, significantly 
transformed the landscape of Algeria. What had been a landscape domi-
nated by indigenous forest use, subsistence agriculture, and vast expanses 
of pasture land held in common by the Algerian tribes, became a highly 
regulated, privately and state-owned landscape dominated by European 
agribusiness. Whereas the colonial state dominated the protection and 
production of the vast majority of Algeria’s forestland, private ventures led 
the transformation of Algeria’s agricultural landscape. Driven by the belief 
that during the Roman period, large amounts of wheat, vines, and olives 
had thrived and supported large populations, colonists did their best to 
emulate the ancient example. Until the 1880s, wheat dominated European 
agricultural production, in large part because it was not capital intensive. 
With the phylloxera crisis in France and the drop in international prices 
of wheat, the 1880s saw a phenomenal growth in viticulture in Algeria and 
Tunisia. In Algeria, 15,000 hectares of vines in 1878 had increased to 110,000 
hectares by 1890.66
 This spectacular growth was fueled in many cases by the French colo-
nial environmental imaginary. A striking example comes from the young 
protectorate of Tunisia, annexed by France in 1881. The director of agricul-
ture, Paul Bourde, deeply influenced by the colonial environmental nar-
rative, believed that under Roman administration this region “had long 
ago a great reputation of fertility,” and he blamed the “Arab invasion” for 
its “sterilization.”67 He wrote in the report justifying a new decree that the 
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Romans had initiated olive cultivation in Tunisia, creating a huge forest in 
the region of Sfax, in the first century and “they became very rich.”68 Armed 
with this imaginary, in 1893 he enacted policies that favored and encour-
aged the planting of olive and fruit trees on a massive scale by European 
colonists and capitalists. Over the next half century, thanks to these poli-
cies, the landscape, especially around Sfax, was completely transformed by 
the planting of more than 6 million olive trees and 2.3 million fruit trees.69
 In Algeria, one of the biggest transformations of the landscape, and 
probably one of the largest efforts at reforestation, was produced with the 
planting of eucalyptus trees. An Australian native plant, eucalyptus was 
introduced to North Africa by Prosper Ramel, and its propagation and 
spread were avidly encouraged by one settler in particular, François Trottier. 
Known as the apostle of eucalyptus, he was deeply inspired by the colonial 
environmental imaginary. Trottier not only planted thousands of the trees 
himself, he also wrote multiple influential and widely read tracts during the 
late 1860s and 1870s extolling the virtues of eucalyptus for Algeria. Echoing 
common sentiments in Algeria at this time, Trottier proclaimed that refor-
esting with eucalyptus would supply wood for Algeria and France, that it 
would regularize the rains, improve the climate, purify the country, and thus 
favor civilization. Such changes he believed were necessary to prevent the 
moral deterioration commonly encountered when living in Africa.70 By the 
late 1870s, approximately four million eucalyptus trees had been planted.71 
Hundreds of thousands more were planted later by various parties, includ-
ing municipal governments around Algeria, railway and mining companies, 
and many settlers. By the mid-1870s, so many eucalyptus trees had been 
planted that one French journalist remarked that “a stranger who was not 
instructed of its exotic origin would take it for one of the indigenous trees 
of the region.”72 By the 1890s, eucalyptus trees had been planted in most 
villages and towns of Algeria. For his successful efforts at reforesting Algeria, 
Trottier was awarded the prestigious Cross of the Legion of Honor in 1878.73
 In Morocco, the last territory to be conquered by the French in North 
Africa, the French colonial environmental imaginary was invoked from 
the very beginning of French control. The first and most influential of the 
governors-general of Morocco, Louis H.-G. Lyautey, believed that Mo-
rocco had been one of the granaries of Rome, and he acted on that belief.74 
For much of the colonial period in Morocco, agricultural development was 
driven by the legend of the granary of Rome, especially in the cereals sec-
tor. Known as the “wheat policy,” the development and expansion of wheat 
cultivation in Morocco into the early 1930s reshaped significant portions of 
the protectorate’s agricultural land.75
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 In the realm of forestry, a single man, the director of forestry Paul 
Boudy, developed the 1917 Moroccan forest code (based on Algeria’s) and 
its attendant policies, fundamentally reshaping lands categorized as forest 
as well as curtailing forest resource use and access. An article he published at 
the end of his career in 1954, titled “The Resurrection of the Moroccan For-
est,” provided a triumphant overview of the forest service’s work and also 
summed up many of Boudy’s beliefs about forests in Morocco. He estimated 
that about two-thirds of Morocco’s original forests had been destroyed since 
the “Arab invasions.”76 Like Trolard before him, Boudy believed that North 
Africa should have a rate of woodedness of 30 percent, and that it did have 
earlier, during the thriving and productive Roman period.
 In the first tome of his four-volume masterpiece, the North African 
Forest Economy, Boudy eloquently articulated the still dominant colonial 
environmental narrative.77 He added to his arsenal of documentation the 
new “natural vegetation” maps drawn up by the ecologist Louis Emberger 
in the 1930s, which “scientifically proved” the massive deforestation that 
had until then been deduced primarily from literary sources and question-
able botanical theories.78 These maps, though, were created by using the 
French colonial environmental narrative and simply put in authoritative 
map form the story that had been told of deforestation since the early years 
of the Algerian occupation.
 The impact of Emberger’s natural (potential) vegetation maps, as well 
as Boudy’s inflated deforestation statistics derived from these maps, on the 
North African environment has been profound. During the late colonial 
period the maps and statistics informed countless projects to try to re-
forest the region, control erosion, and prevent further deforestation. Still 
considered some of the most authoritative sources on North African ecol-
ogy and forestry today, Emberger’s maps and Boudy’s North African Forest 
Economy continue to be cited in support of a variety of local, regional, 
and international environment and development projects. Many of these 
projects fail since they are based on spurious ecological information, and, 
moreover, they are often socially disruptive.79 Millions of hectares of land 
and millions of people in North Africa have been touched in some way by 
this long-lasting French colonial environmental history.
THE LEGACY of the French colonial environmental imaginary, then, is still 
with us today in the form of a commonly accepted environmental history of 
North Africa that continues to drive a significant amount of environmental 
and agricultural policy formulation at national and international scales.80 
Embedded in many of these reports and plans is the idea that indigenous 
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North Africans don’t respect vegetation, especially trees, whereas those in 
the “civilized world” of Europe and North America revere trees and under-
stand the ecological importance of vegetative cover. This, too, is largely a 
legacy of the French colonial environmental history of the Maghreb. It was 
repeated with great frequency during the colonial period that “the natives 
manifest a veritable hatred for trees.”81 Such claims were usually contrasted 
with the love the French had of trees and the care with which they protected 
their forests and other important plants. This was a common sentiment 
among most Europeans at the time as it was in North America.
 The dichotomy of tree lovers versus tree haters played well into the sense 
of identity that the French developed in colonial North Africa. Building on 
long-established traditions of seeing themselves as the heirs of Rome in 
France, as well as in Rome’s former imperial territories, the French quickly 
adopted this trope in the Maghreb. The tree-loving French envisioned 
themselves bringing civilization to the desert by planting trees and saving 
the forest from abuse by the local inhabitants, thus re-creating the suppos-
edly thick forests of the Roman era. Looking to Roman examples and claim-
ing Roman heritage also helped guide them in the war of conquest, develop 
agricultural improvement plans, sedentarize the troublesome nomads, and 
construct a distinct colonial identity as “Latin Africans.”82
 This chapter has explored the role of the French colonial environmental 
history of North Africa as a key component of colonial identity among the 
settlers living in the Maghreb and also how it informed certain notions of 
French imperial and thus national identity in France. Restoring the alleg-
edly ruined environment to its imperial Roman glory with reforestation and 
agricultural improvements was something nearly all the French could point 
to with pride. Especially during the 1930s and 1940s, a sense of “imperial 
identity” grew stronger in France as a result of multiple factors, including 
the strong promotion of colonization by the government as well as historical 
impetuses such as the psychological toll of the Franco-Prussian war.83
 As many of their other colonial possessions were beginning to fall apart, 
the Maghreb territories, especially Algeria, became even more important to 
the French. Held up as models of colonial success, they were in many ways 
crucial to notions of French imperial identity in large part because the “af-
firmation of French greatness was central to all definitions of French iden-
tity.”84 And as Krishan Kumar has recently argued, “The making of French 
national identity, just like the making of English national identity, has to be 
seen at least in part as a product of imperial ambitions and imperial rule.”85 
In reality, though, ideas of imperial identity likely remained more an official 
and elite discourse than a focus of attention for the lay public.86
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 The French colonial environmental imaginary of North Africa thus 
may be seen as an important component of French settler identity in North 
Africa and also as an overlooked component of imperial and national 
identity in France, especially in official circles. As the heirs of Rome in 
North Africa, many French felt it was their duty and also a matter of honor 
to restore “their environment” to its ancient productive glory. Since the 
North African landscape was perceived as a landscape of “Gallo-Roman” 
self, rather than a foreign, exotic, and threatening landscape, restoring it 
was seen as a relatively simple affair. Reforestation, agricultural improve-
ments, and outlawing many indigenous uses of the land were deemed to be 
sufficient to create a “new France” in North Africa.
 The belief that the North African environment was a landscape of 
“self,” degraded but relatively easily restored to productivity, sets the 
French experience with nature there apart from the vast majority of Eu-
ropean imperial experiences with nature around the globe. Rather than 
forging an identity out of the need to “tame” or “control” an exotic, wild, 
and dangerous landscape as occurred in so many other European colonial 
encounters, the French in North Africa identified themselves as heroes 
who had restored the ruined environment and proved themselves the true 
heirs of Rome.
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Body of Work
Water and Reimagining the Sahara in the Era of Decolonization
George R. Trumbull IV
“IF YOU knew the secrets of the desert, you would think like me; but you 
are ignorant of them, and ignorance is the mother of evil.”1 This supremely 
confident boast, attributed apocryphally to the celebrated Algerian intel-
lectual, poet, and resistance leader, the Emir (Abd al-Qâdir, illuminates the 
centrality of environmental representations to the engendering of projects 
in the Algerian Sahara. Knowledge of the secrets of the desert, and the defi-
nition of such secrets, remained a contested field throughout the history of 
French intervention in Algeria. As French colonial apologists confronted 
the challenges of empire in the twentieth century, they increasingly mobi-
lized an array of representations aimed at remaking the land and people of 
the desert, a body of images both congruent with and dissimilar to earlier 
representations of the land of thirst and fear.
 Colonial understandings of the Sahara as a potential site of economic 
activity depended on the genesis of new kinds of representation of the envi-
ronment. Rather than functioning as an unmediated flow of speculative capi-
tal from metropole to colony, the economic history of French colonialism, 
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at least in the Sahara, necessitated first a variety of representational invest-
ments, from the penny press to the avant-garde tableaux. French interest in 
the Sahara, for much of the history of colonial Algeria, operated as much at 
the level of the spectral as the speculative. Any potentially profitable use of 
the Sahara centered on reconfiguring the Sahara as environmentally suit-
able for mastery, no mean task. Discussions of profit and investment in the 
Algerian Sahara arose more frequently as representations, depictions, and 
hypotheses than as lines in a ledger or tallies of profit and loss. Indeed, such 
tallies prove nearly impossible to reconcile in any systematic way for the 
Sahara: the French investment in the desert remained more in paper and in 
canvas than in cash and in specie. Water functions as a metonym, illustrating 
the genesis of knowledge and ignorance of, and bodily experiences situated 
in, the desert. The French colonial authors discussed here—government 
officials, military officers, travelers, scientists, economists, popularizers of 
empire, and others—defined Saharan communities in particular, however, 
through their environmental aspects, drawing on both tropes of desert de-
scription rooted in the nineteenth century and twentieth-century fascina-
tions with the potential for technological control over the land. Situated in 
space through reference to specific landscapes, social practices, ecologies, 
and natural phenomena, these communities emerge, not solely as social 
groupings defined as urban or rural, nomadic or sedentary, but also as envi-
ronmentally defined foci for colonial study and action. This chapter argues 
that geographic and economic representations of desert environments, and 
in particular water, operated as mutually reinforcing categories of mediated 
knowledge that ultimately served to open up the Sahara as a reimagined, 
utilitarian space for new, technological forms of empire.
 Historians have demonstrated the degree to which Algerian commu-
nities often remained opaque to French colonial administrators.2 Indeed, 
colonial officers more often figured as rather easily manipulated figures of 
limited power than as representatives of an all-encompassing, all-knowing 
colonial state whose power intruded on every aspect of Algerian life; in 
Algeria at least, France neither knew all, nor encompassed all, nor perme-
ated all.3 Hence, the very relationship between empire and community in 
colonial Algeria was a tenuous one; Algerians often had good incentive to 
attempt to insulate their communities, whether socially, religiously, or geo-
graphically, from colonial officials. If colonial administrators ignored (Abd 
al-Qâdir’s secrets of the desert, it was perhaps not by accident, but rather 
due to the will and actions of people like (Abd al-Qâdir himself.
 Analyzing the discontinuities of the history of people in their environ-
ments has given rise to multiple methods of historical inquiry. In a 1995 
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essay, Alfred Crosby memorably dismissed American environmental his-
torians as “more interested in dirt than in perceptions . . . of dirt. . . . They 
have no doubts about the reality of what they deal with, nor about their 
ability to come to grips with it. . . . They do not suffer from epistemological 
malaise.” If true, that lack of epistemological malaise seems something of 
an intellectual luxury, if not a blessing.4 In contrast, the historian of Ger-
many David Blackbourn posed the question, “What of real geographies?,” 
a question more provocative to historians, I think, than to geographers.5 
People live in tangible worlds, not only in discursive ones, though these 
various environments exist in superimposition upon one another. Expe-
riences of thirst and experiences of taste both represent means of envi-
ronmental inquiry. In an essay on conservation history, Frank Uekötter, 
following on Blackbourn, contends that “nature is not only a cultural con-
struct but also a physical reality. . . . Nature has its own logic, and does not 
care for human attributes of ‘good’ or ‘bad’ results,” nor, presumably, for 
(Abd al-Qâdir’s categories of ignorance and evil. Environmental historians 
of Africa have largely eschewed reinscribing the false binary of represen-
tational and “real” environmental histories. As James McCann has noted, 
“Environmental and landscape history is also . . . the history of ideas, per-
ceptions and prescriptions about” the land.6 Although McCann explicitly 
excludes the Maghreb from his frame of reference,7 Diana K. Davis has 
persuasively demonstrated the centrality of environmental narratives to 
colonial practice in North Africa.8
 The historiography on deserts in particular remains somewhat thin-
ner than that of environmental history more broadly. Recent interest in 
the history of the Sahara specifically has focused especially on patterns 
of political control rather than on discourses and practices of—or claims 
to—environmental mastery.9 Even fewer scholars have attempted to con-
ceive of the history of deserts in a comparative framework. Nevertheless, 
work on other deserts points at fruitful research directions within the 
history of the Sahara. In particular, Robert Vitalis’s argument about the 
connections between Jim Crow, American capitalism, and the oil industry 
in Saudi Arabia raises important questions about the nature of discrimina-
tory imperial systems and the peculiar social worlds of desert technologi-
cal communities.10
Wealth of Another Nature
The environmental delineations of desert life dictated, in part, certain defi-
nitions of community in colonial Algeria. Early, nineteenth-century dis-
cussions of desert environments helped frame, though did not determine, 
90  |   George R. Trumbull IV
debates about the Sahara throughout French colonialism in Algeria. In 
1859, Jules Duval, a magistrate, administrator, journalist, and economist 
in the then-province of Oran, neatly cleaved his world in two: “The Tell,” 
the hills of littoral Algeria, “reflects . . . the mores, the sciences, the arts of 
civilization. . . . Everything else is the Sahara. . . . Here wealth is of another 
nature.”11 Other natures—deserts in place of hills—implied, for Duval, 
other human natures, other forms of wealth and organization. Geogra-
phy—physical, spatial difference—marked for this administrator clear 
disjunctures, despite the movement, migrations, and exchanges that linked 
desert, plain, and coast. In a later text, he maintained that “through its benefits, 
the artesian well gives to the Sahara material life and, up to a certain point, 
moral life.”12 Water coded for a range of moral attributes subsumed under 
the imperial rubric of “civilization,” and its mere presence proved, Duval 
claimed, transformational in the moral lives of desert Algerians.
 This cleavage required particular constructions of desert environ-
ments and life. Various writers through the French occupation of Algeria 
referred to the Sahara as the Ocean of Sand, a label attributed to the Roman 
stoic and traveler Strabo.13 Those with actual experience in the desert dis-
missed the label as misleading, fanciful, a gross misunderstanding of the 
diverse environments of the Sahara. The explorer Fernand Foureau rather 
plaintively noted that, in fact, vast rocky expanses and sizable mountains 
rendered his voyages considerably more difficult than navigating the vast, 
flat expanse of sand conjured by the phrase.14 The military commander 
V. Colomieu contended that, in 1862, an ocean voyage offered significantly 
fewer dangers than a desert one. 
The poets have often compared the desert to the Ocean. . . . To 
this just comparison one must add that the Ocean is known, its 
reefs are marked, its harbors described and illuminated with 
lighthouses, while the map of the desert does not exist, reefs are 
more numerous there. . . . A map of the desert would exist, but, 
whatever care taken in establishing it, it would be insufficient 
to guide the voyager in an effective manner.15
However poetic the ocean of sand as a category, explorers and colonial 
military officers found it lacking as an effective description of the Sahara 
itself. Colomieu presented the geographic menaces of the Sahara as, in 
some sense, unknowable, unmappable, incapable of textual or poetic 
representation. Paradoxically, the depths of the sea held fewer surprises for 
him than the expanses of the desert.
Body of Work: Water and Reimagining the Sahara | 91
 Other hazards awaited in the Sahara, as well. Referring to what is now 
eastern Algeria and western Libya, Eugène Daumas’s 1853 Mœurs et cou-
tumes de l’Algérie called it “veritable desert, the ocean of sand, of whom 
the Tuareg have made themselves the pirates.”16 Colomieu, too, singled out 
pirates as an element that rendered at least some truth to the comparison 
to the sea.17 The nomadic Tuareg, many of whom made their living pillag-
ing caravans, found themselves transformed, not inaptly, into pirates of the 
desert. Ocean narratives, whether of sand or water, do not require pirates, 
but seem more captivating for readers with their presence. However facile 
the analogy, for Daumas, environmental conditions defined the Tuareg as 
a community of pirates.
 But the Sahara exists, and not just as a discursive ocean of sand. It is a 
real place, real in Blackbourn’s sense, physically, corporally, environmen-
tally, and historically real. As Colomieu noted, its “pure reality is rather ter-
rible: thirst kills, and sand covers over the cadavers.”18 In Arabic, Algerians 
refer to one particularly desolate part of the desert as the bilâd al-(atash 
wa al-khawf: the land of thirst and fear. People died in the desert. They 
died, however, in different parts of the desert, in some parts more than 
in others. Arabic distinguishes different portions of the desert in different 
ways. Fayfâ’, in colloquial fiafi, referred, like sahrâ’, to the desert generally, 
but also at times specifically to the portions of the Sahara with inhabited 
oases. Qifâr called to mind wastelands, not full desert, but rocky, stony, 
apparently useless land that nevertheless could spring to life with the in-
frequent and unpredictable rains. Algerians sometimes referred to this as 
khalâ’, the void. The most deadly and empty parts of the Sahara, however, 
were the falâ, the completely sterile lands without water.19 These terms dis-
tinguished, usefully, between different environments, between dry lands 
with scattered oases, dry lands with the potential for providing good, if 
temporary, forage, and for dry lands threatening all but the best prepared 
travelers with death.
 Some early explorers attempted to elucidate distinctions similar to 
those articulated in Arabic by Algerians. James Richardson, in his 1850 
Routes du Sahara, remarked that “generally, the Great Desert, in many 
places, is not as arid and as dry a country as is generally depicted.”20 
Nevertheless, the repetition of the adverb “generally” indicates something 
of a struggle with perception, a looming sense that the very definition of 
the Sahara had ossified into one category of environmental understanding 
that elided crucial differences among different ecosystems.
 Despite the utility of these distinctions, “the land of thirst and fear” as 
articulated through nineteenth-century texts and images became definitive. 
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French writers on the Sahara applied it more broadly geographically, and 
imbuing the phrase with near-talismanic qualities, used it to summarize 
the ecological and psychological challenges of a desert empire. The menace 
of the desert was not drowning (except during flash floods), but rather 
thirst. The bilâd al-(atash wa al-khawf marked the Sahara as an environ-
mental community defined through both bodily and emotive experiences. 
Those stark deaths became fodder for representational, as well as bodily, 
constructions of desert life. The sands of the Sahara, in particular, have 
long proved fertile ground, if not for agriculture, then for the germina-
tion of Orientalist romance. Not surprisingly, this romance emerged early 
on in France’s imperial project in North Africa. Eugène Fromentin, the 
traveler, writer, and artist who inducted many in metropolitan France into 
his cult of Saharan romance, visually situated the Sahara in a clear Ori-
entalist trajectory. His 1859 La rue Bab-el-Gharbi à Laghouat depicted, in 
near-canonical fashion, an Orientalist scene of the so-called Arab street, 
inscribing colonialist representations of feminine seclusion, masculine 
public life, and decadence on canvas. Ten years later, however, the jumbled 
bodies of Rue take on a decidedly more sinister tone in 1869’s Le pays de 
Figure 3.1. The Land of Thirst (Le Pays de la soif). 1869. By Eugène Fromentin 
(1820–76). From Musée d’Orsay, Paris, France/Giraudon. The Bridgeman Art Library 
International. Reproduced by permission.
Body of Work: Water and Reimagining the Sahara | 93
la soif. Fromentin’s palette has little changed, and though his subject mat-
ter ostensibly has, the prone colonized body still takes central position 
in the canvas. Fromentin’s “land of thirst” communicated the physical 
experiences of the desert to a wider audience. Thirst, rooted in specific 
environmental landscapes, became an artistic still life rooted in a specific 
geographic and embodied landscape.
Water, Mastery, Miracles
Mastery over the landscape, mastery over thirst and the material conditions 
of life, served, for many writers, as the marker of colonial domination. Wrote 
the Oranais bureaucrat Duval,
Among the works undertaken by France in Algeria, there is one 
that . . . effects in the material economy, and even in the social 
constitution of populations, a rapid and marvelous metamor-
phosis: . . . the artesian well, those gushing fountains, as ad-
mired by the learned as by the ignorant, blessed in the deserts 
even more than in the heart of civilized countries.21
The introduction of water, in the guise of artesian wells, into the Sahara 
would fundamentally remake, according to Duval, the very social com-
position of desert communities. “It is in the Algerian and French Sahara,” 
he continued, “that are accomplished these marvels, which, in other ages, 
would have merited their authors the aura of heroes and demi-gods.”22 
Duval accorded to the mastery of water, and, importantly, to the people 
who master it in this “Algerian and French Sahara,” the transformational 
powers of the near-divine. As miraculous as artesian wells may have seemed 
in the midst of the desert, they were by no means new, or French; Saharans 
had long used the technology to tap aquifers and underground springs. 
All of Duval’s excitement arose from the prospect of the introduction of a 
slightly more efficient variety of an existing technology. The transforma-
tive act here was not technological, and it involved no magical greening of 
the desert wastes through the actions of heroes or demigods. It depended, 
instead, on the act of mastery itself, and on the origins of the hand who 
held the pump. Duval never accorded to Saharan artesian wells the kind of 
mastery he saw in their French-created replacements.
 Artesian wells by no means represented the only form of mastery 
over the environment that excited nineteenth-century French writers 
engaged with the Sahara. More famously, proposals to create a gigantic 
inland sea in the desert likewise relied more on the conceiving of the act of 
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mastering hostile environments than on the utility or advisability of doing 
so. In 1879, the president of the Commission du Trans-Saharien, Gazeau 
de Vautibault, took on the question of water directly. He admitted that 
“the Trans-Saharan will have the disadvantage of requiring the transport 
of rather expensive quantities of water,”23 but dismissed this criticism of 
the project as one rooted in ignorance. He emphasized, not incorrectly, 
that the Sahara possessed, in fact, sizable reservoirs of water underground. 
His argument depended, however, on a certain sleight of hand: discussing 
one region, he noted that “in this part of the Sahara, as in others, there is 
really more water than the caravans indicate,”24 setting aside entirely the 
question of whether “more” water, in fact, sufficed. The project as a whole 
in fact would utilize three separate sources of water: artesian wells, surface 
water, and water stored underground in the courses of dry riverbeds, yet 
Gazeau de Vautibault’s discussion divorced the assertion of the existence of 
water from analysis of its potential for use.
 In other proposals, mastery over specific natural spaces and clearly 
identified aspects of real environments took precedence over clear ar-
ticulations of the productive outcomes of such plans and proposals. Less 
spectacular were the 1865 discussions of the potential creation of a thermal 
spa in Hammam-Meloun, in the then-province of Algiers. M. Ville pains-
takingly detailed the process for creating a hotel, baths, and infrastructure 
for transporting the invalid and ailing to distant Hammam-Meloun. The 
desert climate surrounding the oasis, he claimed, could provide a recu-
perative site. “The natives,” he continued, “would keep their habitual place 
of encampment and would thus furnish to the patients a new distraction 
through the spectacle of their original customs during the season of the 
baths.”25 He “admitt[ed] that the sojourn on the plateau of Hammam-
Meloun offers inconveniences of every nature: too small a space, debilitat-
ing heat, foul air, monotony of view, and thus, sadness and ennui among 
the patients.”26 Moreover, he deemed prospects for patronage quite poor: 
Europeans in Algeria were too few and consisted largely of soldiers unlikely 
to frequent the spa, and Algerian Muslims bathed separately from Europe-
ans, and usually for free. As the Arabic name indicates, Hammam-Meloun 
had, in fact, a bath at its thermal waters, one shared by Algerian Muslims 
and Jews. At any rate, he noted ruefully, they seemed unlikely to patron-
ize the hotel.27 In short, Ville spent pages outlining in painstaking detail 
quite possibly the worst spa ever, guaranteed to bore its scant patrons to 
death, or kill them with hyperthermia, or asphyxiate them with noxious, 
sulfurous fumes, before ultimately bankrupting its owners. “Our goal,” he 
explained, “is not to engage a businessman to attempt today so costly an 
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enterprise and [one] which is of a nature to present many risks. We have 
solely sought to demonstrate that it is possible.”28
 To the best of my knowledge, no speculator has constructed the ill-
advised thermal baths of Hammam-Meloun. Nevertheless, an engineer 
made detailed figures and calculations of costs and technical details for the 
organization and transportation of water at an out-of-the-way thermal site 
in the arid plains of the Algerian desert. He then published it with the of-
ficial publisher of the prestigious Corps impériaux des ponts et chaussées 
et des mines. Ville wrote to demonstrate the possibility of mastering the 
desert environment. In the land of thirst and fear, Ville offered the mea-
surements and figures to prove the possibility, if not the advisability, of the 
creation of a thermal bath in the heart of the desert. The environmental 
fact of hot springs and their potential utility overriding the economic as-
pects of his plan, Ville generated a body of geographic representations that 
sketched out imagined desert interventions, however ill advised.
 What became of the audacious M. Ville? The vicissitudes of desert de-
velopment apparently conquered him, and he retreated. Duval notes that, 
“abandoning to the secrets of the future the mysteries of the Great Desert, 
industrial science fell back towards the Tell, and for several years, under 
the direction of M. Ville, chief engineer of mines, the Mitidja has been, 
in thirty places, attacked by teams of drills.”29 The nineteenth century’s 
representational legacy, like that of Ville, in the desert wedded colonial 
environmental knowledge to economic possibility. As Benjamin Claude 
Brower demonstrates, the middle to late nineteenth century witnessed the 
emergence of concerted efforts to describe the Sahara, “like . . . Napoleon’s 
famed scientific mission to Egypt.”30 The ideology of “peaceful penetra-
tion” and the reality of Algerian deaths formed what Brower correctly calls 
“the multiple logic of violence in colonial Algeria.”31 At the same time, late 
nineteenth century and early twentieth century explorers, travelers, tour-
ists, missionaries, artists, ethnographers, and others met with greater and 
lesser degrees of success in their attempts to systematize knowledge about 
the Sahara as an environmental and cultural space.
 In particular, the deaths of explorers in the Sahara largely overshad-
owed attempts at systematizing knowledge about the ecological conditions 
of the desert. Most notably, commemoration of the deaths of Paul Flatters 
and the marquis de Morès revolved around configuring the Sahara as more 
of a place of political threats than one of the menace of thirst.32 Environ-
mental, biological, and ecological knowledge of the desert, of course, did 
not stagnate, yet death became more a question of violence than of thirst. 
Duval, in a sense, did not err in positing a retreat of “industrial science.”
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Trellised Roses and Portioned-Out Miracles
Nevertheless, even the future’s secrets could not unveil one mystery of the 
Great Desert, of the land of fear. One “myth with which one does not trifle: 
thirst; one can die of thirst in the Sahara,”33 even in 1957, when, as Jean 
Lartéguy noted in his Sahara: An I, “on this ocean of sand, in the guise of 
caravelles, have been launched all-terrain trucks of the geophysical com-
panies.”34 In the 1950s as in the 1850s, those interested in the Sahara had to 
come to terms with the meaning of its environmental extent, its physical 
limitations, the possibility of death. Frequently, they defined, too, their 
embedding in place through embodied experiences of the environment. 
The travel writer and playwright Stéphane Désombre titled a chapter, with 
inestimable directness, “How I Almost Desiccated.”35
 New metrics, however, began to supplement the rather more visceral 
scales of measurement such as that of Désombre. Increasingly, pluviomet-
rics and hydrology began to define the Sahara scientifically. Most obviously, 
geologists and publications of the Institut Pasteur mobilized such statistics 
as part of their disciplinary apparatus,36 but perhaps more surprisingly, 
popular works that aimed at familiarizing a general audience with the 
Sahara, such as Jacques Britsch’s Perspectives sahariennes, and politicians, 
such as Albert Sarraut and Pierre Cornet, made recourse to similar num-
bers.37 Even general-audience texts marshaled statistics and data, rainfall 
measurements, and water tables for the creation of environmentally spe-
cific representations of expertise. In the mid-twentieth century, precise, 
numerical definitions came to define the Sahara in terms of centimeters of 
rainfall and rapidity of evaporation, consolidating knowledge of the desert 
in tables, charts, and graphs.
 Numerical definitions of the desert did not stamp out more descrip-
tive ones. Suzanne Normand and Jean Acker published one such descriptive 
work, lavishly illustrated with photographs of landscape and oil installa-
tions, in 1957. “Ancient sea dried up for millions of years, symbol of ab-
solute sterility, desert of fear and thirst, the Sahara opens itself to a new 
conquest,” epitomized by the petrochemical facilities and uranium mines 
of their photographs.38 However, the greatest conquest, they made clear, lay 
in the relation of people to the land itself. “‘The Sahara remained uninhab-
itable because people did not know how—or did not want—to render 
it inhabitable.’ But let’s be just: did they have the possibility, before our 
époque that portions out miracles?”39 Normand and Acker offered precise 
depictions of just what such miracles would entail, of their eventual results. 
They traveled to one locale with “an agronomist in shorts who . . . let the 
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sand run through his fingers. What do they demand of the mysterious soil 
of the desert? Geraniums, trellised roses? ‘With water, nothing is impos-
sible,’ murmured the agronomist. . . . One day . . . there will be bungalows 
for the families, with flowers all around.”40 Normand and Acker witnessed 
“management of the oases and technical equipment in the process of meta-
morphosing, not only the rhythm of life, but the entire native economy.”41 
To their credit, the two saw this as a process, remaining quite aware of 
the physical dangers of thirst and death in the desert, and explaining their 
own fear at their automobile trip through it. Nevertheless, they expressed 
complete confidence in the ultimate triumph of the management of the 
desert environment through the manipulation of water resources.
 The explanation of Normand and Acker offers a neat, clean interpreta-
tion of the environmental history of the Sahara as a passage from menace 
to management. In no way, however, can a history of water in the Sahara 
trace such a simplistic narrative line from the land of thirst and fear to the 
land of trucks and numbers: the Sahara, after all, remains a place where it 
is still eminently possible to die of thirst, a place of precious few bungalows 
and trellised roses. Contemporary with increasingly precise geological 
definitions of the desert emerged questions about the very nature of the 
Sahara itself in a time of technological change: a desert with roses and bun-
galows, after all, is not much of a desert. The potential for new technology, 
for Duval’s “secrets of the future” to tame nature, threatened to call into 
question the very idea of a desert, rainfall measurements notwithstanding.
 “The essential character of deserts,” wrote Robert Capot-Rey, “is the dis-
appearance of living beings.”42 The essential character of deserts is, of course, 
not the absence of people, but the absence of water, and Capot-Rey, profes-
sor at the university in Algiers and in the 1950s the foremost expert on the 
Algerian Sahara, knew this.43 Especially in the Sahara, crossed by trade routes 
for millennia and dotted with oases, sites of pilgrimage, and a wide variety 
of ecological practices, the absence of people rarely, despite the absence of 
water, served as the quintessence of a definition of desert environments. 
Nevertheless, Capot-Rey struggled with how to define a desert whose ulti-
mate defeat seemed imminent. “Human industry,” wrote Edmond Sergeant, 
an Institut Pasteur d’Algérie employee, “intervenes to mitigate the indigence 
of nature and to maintain water in the land of thirst.”44
 Mitigating the indigence of nature—the very concrete attempts to 
remake the Saharan landscape and environment to conform to industrial 
or agricultural uses highly dependent on water—posed something of an 
epistemological problem. The question of what, exactly, is a desert that is 
no longer arid had wider repercussions in a political system that defined 
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communities according to their place of residence, but also in relation to 
how they used the land: as nomads, as sedentary farmers, as potentially restive 
urban dwellers, as land pirates, as oil-rig workers. In a 1958 book published 
as part of the Que Sais-Je series, Bruno Verlet noted that, “geographically 
speaking, the Sahara possesses no natural frontier. The principal character 
of the desert being its aridity, the best definition geographically seems thus 
to rest on criteria on the order of vegetation.”45 He made clear, however, 
that he himself preferred a completely different definition, embedded not 
just in space, but in time.
The Sahara undergoes at the present hour upsets of a considerable 
scope that are profoundly modifying its physiognomy. On its 
ground confront, clash, two civilizations, two worlds. On the 
one hand, an ensemble of millennial adaptations . . . , heritage of 
a long series of indigenous civilizations. On the other, a violent 
and rapid intrusion of technical and Western methods, funda-
mentally foreign to life in the desert, but seeking to surmount 
its difficulties by mechanical force. Between the two a funda-
mental difference: the Saharans of yore submitted to the law of 
the desert, those of today seek to impose their own upon it. On 
one side tradition, on the other evolution.46
Verlet interpreted the twentieth century as transformative, exaggeratedly 
so, in its potential for remaking desert environments. Technical change 
would replace adaptation and heritage. Lacking geographic boundaries, the 
Sahara would eventually vanish under the weight of “mechanical force.” A 
desert without possibility of desiccation is no desert at all.
 Inadvertently, even though they cast their ideas as revolutionary, pro-
ponents of those interventions echoed nineteenth-century descriptions of 
the desert. Just as Colomieu, Foureau, Daumas, and others had criticized 
the idea of an “ocean of sand” for neglecting the varied environments of 
the Sahara, so, too, did later writers. Guy Le Rumeur’s Le Sahara avant le 
pétrole of 1960 recalled that the regions “without water and without people 
are called ‘the land of thirst’ or ‘the land of fear.’ . . . No! The Sahara is 
not a ‘no man’s land,’ for it is not entirely deserted.”47 In some senses, and 
without knowing it, Le Rumeur had attempted to reintroduce the Arabic 
distinction of water and land. Like Arabic-speaking Algerians, Le Rumeur 
did not deny the existence of expanses of emptiness and aridity, but un-
derlined that they did not, in fact, encompass the entirety of Saharan en-
vironments. Le Rumeur, however, cast this understanding as part of the 
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outcome of technological change, new forms of transportation and water 
technologies, not as part of a deeper knowledge of the desert. Thus, he 
situated this recognition of multiple Saharas not as greater comprehension 
of the environment, but of greater control over it.
 This mooted transformation, this crucial addition of water to the 
landscape, like earlier plans for artesian wells, undermined the very idea of 
a desert. One law professor struggled, in a 1960 text titled Sahara et com-
munauté, to define what, exactly, he took for the boundaries of his com-
munity. “One calls ‘desert’ all territory abandoned by man, all centrifugal 
land. . . . This arid zone is not and has never been but a relative desert 
where . . . man has always tried to maintain himself. There is, in this will 
of existence, something dramatic, a struggle of man against nature.”48 He 
defined the desert as land simultaneously abandoned and fought for by 
man, as deserted,49 rather than primarily arid, because he saw the immi-
nent end, he thought, of that struggle. “Water is the condition of all life and 
all development,” he explained, and “the program of mise-en-valeur” that 
had constructed waterworks in parts of the Sahara made “the desert cede 
place to an oasis.”50 The lawyer literally redefined the Sahara as deserted 
rather than desert, as abandoned rather than uninhabitable, and capable of 
imminent restoration. The possibility of making the Sahara wet, impracti-
cal though it proved to be, seemed to presage a radical reconfiguring of the 
very idea of “desert” from thirst to utility.
 At the same time, a curious kind of doublespeak emerges from such 
colonial texts. Although these projects never conceived of Saharan Algeri-
ans in relation to the project, their proponents cannot, of course, ignore 
the existence of people altogether. In short, Saharan Algerians emerged 
ambiguously connected to economic proposals cast almost exclusively in 
environmental terms. These analyses of the future of the peoples of the 
Sahara remain simultaneously divorced from and linked to various aspects 
of economic projects: not active, cogitating participants in the remaking 
of the Sahara, but bystanders acted upon, like the land they inhabit, by the 
French builders of railroads, inland seas, derricks.
 Many portrayed Algerians as a vanishing presence, a silent absence, 
in the Sahara. Peyré contended that “this desert was abandoned to us 
like a realm of derision,” yet congratulated the colonial state for not ex-
terminating the “natives,”51 who apparently remained in the “abandoned” 
desert. Similarly, Albert Sarraut, president of the Assemblée de l’Union 
Française, described Algerians as inert, in stasis, ultimately incapable of 
action or improvement without French activation, trapped in “a desert 
that could be animated, peopled, irrigated, fertilized, utilized to furnish to 
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local populations” the benefits of agriculture and mineral exploitation.52 
Sarraut’s very words underline the contradiction at the heart of plans for 
the Saharan mise-en-valeur: an inhabited desert nonetheless “fertilized” 
and “animated” solely through “peopling,” inhabited yet simultaneously in 
need of people. Another politician soberly reminded the reader of “the role 
and importance of man for the mise-en-valeur of these abandoned terri-
tories.”53 The constant reassertions of the human emptiness of the Sahara, 
usually alongside acknowledgments of the very real people who did, in 
fact, make a living in the desert, demonstrates that, for many French writ-
ers and policymakers, Algerians simply did not or could not contribute to 
the potential use of the region. In short, for Peyré, Sarraut, and others, the 
desert remained empty of those who mattered, those who acted, those 
who built.
 Indeed, Guy Le Rumeur, in his majestically titled Le Sahara avant le 
pétrole (1960), explicitly linked water, the romance of the desert, and the 
relative absence of people. “Gazelles,” he wrote, “live there in bands, but 
people scarcely venture from rare points of water.”54 His image, though 
picturesque, sacrificed no small amount of accuracy in its pursuit of imag-
ery: oasis communities, those “rare points of water,” depended as much on 
nomadic populations passing, like gazelles, through that desert in bands, as 
upon settlers in the oasis town itself. Romances of the Sahara, both verdant 
and parched, did not die out in the petrochemical age.
 Daniel Strasser, economist and political scientist at the Institut 
d’Etudes politiques in Paris, best summarized the political stakes behind 
such representations. “The Sahara, empty of people and rich with po-
tential, appears as a privileged space for national grandeur.”55 The Sahara 
was not, of course, empty of people, but desires for “national grandeur” 
reserved its potential riches for those not inhabiting it. “This dynamism 
of the occidental type,” he maintained, “is incumbent upon the French 
government to possess.”56 This depiction of the Sahara, empty, rich, and 
privileged, relied on environment and economics as modes of description 
to offer the Sahara up as a site of renewed colonial interest in a time when 
Algerian opposition made itself heard with increasing vehemence.
 In an opinion submitted to the Assemblée de l’Union Française in 
favor of creating a desert territory, equivalent to the Afrique occidentale 
française or Afrique équatoriale française, called “l’Afrique saharienne fran-
çaise,” Valerio Cianfarani neatly summarized the romance of an empty des-
ert for colonial politicians: “Territories ‘vacant and without masters’? . . . 
One could have said that before the French presence, one cannot anymore, 
since the bleached bones of the soldiers of France have staked out the trails 
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of ergs and of hamadas, since French sacrifices of all sorts have generously 
multiplied to pacify, organize, administer the Saharan territories.”57 Only 
once the French arrived, the bureaucrat opined, did the Sahara cease its 
vacancy, its emptiness. At the same time, French sacrifices aimed at pacify-
ing, organizing, administering . . . whom? The empty desert? Or desert 
inhabitants constructed as absent? Cianfarani kept a strategic silence.
 Capot-Rey went even further, organizing his seminal text to begin 
with a lengthy environmental discussion that excluded mention of people 
before moving on to addressing Saharan inhabitants in detail as func-
tions of their environment. Capot-Rey remained throughout his work an 
ardent environmental determinist for whom only those “native” to the 
Sahara could adequately perform labor initiated and dictated by French 
interests.58 Raymond Furon, the associate director of the French museum 
of natural history and internationally regarded hydrologist and geologist, 
further racialized questions of labor, contending that only “noirs” could 
work in the extreme environmental conditions of the desert.59 Narratives 
about the Saharan environment, and especially about human needs for 
and projects regarding water, frequently took the form of ill-concealed 
polemics of environmental determinism.
 Even environmental descriptions not wedded to mechanistic inter-
pretations of ecological influences had difficulty reconciling economic 
development with the human component of the desert. Jean Dubief, a 
hydrologist living and working in Algeria, decried the state of colonial en-
vironmental policy in the desert in the 1950s. “To want to settle nomads by 
making them cultivators or mine workers,” he fumed, “is in fact to seek out 
purely selfish goals under altruistic appearances.” To do so, he continued, 
would “suppress in one blow the only mode of rational exploitation of the 
reaches not totally deprived of life in the desert.”60 As opposed to forced 
settlement and industrial labor as Dubief might have been, he could only 
ultimately subject Algerians to “rational exploitation,” to increased pro-
duction best facilitated, he argued, through the construction of additional 
wells. Dubief rejected mining, agriculture, forced settlement, but not the 
logic of economic maximization behind it. He, like those he criticized, 
still comprehended the Sahara as a place in which manipulation of water 
resources for economic purposes remained the primary goal. Rooted in 
environmental mastery, “rational exploitation” of Algerian bodies for un-
specified work undergirded even Dubief ’s disavowal of forcible settlement.
 Impracticality rarely fazed those interested in an economically useful 
Sahara. The very real challenges of the desert had, in many ways, not van-
ished in the 1950s and 1960s, and, as a result, neither had recourse to what, 
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a century earlier, Duval had called the “secrets of the future.” Furon at-
tempted to argue for the mise-en-valeur of the Sahara in the 1950s: “There 
is water, minerals, and oil, but it is still necessary to be able to exploit them. 
We will leave aside technical difficulties that very generally find elegant 
solutions.”61 Arguing for the economic necessity of maintaining French 
control over the Sahara proved rather easier when the burden of furnish-
ing technical solutions to the problem of water fell to others. Furon, like his 
contemporaries, presumed the resolution of the environmental challenges 
of the desert imminent, and proceeded to the hypothetical reconfiguring 
of the desert in its mooted future as no longer deserted.
 Despite their vagueness, these purported resolutions also concentrated 
on the reorganization of desert communities. The changing character 
of the desert landscape implied, for some, changing the character of the 
people of the Sahara. In a 1960 special issue of La Nef titled “Sahara en 
questions,” Daniel Plessis expressly cast these changes as communally 
based. “The mentality of the desert changes from week to week. Thanks 
to oil workers, a new infrastructure has imposed itself that permits dor-
mant populations . . . to touch, brusquely, the marvels of mechanization.”62 
Infrastructures and machines in the desert, Plessis argued, would awaken 
slumbering Algerians.
 The colonial government similarly viewed its environmental inter-
ventions as social ones, as policies aimed at modifying communal life 
in the Sahara. “The French administration,” claimed a 1954 government 
publication on the Territoires du Sud, “was preoccupied with finding a 
solution to the grave . . . social problems posed” in the desert. “New irriga-
tion methods were tried and popularized there.”63 If irrigation offered the 
solution, then the “grave social problems” arose out of assumptions about 
agricultural uses of land and the sedentarization of nomadic populations. 
The drilling of wells and the creation of irrigation projects, although both 
rooted in water, imply very different uses and organizations of space. The 
colonial government argued that irrigation, and settled use of land, and 
not wells, with the potential for more episodic use, provided the only 
possible solution for reforming Saharan communities and resolving their 
“grave social problems.”
No Man’s Land
Other texts from the era of incipient independence movements and de-
colonization, written by a wide variety of experts, politicians, and popu-
larizers of the Saharan mise-en-valeur, conceived of the Sahara first as an 
ecological landscape, relegating social questions to secondary importance 
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or ignoring them altogether. Georges Le Fèvre and P. Mannoni attempted 
to frame the terms of the debate about the Sahara in 1956: “This Sahara . . . 
[is] visibly arid. . . . Although some still claim that it is but a dead region, a 
sterile scrap of terrestrial crust, others . . . are of the opposing opinion, per-
suaded that this no man’s land of five hundred million hectares contains 
fabulous riches” in petrochemicals and possibilities for nuclear and atomic 
energy.64 In neither arid wastes nor petrochemical wealth do the authors 
identify people: the definition of the Sahara remains essentially and quint-
essentially environmental, the realm of what Capot-Rey referred to as the 
“tyranny of water.”65 The lack of people, for Le Fèvre and Mannoni as for 
Capot Rey, did, in fact, characterize the desert environment and determine 
the boundaries of its potential use.
 Raymond Furon, whose influential works appeared in multiple lan-
guages worldwide, discussed the wells, foggara, and qanat of Saharan Alge-
ria—but not who built or used them.66 The oasis-dwellers who built exten-
sive irrigation or other kinds of waterworks vanish from Furon’s account; 
the built environment of water infrastructure and technology becomes, 
instead, a landscape, a background of structures made without agency, 
emerging as if naturally. Proposals to turn the Sahara into what J.-C. Peyré 
called “a gargantuan Tennessee” purported to mimic the massive construc-
tion projects of the New Deal’s Tennessee Valley Authority, yet shared none 
of the ideology of social welfare implicit, at least theoretically, in such proj-
ects’ American analogs.67 Even if the Sahara represented the new Tennessee, 
the numerous writers who made such comparisons never identified the 
Algerian equivalent of impoverished Appalachians or laborers in need of 
work. They merely wrote such proposals onto the land, mapping potential 
locations and placements, but never uses or builders.
 Indeed, the mid-twentieth century did witness shifts in patterns of 
human settlement in the desert. Wrote one engineer, “the light yellow stain 
of the atlases of our youth that spoke to our spirit and made us imagine 
a Sahara, land of thirst and death, is now replaced by banal roadmaps on 
which one discovers, not without surprise, roads, trails, points of water, 
hotels.”68 These roads and oil derricks and new wells intensified, rather 
than transformed, human use of the Sahara. Settlements remained dot-
ted in oases clustered around wells, whether oil wells or artesian wells, 
and more than one writer referred to petrochemical workers as the “new 
nomads.” Plans to “green” the Sahara came to naught, and economic use 
of the desert emerged despite its environmental constraints, not through 
their obliteration. As one French government publication noted, “all drill-
ing for oil follows a first drilling, that of the discovery of a point of water.”69
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 Drilling for oil only partially answers a question first asked in the 
Revue française in an 1887 article titled “Excursions dans le Sahara” by one 
Edouard Gibert. “Colonization of the Sahara? Certainly, if one has nothing 
better to do. But why spend so much time and money on a land where it is 
necessary to create water and trees, and when trees and water abound on 
the other side of the mountains?”70 Oil might explain drilling wells, but not 
the desire for bungalows and trellised roses.
 In addition to the romance of the desert and conflicting, ideologically 
inflected debates about the nature, literal and figurative, of the human role 
in the Sahara emerged another form of colonial romanticism. Scholars 
have largely failed to investigate the emergence of discourses of economic 
Orientalism in the twentieth century. Indeed, Orientalism itself skips, in 
the words of Said, from “Renan, Sacy, and Lane” to “Orientalism now.”71 
The technological romances of the Saharan mise-en-valeur at the end of 
empire, science fictions though they often proved to be, nevertheless rep-
resent new ways of configuring, of representing, the Sahara and Saharan 
peoples as objects for imperial intervention and domination, new methods 
that nevertheless proved congruent with previous tropes of Orientalism.
 The economist Daniel Strasser succinctly articulated the emergence 
of these new strands of techno-Orientalism. Industrial capital, he argued, 
required a different representational life for the Sahara.
The Sahara cannot be at the same time the expression of a cap-
tivating Orientalism and the hope of a future industrial zone, 
a poetic escape and the field of a new French expansion. These 
mirages that we condemn are moreover equally those that give 
rise to the prophets of a Saharan Eldorado. In fact, the modern 
Sahara will only be the work of a strong and resolute France.72
Strasser explicitly rejected the “captivating Orientalism” of the nineteenth 
century, of a Fromentin, as well as the foolhardy hopes of a Saharan eco-
nomic miracle. He nevertheless never conceived of the Sahara as an object 
of politically interested representations. A “strong and resolute” France will 
create neither a poetic escape nor an Eldorado, but rather “a future indus-
trial zone.” Saharan industrial parks proved, indeed, far less captivating 
than desert escapes or riches, but also proved no less Orientalist: techno-
logical and economic interests in the desert at the end of empire never 
abandoned the genesis of politically interested representations of people 
and land as part of the pursuit of the maintenance of imperial monopolies 
on power and economy.
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 The expansion of Orientalist discourse to include mid-twentieth cen-
tury economic and technological fetishism may seem a discursive stretch, 
but it did not seem so to those attempting to conceive of a French Sahara. 
In his “Quel visage le Sahara d’hier et d’aujourd’hui aura-t-il demain?” 
of 1960, Daniel Plessis remarked that, “on the margins of modernism, 
beside the Saharan unities and the commandos of petrol, still subsist the 
nomads, the people of yore, those whose silhouettes attest to the stagna-
tion of the desert for centuries . . . pass[ing] from point of water to point 
of water.”73 The attempts at a technological reconfiguration of the Sahara 
implied varied and often contradictory, inescapably politically interested, 
representations of Saharan people as both separate from and involved in 
Saharan economics. Moreover, Strasser explicitly juxtaposed the romantic 
and the technological, noting that “after the second world war, the Gov-
ernment of the Republic intended to approach head on what was still the 
Saharan mystery . . . to determine the chances and conditions of a mineral, 
industrial, and strategic Sahara, in the place of the traditional, immutable, 
and sterile Sahara of sands.”74 That governmental approach, reflected in 
the metonym of water, reveals new forms of cultural representations, eco-
nomic and ecological, marshaled in support of empire. The mystery of a 
French Sahara, asserted in the face of an increasingly restive Algeria and 
increasingly assertive anticolonial movements worldwide, began to replace 
the “mysterious Sahara” of previous representations.
 Indeed, economic dreams in the Sahara did not vanish in the face of the 
Algerian War of Independence. As John Ruedy has noted, petrochemical 
discoveries in “the Sahara had stimulated, during the late 1950s, a frenetic 
rush of French businessmen, financiers, and investors hoping to share in 
the bonanza—a new commitment to Algeria that was totally out of phase 
with a politico-military reality that augured imminent disengagement.”75 
Moreover, that reality, which Algerians articulated with increasing armed 
and discursive force in the 1950s and 1960s, existed alongside what Gabri-
elle Hecht has called a belief, entirely colonial in nature, that “technologi-
cal prowess could be particularly important in helping France combat the 
crisis of grandeur brought on by the decolonization of the empire.”76 As a 
result, once independent, Algeria had to address terms of independence 
that had enshrined the interests of French capital in the Sahara (especially 
in the petrochemical industry), primarily through recourse to statist in-
terventions in the industrial economy in the Sahara that in turn financed 
Algerian dependence on imports.77 Declining oil prices and resistance to 
private exploitation of the Sahara in the 1970s and 1980s precipitated so-
cial, economic, and, in the 1990s and 2000s, political instability in Algeria.78 
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Contemporarily, Algeria has turned, not only to the European Union and 
the United States for investment in the Sahara, but to Russia and China, 
as well.79 These economic interests in the Sahara imply a reliance on water 
as yet unarticulated, uninvestigated—a reliance, like water in the Sahara 
itself, largely concealed.
 French conceptions of the Sahara as a colonial, economic, and tech-
nological space depended on the genesis of environmental understandings 
and misrepresentations of the desert. Water posed a particular problem 
of management, need, and access, in particular in the form of newly ar-
ticulated, if often theoretical, political, commercial, and, later, industrial 
projects, and as a result functioned as a placeholder in economic debates, 
standing in for a wider variety of anxieties, hopes, and plans. Thus, the 
economic history of the Sahara, both colonially and after Algerian indepen-
dence, depended on a congeries of primary environmental representations, 
less structured and totalizing than tentative, inchoate, and often contradic-
tory. The indeterminacy of economic projects whose profits often proved 
illusory reflected an underlying uncertainty regarding the potential for 
mastering the desert environment itself.
 “The desert is a pack of lies,” wrote Suzanne Normand and Jean Acker. 
“This lie has enveloped so many people: nothing is real.”80 The desert is, in 
fact, “real,” a real geography in Blackbourn’s sense. People died in the desert 
of thirst, but also worked on oil derricks, and, for a moment in history, con-
ceived of the possibility of an engineered end of the desert. The environmen-
tal constraints of desert life may have prohibited trellises and bungalows, but 
fear and thirst alone never succeeded in closing the Sahara from the realm of 
imagination. To the contrary; the superimposition, though often imperfect, 
of environmental and economic representations perpetuated colonial con-
ceptions of the Sahara as the site of empire’s final interventions.
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C h a p t e r  4
From the Bottom Up
The Nile, Silt, and Humans in Ottoman Egypt
Alan Mikhail
THE NILE Delta and the Mediterranean have been pushing against each 
other for the past 10 million years since the river first began carrying dirt 
to the sea.1 For most of the last 7,500 years though, the Delta has enjoyed 
the upper hand. As the fifth-century b.c.e. Greek traveler and historian 
Herodotus sailed toward Egypt’s northern coast, he wrote of how “as you 
approach it and are still within one day’s run from the land, and you 
drop a sounding line, you will bring up mud, though you are in eleven 
fathoms’ depth.”2 For Herodotus, the presence of all this mud so far out 
at sea was evidence enough of how the Delta had been steadily made over 
the course of thousands of years by the accumulation of sand and dirt 
carried by the Nile.3 In his words, “The Delta, according to the Egyptians 
themselves (and I certainly agree), is alluvial silt and, one might say, a 
contribution of the day before yesterday.”4 As evidence that the Delta 
was indeed a product of “the day before yesterday,” Herodotus noted the 
region’s absence of any of the ancient ruins responsible for bringing so 
many visitors like himself to Egypt.
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 Another of these travelers who wrote of the Nile Delta and its steady 
creation over millennia was an American named John Antes who lived in 
Egypt in the eighteenth century, the period of most immediate concern to 
us in this chapter. Of the Delta he wrote, “The large quantities of muscle 
and oyster beds, with other productions of the sea, which are to be found 
under ground in various places, even not far from Grand Cairo, made me 
sometimes think, that most probably the whole Delta was originally noth-
ing but a shallow bay of the sea, of unequal depth. . . . Near Rosetta there 
seems to be striking proof that the country is still encreasing by the sedi-
ments of the river; by every appearance it seems that Rosetta was formerly 
situated close to the sea.”5 In addition to these fossilized remnants of the 
sea, Antes also observed how the yearly flood moved large amounts of dirt 
to grow the area of the Delta. “When I thus noticed what large pieces of 
ground were yearly carried away, and of course removed towards the sea, 
and considered that this must have been the case from the first existence of 
the river, it seemed to me a very strong argument . . . that perhaps the great-
est part, if not the whole of the Delta has been thus produced, and must 
still be encreasing by an encroachment upon the sea.”6 And like Herodotus 
many years before him, Antes also observed “that no monuments of very 
great antiquity are to be found in these low places, but only on some few 
elevated spots, and even these few do not seem to be so old as those found 
in the upper parts of the country.”7 Thus the period from Herodotus’s visit 
to Egypt 2,500 years ago to Antes’s observations at the end of the eighteenth 
century saw the steady expansion of the Delta into the Mediterranean. This 
reign of Egypt’s northern coast over the sea, however, would soon begin to 
come to an end a few decades after Antes wrote his account.
 Indeed on the basis of much more contemporary accounts, there is 
clear evidence that the multiple millennial domination of the Delta’s dirt 
over the Mediterranean has slowly been coming to an end since about 
1800.8 Like other deltas around the world, Egypt’s is slowly retreating. 
Some parts of the coastline are being eroded at a rate of 125 to 170 meters/
year.9 This is primarily a function of the detrimental effects of two hun-
dred years of gigantic public works projects meant to manipulate the Nile’s 
waters for what were stated at the time to be exigent political and eco-
nomic needs. From the efforts of the early nineteenth-century Ottoman 
provincial governor Mehmet (Ali to irrigate more of the Delta to Presi-
dent Gamal (Abd al-Nasir’s Aswan High Dam hydroelectric project in the 
mid-twentieth century, the ecology of the lower Nile was changed more 
rapidly and more fundamentally in the past two hundred years than ever 
before. One consequence of these changes to the river has been that the 
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Delta no longer receives the full impact of the yearly flood and the rich silt 
it contains (over 125 million tons of sediment a year).10 These gifts of the 
Nile now pile up behind the Aswan High Dam. Thus unlike Herodotus, 
someone sailing toward the Nile Delta today would not find much mud in 
the sea at even a very close distance to the shore. Among the other regret-
table environmental consequences of these public works projects—each 
of course with its own significant human costs as well—are salinization, 
coastal erosion, massive increases in the usage of chemical fertilizers, and 
extreme water loss due to evaporation from Lake Nasir behind the High 
Dam. These grand environmental stories of the creation of the Nile Delta 
and its current erosion are clear enough to anyone interested in Egypt and 
have received much attention from geologists, historians, environmental 
activists, hydrologists, and others.
 Instead of these well-known millennial tales of creation and destruc-
tion, this chapter focuses in on some of the thousands of smaller scale daily 
interactions between Egyptians and the Nile Delta’s silt in the seventeenth 
and eighteenth centuries—a few decades before the nineteenth and twen-
tieth centuries’ massive projects of river manipulation.11 This history of 
human interaction with water and dirt in Ottoman Egypt (as elsewhere) is 
at its heart a story about the outlines of society—literally—and about how 
imaginaries of the rural landscape were formed and maintained through 
and by water. The yearly flood and the massive amount of sediment it 
brought ensured that the shape of Egypt in the Ottoman period and before 
was in constant flux. Water ebbed and flowed, embankments broke, canals 
were dredged, silt settled, water evaporated, and dams collapsed. These and 
other environmental and infrastructural realities of life in rural Ottoman 
Egypt meant that peasants and the imperial bureaucracy they were a part 
of had to adapt to a constantly changing physical landscape. The history 
of how peasants and the Ottoman state dealt with this environment in 
flux reveals how and why they conceived of, negotiated with, and tried to 
harness the dirt of their countryside.
 The annual meeting of water with dirt was a process that fundamentally 
shaped Egyptian peasant and Ottoman imperial imaginaries of the rural 
environment. As is made clear in a seventeenth-century satirical Arabic lit-
erary account of the countryside, proximity to the Nile and the particular 
ways its flood waters settled in land created a hierarchy of rural spaces.12 At 
the bottom of this hierarchy were swampy lands (bilād al-malaq) on the 
margins of the Nile watershed. These areas received water but not enough 
to properly irrigate agricultural fields to grow food. Next were villages 
very close to the river with highly sophisticated irrigation networks that 
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fed water to very productive areas of cultivation. And at the top of this 
social ladder were Egypt’s large towns and cities. That Egyptian peasants 
and the imperial bureaucracy equated relative levels of irrigation to social 
status, political and economic import, and cultural sophistication clearly 
indicates the centrality of water to the development of imaginaries of rural 
society and environment in Ottoman Egypt.
 At the same time, an examination of both local and Ottoman impe-
rial imaginations of the environment further suggests something of the 
cooperative nature of water management. Controlling, sharing, and using 
water both necessitated and fostered cooperation and compromise among 
all parties. As we will see below, many conceptions of how best to manage 
water were built on this cooperative ideal, one understood and cultivated 
by both the imperial bureaucracy and Egyptian peasants. This common 
acceptance of the cooperative nature of water utilization goes a long way 
in explaining the remarkable similarities of many of the shared impe-
rial and local views of the rural Egyptian environment. As I show below, 
however, this is not to say that peasant and imperial interests and actions 
were always in lockstep. Taken together, these cooperative and contested 
negotiations over environmental resource management help delineate a 
set of environmental imaginaries at play in the early modern Ottoman 
Egyptian countryside that included notions of community, responsibility, 
precedent, and resource allocation.
 Two aspects of life in rural Ottoman Egypt bring the imperial bureau-
cracy’s and peasants’ engagements with dirt and water into the starkest of 
reliefs—canal dredging and the changing shape of alluvial islands in the 
Nile and its tributaries. Canals had to be dredged regularly throughout 
Egypt to keep irrigated water flowing in the countryside, and likewise the 
vicissitudes of the Nile ensured that alluvial islands were constantly get-
ting larger and smaller, reforging their spatial form, and connecting and 
disconnecting from canal banks. Both of these processes, among others, 
altered the physical landscape of Egypt, changed political and social rela-
tionships between peasant groups and between peasants and the Ottoman 
state, affected rural labor practices, challenged the abilities of rural Islamic 
courts to adjudicate complex disputes, and reshaped economic interests. 
In more specific terms, I will show below how canal dredging involved 
the establishment of legal precedents for the responsibility of maintaining 
properly functioning waterways and other irrigation works and how allu-
vial islands contributed to notions about what constituted evidence for the 
continuous use and cultivation of property. These ideals of community, 
precedent, sharing, and the establishment of responsibility were all integral 
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facets of both imperial and local imaginaries of the rural Ottoman Egyp-
tian environment.
Ideals in the Dirt
The water of Egypt’s vastly complex irrigation network was forever in 
motion. This perpetual aqueous movement ensured that land as well was 
constantly appearing, disappearing, and changing shape. It also ensured 
that the Ottoman state had to address this continually shifting terrain 
through various bureaucratic and legal mechanisms. It did this largely by 
upholding in its network of legal courts certain notions of how communi-
ties shared and used water resources.
 One of the most important factors determining how water flow 
shaped the banks of canals and the borders of land was the amount and 
character of silt on the bottoms of the beds of Egypt’s waterways. A highly 
silted-up canal could, for example, force water to flow with more force 
and in considerably different directions than it usually did. This could in 
turn erode canal embankments or completely overtake them. Alternatively, 
such a canal could stop flowing altogether. To attempt to gain a semblance 
of control over how water changed the shape of the rural Egyptian en-
vironment, the Ottoman administration of the countryside in the early 
modern period relied on dredging as one of the most crucial elements in its 
management of rural spaces. Because cleaning canal beds greatly impacted 
the local environments of all villages sharing a particular waterway, the 
bureaucratic organization of dredging points to conceptions of ecological 
community and responsibility and to how these notions were established, 
maintained, and manipulated to manage Egypt’s rural irrigation network.
 Dredging is one of the most common issues in the archival record of 
irrigation in Ottoman Egypt.13 Certain canals were notoriously susceptible 
to large buildups of silt and were therefore constantly in need of attention. 
One of these waterways was a canal branching off of a large central canal 
known as al-Bah. r al-S.aghı̄r in al-Manzala in the subprovince of al-Mans.ūra 
in the northeast Delta.14 Between 1684 and 1704, this auxiliary canal was 
dredged in every one of these twenty years to remove what were termed the 
many small “islands and steps” (cezireler ü atebeler) of underwater buildup 
that had formed on the canal bottom.15 The regular opening and closing of 
smaller canals feeding off of this main canal allowed silt and debris to settle 
on its bed resulting in its nearly perennial state of siltation.
 The dirt obstructing the canal’s flow created all sorts of problems for 
peasants living in the forty villages along its length. In an effort to deal 
with these problems in a more permanent way so as to avoid the need to 
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dredge the canal every year, the people (ahali) of these villages served by 
the waterway came to the court of al-Mans.ūra in 1704 with village notables 
and engineers of the region to discuss what could be done about this situation. 
Not surprisingly, it was agreed by all that, in the words of this case, the 
canal should be cleaned of all the dirt clogging it up so as to repair it with 
maximum strength and sturdiness to ensure that funds and effort were not 
continually expended on its dredging and maintenance. Functionaries of 
the court were thus dispatched along with peasants living on the canal to 
determine the costs of such a repair. They returned to the court to report 
that this work would total 50,000 paras.16 The twenty-three upstream 
villages near the mouth of the smaller canal at al-Bah. r al-S.aghı̄r were each 
to contribute 1,000 paras to this repair effort, and the other seventeen 
downstream villages were only to contribute 600 paras each (the remaining 
difference of 16,800 paras was to be made up by Ottoman state funds).17
 This adjudication of the canal’s dredging reflected an understanding 
by the Ottoman administration and by Egyptian peasants of how water 
flow and canal siltation affected communities differently based on their 
location along a waterway. Because downstream siltation was largely a 
byproduct of the opening and closing of upstream canals and of the water 
consumption of upstream villages, these villages had to pay more for the 
dredging of the canal. Undergirding this and other similar court settle-
ments was an understanding shared by all parties involved that the col-
lective usage of a canal tied them together into a community of water uti-
lization and consumption. This reflected a conception of environmental 
resource management in which actions in any one part of this irrigated 
ecosystem were seen to affect and implicate all canal users. This principle 
of irrigation was a basic tenet of the shared rural environmental imaginary 
of Ottoman Egypt and was maintained in almost every dispute involving 
water in the countryside.18 Included in this imaginary was the notion that 
clearly not all actions on a canal were equal. The water usage of upstream 
villages greatly impacted the quantity and character of the water and silt 
that reached downstream villages. The opposite was, however, obviously 
not true. Thus in dealing with the sediment carried by water it was always 
important to remember in which direction water flowed.
 One of the best examples of the implementation of this principle in 
Egyptian irrigation was the management of the flow and dredging of the 
Ashrafiyya Canal that coursed through the subprovince of al-Bah. ayra in 
the northwest Delta to connect Alexandria, Egypt’s second city, to the 
Rosetta (western) branch of the Nile. As with the previous canal, the 
Ashrafiyya’s flow was extremely weak owing both to its lack of incline from 
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its mouth toward Alexandria and to the constant breaking of the canal’s 
embankments by peasants seeking to siphon water off to their fields.19 Un-
like in other cases of communities of water in Egypt, however, with the 
Ashrafiyya it was obvious (at least from the perspective of the Ottoman 
state and Alexandria’s residents) which of the populations served by the 
waterway was most important—those at the canal’s terminus in Alexan-
dria. The imperial bureaucracy therefore expended a great deal of energy 
attempting to prevent villages along the length of the canal from break-
ing into the waterway, since this removal of water from the canal made its 
problems of siltation all the worse.20 The canal was shallow, had a weak 
current, was surrounded by very loose soil, and consistently lost water. All 
of these factors combined with the desire to have copious amounts of fresh 
and clean drinking water reach the people of Alexandria contributed to 
nearly constant dredging efforts.
 In the middle of the eighteenth century, for example, there were several 
major dredging and cleaning initiatives designed to improve the canal’s 
flow. In the summer of 1751, peasants from the village of Minyyat H. it.t.iyya 
were charged by the Ottoman state to dredge the bed of the canal and 
to reinforce embankments near their village to prevent soil and debris 
from falling into the waterway.21 Almost exactly a year later (in 1752), other 
villages along the canal were instructed to carry out similar infrastructural 
work on the Ashrafiyya.22 The canal was divided into three sections to make 
its dredging and cleaning more orderly and efficient. In each section, one 
village was put in charge of overseeing work on that part of the canal. In 
this period as well, a large waterwheel was constructed at the mouth of the 
canal in the village of al-Rah. māniyya in an additional attempt to quicken 
its flow.23
 Despite these and other similar efforts, however, siltation and the col-
lection of debris, rocks, and sand in the canal remained constant problems 
throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. In a firman (impe-
rial order) sent from Istanbul to the vali (Ottoman provincial governor) of 
Egypt Mustafa Paşa in February 1738, for instance, the palace complained 
that the canal had been badly neglected over the previous few years and was 
currently so clogged up with sand and dirt that water was barely reaching 
Alexandria.24 When the canal was clean and properly functioning, the nor-
mal flood height of 16 cubits was more than sufficient to fill Alexandria’s 
210 cisterns with water for the city’s residents, which were estimated here 
to be sixty or seventy thousand.25 In this year, however, the canal was in 
such a bad state that even the waters of the exceptionally high flood mark 
of 22 cubits did not reach Alexandria. Thus, the imperial divan ordered 
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the immediate dredging and cleaning of the Ashrafiyya. Nevertheless a few 
decades later in the spring of 1763, Alexandrians living near the canal filed 
a petition with the Ottoman bureaucracy complaining that the waterway’s 
flow was again being restricted by all the silt, thorny branches, and garbage 
that were collecting in it.26 These petitioners continued on to say that this 
shortage of flowing water exposed them to great difficulty and hardship, 
and they thus implored the state to clean and dredge the canal as soon as 
possible. Realizing the urgency of this situation, the imperial capital issued a 
firman to its vali in Cairo to immediately undertake this work.
 In these cases about the dredging of the Ashrafiyya and other canals, 
the Ottoman state and Egyptian peasants sought to preserve the flow of ca-
nals so that their water would serve as many people as possible all along the 
waterways. At play in these cases were attempts to balance the needs and 
desires of the upstream against the demands and necessities of the down-
stream—a fundamental aspect of the imagined ideal of how to manage the 
consumption of water by multiple parties. And in these cases, community 
welfare was always privileged over individual rights. This was one of the 
basic principles guiding the management of water and dirt in Ottoman 
Egypt. In establishing how to dredge canals and who was to be charged 
with this work, several other conceptions of environmental management 
were also at play. Foremost among them were notions of how proximity 
and shared usage determined responsibilities for the maintenance of ir-
rigation works and the dredging of canal beds. Those in the immediate 
vicinity of an irrigation work who directly benefited from its presence 
and proper function were responsible for its upkeep; likewise, those who 
shared the water of a canal were also to share in the work of dredging 
and maintaining that canal. Telling examples of these ideals in action in 
the Egyptian countryside were instances of the dredging of canals shared 
between two or more villages on opposite sides of a waterway.
 In June 1724, three villages—two from the subprovince of al-Daqahliyya 
(Kafr Ghannām and al-Jazı̄ra Bākhir) and one from al-Sharqiyya (al-Hajārsa)—
came to the court of al-Mans.ūra (the subprovincial seat of al-Daqahliyya) 
to report on the successful dredging of a shared canal that served as the 
border between the two subprovinces.27 The hakim (subprovincial gover-
nor) of each of these two subprovinces was responsible for dredging and 
cleaning the canal every year from the water’s edge at the border of his sub-
province to the middle of the canal.28 In 1724, the court of al-Daqahliyya 
sent its representatives to villages near the canal to ask local village elders 
(mashā )ikh) whether or not their half of the canal had indeed been prop-
erly dredged. These local notables reported to the court’s functionaries 
From the Bottom Up: The Nile, Silt, and Humans in Ottoman Egypt   | 121
that the hakim of al-Daqahliyya had indeed carried out his required charge 
efficiently and properly. His men (rijāl) had worked for thirteen days to 
clean the canal and to reinforce its embankments, and its waters were 
now flowing quickly and without obstruction. The judge in this case 
then reminded these local village elders that the responsibilities to keep 
the canal properly functioning were now completely in their hands. The 
imperial bureaucracy had, in other words, carried out a major dredging 
operation on a canal and was now handing off its fate to villagers living 
around it. Moreover, the judge added that should these local notables fail 
to maintain the canal’s proper function they would have to pay for this 
failure with their lives.29
 Water and silt were thus literally matters of life and death. With this 
dramatically unambiguous threat of execution, the Ottoman bureaucracy 
clearly indicated its conceptions of irrigation and dredging as two of the 
most important aspects of its rule in the Egyptian countryside. Moreover, 
it was also making a strong declaration in this case, as in others like it, that 
ensuring the steady supply of irrigated water to dozens or scores of villages 
and thousands of peasants was of greater concern to the state than preserv-
ing the life of one or a few peasants. This ideal of resource management 
and access was, needless to say, one that only some Egyptian peasants bene-
fited from and hence consented to and willingly implemented. Thus unlike 
previous cases, this was an instance in which various Egyptian peasants 
and the Ottoman bureaucracy obviously held very different environmental 
ideals. This disjuncture of outlook and priority aside, the fact remains that 
the Ottoman imperial imagination of the countryside consistently privi-
leged the interests of the whole over the life of the individual.
 Moreover, these examples of the sharing of a canal between multiple 
villages also illustrate how authority over dredging and irrigation was con-
ceptualized, organized, and delegated in Ottoman Egypt. Proximity was 
again key to the empire’s imagination of environmental management. Like 
the peasants and their village heads in the above case, those who directly 
benefited from a properly functioning canal were responsible for keeping 
it flowing. This authority invested in the local control of irrigation works 
was meant to serve as a preemptive measure against massive destruction 
and the repairs it would surely necessitate. Steady maintenance of canals 
by those directly served by them would ensure the overall health of Egypt’s 
irrigation network. The Ottoman administration of Egypt calculated that 
if all peasants took control of their immediate surroundings, then the irri-
gation system would work together as a whole. The line of authority traced 
in this case makes this abundantly clear: from the Ottoman state through 
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its imperial institution of the court, to subprovincial hakims, to represen-
tatives of the court, to local peasant elders, and finally to those peasants 
who actually carried out the canal’s repairs. Cases like this one in many 
ways thus represented the ideal function and most efficient execution of 
the empire’s conception of irrigation management.
 In other cases, these privileged conceptions of proximity, shared 
authority, and communal welfare were again challenged by peasants at-
tempting to gain some degree of advantage over their neighboring peas-
ants through the manipulation of a canal’s water or silt or both. As before, 
some of the most common and instructive of these disputes over water 
and dredging were those between upstream and downstream villages. In 
February 1682, the heads of two neighboring villages on the same bank of 
a shared canal came to the court of al-Mans.ūra.30 The head of the down-
stream village Nūb T.arı̄f complained to the court that the peasants of the 
upstream village T.ummāy had failed to dredge and clean the section of 
the canal that ran past their village.31 As a result, the canal’s embankments 
were crumbling and silt mounds were beginning to peak through the water 
surface. An insufficient amount of water was thus reaching Nūb T.arı̄f caus-
ing many of its fields and those of other villages near it to become parched 
and dry. The representative of this village thus asked the judge to send state 
officials to inspect the situation so that they could see for themselves that 
the peasants of T.ummāy had failed to clean and dredge the canal as was 
their duty “from times of old” (min qadı̄m al-zamān)—as the oft-repeated 
phrase went—and so that they could force these locals to fix the waterway.
 The peasants of T.ummāy in this instance either through choice, in-
competence, or irresponsibility let their canal silt up, which in turn pre-
vented water from reaching their downstream neighbors. This case gives 
no indication as to why the canal’s dredging was ignored in opposition 
to the empire’s idealized imaginary of environmental resource manage-
ment. Perhaps the people of T.ummāy had acquired some other source of 
water that made the older canal no longer relevant for their own irrigation 
purposes. Perhaps there was some crisis in the village that took peasants’ 
attention away from the canal. Alternatively, perhaps a dispute between the 
two villages caused the people of T.ummāy to use their more advantageous 
upstream position as a weapon against Nūb T.arı̄f. Whatever the case may 
be, the actions of the court instigated by the head of Nūb T.arı̄f upheld 
the ideal of proximity in determining responsibility for canal maintenance. 
Moreover, in a statement asserting the power of community above all else, 
the physical presence of the canal in T.ummāy did not give its residents 
ultimate authority over the canal’s usage, consumption, and management 
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rights. The downstream village of Nūb T.arı̄f indeed exercised its author-
ity as an invested member in a community of water to force peasants in 
another village to dredge a canal they all shared.
 The constantly changing shape of rural Egypt caused by the move-
ment of water and sand, siltation, the collapse of dams and embankments, 
and the various actions of users of canals and other irrigation works en-
sured that dredging was a central aspect of Ottoman rule in Egypt. As a 
site of regular cooperation and contestation between the empire and peas-
ants and between different peasant communities, dredging indeed serves 
as a crucial indicator of how various challenges to the Ottoman imperial 
imaginary of the Egyptian environment were handled. Within this realm 
of negotiation over how to deal with silt, water, and their multiple and 
often unpredictable effects on rural life, ideals of community, proximity, 
and the sharing of responsibility were both developed and maintained 
to govern canal dredging and cleaning. This was accomplished through 
various legal institutions, infrastructural formations, and social prin-
ciples that operated to uphold and reinforce these ideals and to protect 
the overall health and productivity of agriculture in the countryside. Nile 
sediment thus not only made Egypt the most lucrative agricultural and 
financial province of the Ottoman Empire, but it also shaped much of 
Ottoman rule in Egypt and much of both imperial and local social, eco-
logical, and political understandings of the countryside and of how rural 
physical spaces were to be governed.
Dots on the River
Some of the best examples of how Ottoman imperial and local Egyptian 
imaginaries came to bear on the rural environment are the multiple ways 
in which the Nile and the dirt it carried altered the topography of the 
Egyptian countryside through the changing shape, size, and connectiv-
ity of islands in the Nile and its tributaries. The rise and fall of the Nile 
meant that islands were constantly getting bigger and smaller and often 
connecting and disconnecting from the mainland. This geographical flux 
challenged conceptions of terrestrial fixity, on which was built the whole 
edifice of ideas about responsibility, sharing, and communal governance. 
Even perhaps Egypt’s most famous island—al-Raud.a, whose prominence 
derived chiefly from the Nilometer (miqyās al-Nı̄l) on its southern tip, the 
device used to measure the official level of the annual flood for purposes 
of taxation and agricultural production—often found itself connected 
to Cairo’s coastline due to the river’s recession.32 Such was the case in the 
spring of 1792 when the eastern portion of the Nile between al-Raud.a and 
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Cairo began to dry.33 Huge piles of sand formed all along the channel and 
even further north, serving essentially to connect al-Raud.a to the eastern 
bank.34 Water levels in this season were so low that even to the west of the 
island, in the much wider portion of the river separating al-Raud.a from 
Giza, land had begun to emerge from underneath the river, turning this 
western section into a pathetic trickling brook (salsūl jadwal) in which lit-
tle children played and through which only the smallest boats could pass.35
 With the river’s rapidly changing water levels and its slower and faster 
currents, the amount of land available for cultivation on islands like al-
Raud.a was constantly fluctuating. As we saw with the example of dredging, 
because of erosion and other environmental changes, some areas of land 
along the banks of the Nile and its branches were exposed for parts of 
the year and submerged in others. Thus, some dirt formerly covered by 
water often became permanent agricultural land as a result of changes—
humanly induced or otherwise—to the direction and flow of the river. This 
emergence and disappearance of cultivatable earth meant that there was 
a constant need to reimagine and redetermine the legal, social, and agri-
cultural status of these new and old lands. The working out of resolutions 
to these administrative imperatives again shows us how the bureaucratic 
mechanisms of the Ottoman Empire in Egypt sought to maintain precedent 
as the empire’s overriding conceptual framework for understanding and 
managing the persistently changing rural environment. And furthermore 
it also helps us see how Egyptian peasants attempted to harness these changes 
for their own local advantage.
 In a dispute over an island from the late eighteenth century, a group 
of tax farmers (multazims) from the subprovince of al-Daqahliyya came 
Figure 4.1. Nile between al-Raud. a and Mainland Cairo, late eighteenth century. 
Commission des sciences et arts d’Egypte, État moderne I, vol. 7 of Description de 
l’Égypte, ou, recueil de observations et des recherches qui ont été faites en Égypte pendant 
l’éxpédition de l’armée française, publié par les ordres de Sa Majesté l’empereur Napoléon 
le Grand (Paris: Imprimerie impériale, 1809–28), 36 (plate 17).
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to the court of al-Mans.ūra to testify on behalf of the rights of the village 
of T.alkhā al-Gharbı̄ over an island that had recently been seized by peas-
ants from the neighboring village of Qūjindı̄ma.36 Whereas this island had 
historically been separated from the mainland by water on all sides, it had 
recently attached to the shoreline near the two villages due to the receding 
or shallowing of the river. Once connected to the mainland, the people of 
Qūjindı̄ma moved quickly to take control of the former island by crossing 
over the newly formed land bridge. Although the peasants of Qūjindı̄ma 
freely admitted to seizing the island, they refused to give up their claims 
to it, and thus the present quarrel between the two villages came to pass. 
All the tax farmers and other locals who came to court and everyone else 
mentioned in this case—other than the peasants of Qūjindı̄ma of course—
agreed that the island, no matter that it was now connected to the mainland, 
belonged to the peasants of T.alkhā since they had historically cultivated it. 
And thus on the basis of this testimony, the judge in this case ruled in favor 
of the peasants of T.alkhā. Unlike other disputes over islands in which the 
presence of irrigation works and other built features evidenced a history of 
cultivation, in this case no such structures existed, and hence the assertion 
of rights over the island rested purely on the testimony of various parties 
as to which group of peasants had historically farmed the island.37
 For their parts, through their takeover of the island the peasants of 
Qūjindı̄ma clearly prescribed a reimagination of its status. Not only had its 
new connection to the mainland fundamentally altered a particular local 
geography, but it also necessitated a completely different bureaucratic and 
legal configuration. Given the new land bridge, where were the new borders 
of the former island’s cultivated space? To whom did the cultivation rights of 
the new land bridge belong? Did it belong to the people of T.alkhā since the 
land fell between two areas they farmed? Or was its status as yet undefined 
since it was a new piece of land that had never before had an assertion of 
rights applied to it? For the imperial court, the answers to these and other 
similar questions were reached through a determination of legal precedent—
the precedent of the historic cultivation of the island by the people of T.alkhā. 
To this end, the court sought out the testimony of peasants from neighbor-
ing villages to help establish who had previously cultivated the island. Thus 
in this instance of their imagining of the rural Egyptian environment, the 
Ottoman state sought to reinstitute a system of resource management that 
had obtained before the island had attached to the mainland.
 At the same time, the peasants of Qūjindı̄ma wanted to establish their 
own new superseding precedent of cultivation on the island by moving 
quickly to take it over once it was connected to the shore. Theirs was thus 
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an effort to create new facts on a new ground. They attempted to entrench 
a new physical reality so as to precipitate a reimagining of the island as their 
possession. In this case, however, the court upheld that the recent connection 
of the island to the shore did not change who enjoyed cultivation rights to the 
island. Thus even in the face of literally shifting geographies and challenges 
to established imaginations of the Egyptian countryside, here, as elsewhere 
in the Ottoman Empire, precedent continued to reign supreme.
 What is not made explicitly clear in this case is the legal status of the 
new land that emerged from underneath the water. The judge made no 
determination in this regard. Thus here again it seems that there was resis-
tance to reimagining this land as having a legal status other than the one 
that previously obtained. Perhaps establishing rights to cultivate this new 
piece of earth was considered unnecessary since all knew that land near 
the Nile and its canals regularly appeared and disappeared as the river rose 
and fell. It was only a matter of time, therefore, before this land was again 
flooded over, making the complexities of its legal status rather irrelevant. 
As we saw previously, however, in cases involving the dredging of canals 
between villages on opposite sides of a waterway, there was an imaginary 
line established down the center of canals splitting the responsibilities of 
cleaning and dredging them into equal parts. Was such a notion at play in 
this case that made the establishment of rights to the new land unnecessary 
since it was clearly that of the nearest village? These questions are at their 
base inquiries into how silt and dirt were imagined and legally assessed 
in rural Ottoman Egypt. Despite the lack of explicit answers to some of 
these questions, we should nevertheless not assume that these issues were 
somehow not debated or disputed in Ottoman Egypt. Clearly they were, 
as evidenced by the numerous court cases produced to deal with Egypt’s 
ever-shifting rural terrain.
 Another of these cases shows how conceptions of precedent and a 
notion of shared usage similar to that discussed previously came to gov-
ern the management of peasant actions precipitated by physical changes 
to alluvial islands. In the spring of 1792, a series of cases came to the court 
of al-Bah. ayra about an island in a branch of the Nile between the villages 
of Nitmā and Kafr al-Gharı̄b.38 From times of old (min qadı̄m al-zamān), 
these two villages had equally shared the island in sowing and cultiva-
tion.39 Beginning a few years earlier, however, the tax farmer of the village 
of Nitmā started preventing the peasants of Kafr al-Gharı̄b from coming 
to cultivate their fields on the island. Moreover, because of the strength 
of the Nile’s crashing waters, the river “ate” (akala) most of the section 
of the island that had historically been cultivated by the people of Kafr 
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al-Gharı̄b. Thus, needless to say, this situation caused great hardship and 
concern for the peasants of Kafr al-Gharı̄b, since not only had the total 
area of their section of the island’s agricultural land decreased because of 
the Nile’s encroachment, but the whole of the lands that did remain were 
taken over by the peasants of Nitmā. In the face of this difficult state of 
affairs, the firman issued in this case directed the people of Kafr al-Gharı̄b 
to take back half of the reduced total area of the island so that, as before, 
both villages again cultivated equal halves of this bounded piece of land. 
Indeed, these cases cite the imperative to return to the precedent from 
times of old that the two villages were to split the island’s area equally.40 
As such, these cases also end with an admonition, if even a formulaic one, 
to both villages to never again act against this principle of equal usage—
one of the basic conceptual ideals shaping how the rural landscape was to 
be managed.
 In this example, as in most, the set of strictures that determined how 
disputes over a shared island were to be resolved was precedent. Precedent, 
then, was the “law” as it came to be practiced in rural Ottoman courts. 
Over and over in these cases, judges, litigants, and witnesses underscore 
their ideas of environmental resource management by invoking the way 
things have always been done, again “from times of old” (min qadı̄m al-
zamān), as a justification for why they should remain that way. Thus in 
the face of a rural topography that was constantly changing, the Ottoman 
bureaucracy of Egypt and the province’s peasants sought to preserve a 
social order based on their understandings of the previous shape of the 
Egyptian countryside. Principally through its courts, the Ottoman impe-
rial bureaucracy strove to make the countryside match its ideal imagining 
of the history and function of the rural Egyptian world. And through their 
recourse to these courts, groups of Egyptian peasants sought to preserve 
their history of cultivation and water usage rights.
 To put it differently, the Ottoman state attempted to prevent environ-
mental change from dictating its imperial rule. Although the empire could 
do very little to prevent the environmental impacts of erosion, siltation, 
or flood, it could attempt to prevent these natural forces from changing 
its management of the Egyptian countryside.41 This is perhaps an obvious 
point—that existing political powers want to preserve the status quo of 
their rule. For their part, Egyptian peasants were likewise so invested in this 
imperial system of natural resource management that they too had a stake 
in its preservation. Nevertheless, neither Ottoman imperial power nor 
Egyptian peasant knowledge of local environments could prevent islands 
from becoming larger and smaller or from connecting and disconnecting 
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from the mainland. Thus to preserve a sustainable rural social order given 
these constants of change, the state—through cooperation and contesta-
tion with Egyptian peasants—upheld and defended precedent, cultivated 
ideals of sharing and community, and financed and supported irrigation 
repair work in an effort to fashion the countryside in accord with its own 
imperial environmental imagination.
WHEN ANALYZING the environmental imaginaries and rule of political 
entities like the Ottoman Empire, it is essential to define the specific spa-
tial demarcations within which such polities exist. In the case of Ottoman 
Egypt, the physical outlines and shape of this province were constantly 
changing. As the Nile’s waters pushed silt along or allowed it to settle, some 
lands were submerged and others appeared. Canal embankments were 
eroded away, and islands often changed size or connected to the shore. 
Through a consideration of how precedent was defended and of the legal 
and social mechanisms used to establish responsibility over irrigation 
works, I have attempted in this chapter to outline part of the environmen-
tal imaginary of Ottoman state bureaucrats and Egyptian peasants as it 
emerged in their dealings with the rural environment’s forever shifting ter-
rain. In contemporary parlance, we would say that the Ottoman Empire’s 
“environmental policy” in dealing with the dirt and water of early modern 
Egypt was to return irrigation works to their former states of functionality 
through dredging or some other means of environmental manipulation 
and to uphold previous local cultivation rights no matter the changes 
made to the land. In sum, the Ottoman Empire’s goal was to maintain the 
physical parameters of the rural environment in accord both with local 
Egyptian imagined conceptions of its past and with perceived notions of 
its most efficient function in the present moment.
 The twin examples of dredging and islands thus highlight two very 
different aspects of Ottoman rule in Egypt as it relates to local commu-
nities—respectively, peasant responsibilities of maintenance and peasant 
rights of cultivation. Whereas the former was an imposition on village 
communities, the latter was a privilege. Both however were ultimately de-
rived from and sustained by notions of what proximity, shared usage, com-
munity, and precedent represented for the users of canals and the farm-
ers of lands fed by these waterways. Such environmental ideals and the 
imaginations that underlay them—though often submerged under water 
and buried in the dirt—are fundamental to any understanding not only of 
the history of rural Ottoman Egypt, but also of the Ottoman Empire as a 
whole and of riparian communities more generally.
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Davis, Beshara Doumani, Huri İslamoğlu, and Edith Sheffer. My sincere thanks 
as well to the very helpful staffs of the Prime Ministry’s Ottoman Archive in 
Istanbul and the National Archives of Egypt in Cairo.
1. The sedimentary processes that formed the Nile Delta began during 
the Upper Miocene. Scot E. Smith and Adel Abdel-Kader, “Coastal Erosion 
along the Egyptian Delta,” Journal of Coastal Research 4, no. 2 (1988): 245–55; 
Rushdi Said, The Geological Evolution of the River Nile (New York: Springer-
Verlag, 1981).
2. Herodotus, The History, trans. David Grene (Chicago: University of Chi-
cago Press, 1987), 2.5.
3. Approximately half of the total sediment load of 125 million tons car-
ried by the river each year into Egypt was discharged to the Mediterranean. 
Smith and Abdel-Kader, “Coastal Erosion,” 249. For a further analysis of these 
Delta sediments, see Janusz Dominik and Daniel Jean Stanley, “Boron, Beryl-
lium and Sulfur in Holocene Sediments and Peats of the Nile Delta, Egypt: 
Their Use as Indicators of Salinity and Climate,” Chemical Geology 104, no. 1–4 
(1993): 203–16.
4. Herodotus, History, 2.15.
5. John Antes, Observations on the Manners and Customs of the Egyptians, 
the Overflowing of the Nile and its Effects; with Remarks on the Plague and Other 
Subjects. Written During a Residence of Twelve Years in Cairo and its Vicinity 
(London: Printed for J. Stockdale, 1800), 64–65. For a study of these fossil-
ized mollusks in the Delta, see Maria Pia Bernasconi, Daniel Jean Stanley, and 
Italo Di Geronimo, “Molluscan Faunas and Paleobathymetry of Holocene 
Sequences in the Northeastern Nile Delta, Egypt,” Marine Geology 99, no. 1–2 
(1991): 29–43.
6. Antes, Observations, 74–75.
7. Ibid., 75.
8. Smith and Abdel-Kader, “Coastal Erosion”; Abdel-Aziz I. Kashef, “Salt-
Water Intrusion in the Nile Delta,” Ground Water 21, no. 2 (1983): 160–67; 
Omran E. Frihy, Alfy M. Fanos, Ahmed A. Khafagy, and Paul D. Komar, “Pat-
terns of Nearshore Sediment Transport along the Nile Delta, Egypt,” Coastal 
Engineering 15, no. 5–6 (1991): 409–29. See also J. R. McNeill, Something New 
Under the Sun: An Environmental History of the Twentieth-Century World (New 
York: W. W. Norton, 2000), 166–73.
9. Mohamed A. K. Elsayed, Nazeih A. Younan, Alfy M. Fanos, and Khalid H. 
Baghdady, “Accretion and Erosion Patterns along Rosetta Promontory, Nile 
Delta Coast,” Journal of Coastal Research 21, no. 3 (2005), 413. From 1900 to 
1964 (when construction of the Aswan High Dam began), the average rate 
of erosion was much lower: about 50 meters/year. As with most aspects of 
environmental or historical change, this was neither a completely linear nor 
130  |   Alan Mikhail
universal phenomenon. Even into the nineteenth century, some parts of the 
Delta continued to expand into the sea. For example between 1500 and 1900, 
sections of the Rosetta promontory advanced into the sea at an average rate of 
25 meters/year.
10. Smith and Abdel-Kader, “Coastal Erosion,” 249.
11. Much of the writing of environmental history has privileged the stories of 
very big changes to the natural world—coastal erosion, climate change, defor-
estation, species extinction, and so forth. As this chapter attempts to illustrate, 
however, the minutiae of these enormous ecological processes as well as other 
independent small-scale environmental changes are of no less historical and 
environmental significance and are thus equally deserving of our attention.
12. For the Arabic critical edition of this very important text and an Eng-
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al-Mis.riyya min 
(Ahd Qudamā ) al-Mis.riyyı̄n ilā Sanat 1945, 6 vols. in 2 parts 
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century work: Jalāl al-Dı̄n al-Sayūt.ı̄, Kawkab al-Raud. a, ed. Muh. ammad 
al-Shashtāwı̄ (Cairo: Dār al-Āfāq al-(Arabiyya, 2002).
The Ottoman historian Mus.t.afā 
(Ālı̄, who visited Egypt at the end of 
the sixteenth century, describes the Nilometer as “indeed one of the rare 
creations of the world and of the curious works resembling magical devices.” 
Andreas Tietze, Mus.t.afā 
(Ālı̄ ’s Description of Cairo of 1599: Text, Transliteration, 
Translation, Notes (Vienna: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der 
Wissenschaften, 1975), 30. More generally on the Nilometer, see William 
Popper, The Cairo Nilometer: Studies in Ibn Taghrî Birdî’s Chronicles of Egypt, 
I (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1951); Amı̄n Sāmı̄, Taqwı̄m al-Nı̄l, 5 
vols. in 3 parts (Cairo: Dār al-Kutub wa al-Wathā)iq al-Qawmiyya, 2003), part 
1, 65–95; Nicholas Warner, The True Description of Cairo: A Sixteenth-Century 
Venetian View, 3 vols. (Oxford: Arcadian Library in association with Oxford 
University Press, 2006), 2:123–25.
33. al-Jabartı̄, (Ajā )ib al-Āthı̄r, 2:363–64.
34. Ibid., 2:363.
35. Ibid., 2:363–64. A few decades later in May 1812 the Nile in Cairo dried to 
such an extent that it was possible to walk on the exposed riverbed nearly the 
entire width of the river from Būlāq to Imbāba. Ibid., 4:246.
36. Mad. ābit. al-Daqahliyya 34, pp. 93–94, case 198 (21 S 1211/25 August 1796), 
DWQ. On the village of Qūjindı̄ma, see Ramzı̄, Al-Qāmūs al-Jughrāfı̄ , part 1, 
no vol. number, 354. On T. alkhā, see ibid., part 2, vol. 2, 88.
37. For cases in which the presence of irrigation works on an island was 
used as evidence of the continued cultivation of that island by a particular 
group of peasants, see Mah. kamat al-Mans.ūra 7, p. 90, case 240 (3 Ca 1091/31 
May 1680), DWQ.
38. Mah. kamat al-Bah. ayra 21, p. 152, case 298 (12 Ş 1206/4 April 1792), DWQ; 
Mah. kamat al-Bah. ayra 21, p. 480, case 943 (25 B 1206/19 March 1792), DWQ. On 
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Nitmā, see Ramzı̄, Al-Qāmūs al-Jughrāfı̄ , part 2, vol. 2, 340. On Kafr al-Gharı̄b, 
see ibid., part 2, vol. 2, 169.
39. Of note here is the use of the colloquial Egyptian Arabic verb declension 
in the following passage: “ahālı̄  al-nāh. yatayn al-madhkūratayn biyazra
(ū 
at.yānahā” (the people of the two aforementioned villages cultivate its [the 
island’s] lands). Mah. kamat al-Bah. ayra 21, p. 480, case 943 (25 B 1206/19 March 
1792), DWQ. This and other instances of the use of colloquial Egyptian Arabic 
in the normally formal Arabic texts of Islamic court cases are important 
examples of the ways in which Egyptian peasants were able literally to interject 
their voices into the workings of the court and of other bureaucratic structures 
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40. The operative phrase in the following case is “h. ukm mā kānū 
(alayhi min 
qadı̄m al-zamān” (in accordance with what they practiced from times of old): 
Mah. kamat al-Bah. ayra 21, p. 152, case 298 (12 Ş 1206/4 April 1792), DWQ. In the 
other case, the phrase is: “h. ukm mā kānū awwal 
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p. 480, case 943 (25 B 1206/19 March 1792), DWQ.
41. As an example of these efforts on the part of the Ottoman state in Egypt, 
consider the speed with which the two court cases related to the previous 
island dispute were adjudicated and implemented. Only seventeen days 
elapsed between the date of the original petition and the date of the second 
case confirming that the orders of the firman issued in response to this petition 
were implemented. In other words, in two and a half weeks, a petition was 
written, delivered to Cairo, and heard by the high divan of Egypt; this petition 
was discussed and a decision was made; the piece of paper on which the divan’s 
firman was written was transported from Cairo to al-Damanhūr, the seat of 
the court of al-Bah. ayra (a distance of roughly 100 miles); it was then delivered 
to the appropriate representatives of the subprovince; these men discussed the 
best way to address the situation; their plan was implemented; the results of 
this implementation were heard by the court; and the case reporting these 
results was recorded in the registers of this legal body. On al-Damanhūr and 
its hinterland, see Ramzı̄, Al-Qāmūs al-Jughrāfı̄ , part 2, vol. 2, 282–97. Not only 
does the speed with which all of this occurred suggest a very efficient process 
of Ottoman imperial rule that relied on networks of communication, roads, 
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to undertake all the steps in these bureaucratic processes, but it also serves as 
further evidence of the imperative to quickly establish and uphold precedent.
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İmparatorluğunda Ziraî Ekonominin Hukukî ve Malî Esasları. İstanbul Üni-
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(Ālı̄ ’s Description of Cairo of 1599: Text, Transliteration, 
Translation, Notes. Vienna: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wis-
senschaften, 1975.
Warner, Nicholas. The True Description of Cairo: A Sixteenth-Century Venetian 
View. 3 vols. Oxford: Arcadian Library in association with Oxford Univer-
sity Press, 2006.
C h a p t e r  5
Drafting a Map of  
Colonial Egypt
The 1902 Aswan Dam, Historical Imagination, and the Production 
of Agricultural Geography
Jennifer L. Derr
IN DECEMBER 1902, with much pomp and circumstance, Egypt’s Brit-
ish and Egyptian elite celebrated the completion of the first Aswan dam. 
The 1902 Aswan dam (Khazan Aswan) represented a dramatic new foray in 
the colonial government’s ability to manipulate the physical environment 
and allocate its most valuable resource. Egypt’s economic livelihood had 
always depended on the annual Nile flood, and successive governments 
spearheaded irrigation works to best capitalize on this resource. Follow-
ing their 1882 occupation of Egypt, the British were no exception. In the 
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, newly powerful forms of 
irrigation infrastructure facilitated the engineering of colonial geography 
through the spatial and temporal reconfiguration of the Nile. I argue that 
the significance of the 1902 dam lay in the manner in which it configured 
Egypt as a colony, specifically its environment, pursuing the following 
questions: First, how did colonial technocrats imagine and map the colo-
nial Egyptian environment? Second, how did this particular imagination 
render possible the construction of the dam and its associated irrigation 
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infrastructure? Finally, how did irrigation infrastructure rearticulate the 
colonial geography of Egypt, facilitating the emergence of a regionally dif-
ferentiated agricultural landscape? The construction of the dam and the 
entrenchment of new irrigation regimes reflected a particular vision of 
the rural Egyptian environment as well as the potential of newly powerful 
infrastructural forms to transform colonial territory.
British Rule and the Construction of the Dam
The standard narrative of the 1902 Aswan dam explains its construction as 
the product of British industrial demand for Egyptian cotton.1 Widespread 
cultivation of export-oriented cotton in Egypt began in the first portion 
of the nineteenth century during the rule of Mehmed Ali, Egypt’s strong 
Ottoman governor. At the time of the British invasion, cotton represented 
Egypt’s primary economic resource and the means by which this colony 
could be made productive within a colonial framework. The British colo-
nial administration in Egypt was eager to construct a dam on the Nile to 
Figure 5.1. The completed 1902 Aswan Dam, viewed from downstream. D. S. George 
and William E. Garstin, The Nile Reservoir Works at Aswan and Asyut, Cairo: 1902. 
Reproduced with the permission of The Harry Ransom Humanities Research Center, The 
University of Texas at Austin.
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increase Egyptian cotton production and supplies to British mills. Discus-
sions concerning possible locations for the dam and the technical aspects 
of the grandiose project began in the early years of the occupation. Evelyn 
Baring, the first Earl of Cromer and the British consul-general, requested 
£E500,000 from Egypt’s reserve fund to pursue the project, only to find 
his request blocked by the French and Russian members of La Caisse de la 
Dette Publique (the Public Debt Commission).2 In 1895, Cromer raised the 
issue to the powers in London, with the idea that the profits from a dam 
could help finance a British invasion of Sudan. After a period of indecision, 
the British opted to pursue a military campaign in Sudan instead of con-
structing the reservoir. However, Cromer and his business allies remained 
enthusiastic about the dam project, and the consul-general concocted a 
plan by which an English engineering firm, Sir John Aird and Co., would 
build a dam over a period of five years, and the “Egyptian” government 
would repay the cost of construction over a thirty-year period.3
 Ernest Cassel, a German British businessman active in many facets of 
the Egyptian economy during the first three decades of British colonialism, 
came forward with the money to build the dam and a barrage at Asyut to 
control the release of stored water. The Asyut barrage was complemented 
by a series of similar barrages designed to increase the availability of water 
in specific regions of Egypt.4 Following the completion of the initial dam, 
a debate began almost immediately concerning the demand for water.5 As 
a result, the dam was raised twice: first between 1907 and 1912, and again 
between 1929 and 1933.
 In the early twentieth century, Egypt possessed approximately six and 
half million irrigable acres. Following the construction of the Aswan dam, 
around four million of those acres were perennially irrigated. In Modern 
Egypt, Lord Cromer boasts of the achievements of British irrigation engi-
neers, describing the irrigation infrastructure associated with the dam in 
glowing terms. He claimed that in the first ten years of British administra-
tion “the cotton crop was trebled, the sugar crop more than trebled, and 
the country was gradually being covered with a network of light railways 
and agricultural roads in order to enable the produce to be brought to 
market.”6 Cromer describes a decaying Egyptian irrigation system that was 
revived, expanded, and advanced by the work of British irrigation engi-
neers in the early years of the occupation.7 However, Cromer’s enthusiasm 
for new infrastructure was limited to that which facilitated the expansion 
of Egyptian cash crop agriculture and moved goods to Mediterranean 
ports for transport to England. His conceptual map of the Egyptian co-
lonial environment was simple, yet involved both temporal and spatial 
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transformations: Water from the Nile would soak a larger surface area of 
Egyptian land with greater frequency to grow more cotton. For Cromer, 
the process of colonizing Egypt extended beyond politics to include the 
mastery and structuring of the raw material of its environment.
Engineers and Technocrats
The dam itself, as a showpiece of environmental infrastructure, was a fun-
damental component of the unfolding relationship between colonialism 
and environmental engineering within the context of British Empire. In 
British India, the practice of engineering the environment contributed to 
the processes of imagining and building colonies. During the nineteenth 
century, the profession of civil engineering evolved from a profession re-
quiring little formal training, dependent on field experience and experi-
mentation, to one characterized by a body of predictive theory, demanding 
more formal training.8 In 1847, the Roorkee Civil Engineering College, later 
renamed the Thomason College of Civil Engineering, was founded on the 
Ganges Canal in India, and in 1871, the government of India established 
an engineering school at Cooper’s Hill in England to train future genera-
tions of British, and eventually Indian, civil engineers. Notable members of 
Egypt’s first generation of colonial engineers, including William Willcocks 
and William Garstin, were educated at Thomason and began their careers 
in India. Willcocks crafted the initial plans for the Aswan dam, and Garstin 
became the British “adviser” to the Ministry of Public Works in 1892.9
 Exploring the work of Willcocks, one of Egypt’s most noteworthy 
colonial engineers, highlights the positions of colonial technocrats in 
the projects of colonialism and civil engineering. Willcocks, the son of a 
British irrigation engineer, was born and raised in India. His father was 
posted to India after serving in the Bengal Horse Artillery and fighting in 
Afghanistan. At the age of eighteen, Willcocks enrolled in the Thomason 
Civil Engineering College at Roorkee. Following graduation, he was assigned 
to several different locations in India. With the British occupation of 
Egypt, another fellow engineer working in India, Sir Colin Scott-Moncrieff 
assumed the position of undersecretary of public works in Egypt. Scott-
Moncrieff recruited irrigation engineers from India for the higher posts of 
the irrigation service, and in 1883, Willcocks accepted a post as an irrigation 
inspector in the regions of the Nile Delta that the Egyptian Ministry of 
Public Works classified as the “second circle of irrigation.”10
 Willcocks played an active role in Egypt’s world of colonial governance. 
He emerged as an early critic of corvée, a practice that supplied the bulk of 
the labor force for the Ministry of Public Works, especially in clearing canals 
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and maintaining irrigation infrastructure during the Nile’s annual flood. In 
1890, the British administration sent Willcocks on a mission to Italy, France, 
and England to investigate various irrigation technologies and plan for the 
construction of a dam at Aswan. At the request of Ernest Cassel, Willcocks 
accepted a position as the chairman of the Daira Sanieh Company in 1899. 
Composed of a prominent set of businessmen that dominated the Egyptian 
economy during this early British colonial period, the Daira Sanieh Com-
pany was charged with the sale of the former khedive’s agricultural proper-
ties to private owners.11 Willcocks’s association with the company tied him 
closely to the matrix of elite business interests that helped fund colonial 
infrastructure and reaped its benefits through the distribution of more valu-
able agricultural property and the expansion of cash crop cultivation.
 Although he eventually left Egypt and turned against the irrigation 
infrastructure that he helped build, Willcocks was, in many ways, em-
blematic of the colonial technocrats that engineered the British Empire. 
Although not all were born and raised in the far reaches of the empire, 
many ventured into this realm for technical education at relatively young 
ages and served as colonial administrators for much of their adult lives. 
Whereas political administrators managed one set of affairs in the empire, 
colonial engineers designed the physical infrastructure of the colony and 
this, in turn, determined patterns of agricultural production and the geog-
raphy on which peasant agricultural life was lived. The historian of South 
Asia David Gilmartin reads Willcocks as the embodiment of imperial en-
gineering and its association with the colonial state, and this characteriza-
tion is largely suitable for the first portion of Willcocks’s career.12 However, 
Willcocks’s ideology and public role underwent a transformation due to 
his critique of perennial irrigation and his subsequent estrangement from 
the British colonial establishment in Egypt. In his memoir, one senses the 
distance that separated engineers like Willcocks from political functionar-
ies: Willcocks’s attitude toward Cromer is lukewarm at best, and he argues 
that Kitchener, consul-general between 1911 and 1914, did not strive to im-
prove the colony.13 He viewed himself and the project of colonial engineer-
ing as distinct from political colonialism and administration. Although 
engineers represented vital components of the colonial project, they un-
derstood their mandate to be both related to and distinct from what we 
commonly consider the body of practices that constitute colonialism.
Reading the Egyptian Environment with Colonial Eyes
Although the British demand for Egyptian cotton fueled support for the 
dam’s construction, that the project of damming the Nile was thought 
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plausible reflected a colonial imagining of the Egyptian environment that 
extended beyond economic and political considerations. The idea that the 
Nile could be dammed was premised on a particular conceptualization 
of the “natural” environment associated with the Nile and the practice of 
agriculture within that environment. Reading the environment was a vital 
step in constructing conceptual maps of Egypt’s historical landscape and 
tangible maps of its environment. Colonial technocrats assembled histori-
cal frames of reference to situate and contextualize the history of the Egyp-
tian environment, the organization of the river within that geography, and 
the place of its human components. A voluminous body of literature de-
scribes the Egyptian environment of the late nineteenth and early twenti-
eth centuries.14 Whereas many colonial engineers focused on matters more 
directly technical, the work of William Willcocks ranged more widely. His 
conclusions and method are individual. However, they reflected broader 
assumptions, thought patterns, and practices among colonial officials. The 
construction of the dam and its articulation of the Egyptian environment 
made stark the significance of these visions.
 One popular frame of reference among colonial technocrats concerned 
Egypt’s significance within biblical history. For many Europeans, the pro-
cess of discovering Egypt in the late nineteenth century was intimately 
connected to the imagining of a more ancient biblical landscape. This emo-
tional relationship to the Egyptian environment, as the historical backdrop 
for an imagined biblical past, fueled the popularity of tours to Egypt and 
Palestine among wealthy Europeans during the nineteenth century. The 
desire to associate nineteenth-century Egypt with Christian beginnings was 
not limited to tourists; for colonial officials of many stripes, biblical history 
functioned as a touchstone for their encounters with nineteenth-century 
Egypt. These individuals sometimes doubled as amateur biblical scholars, 
dabbling in archeology, particularly its more speculative aspects. William 
Willcocks was no exception. In 1919, Willcocks published From the Garden of 
Eden to the Crossing of the Jordan. Portions of this text were originally given 
as a series of lectures to the Geographical Society of Cairo, the Egyptian 
Institute, and the Royal Geographical Society of London. From the Garden 
of Eden situates colonial endeavors in agriculture and irrigation within the 
context of the biblical histories of Egypt and Mesopotamia (Iraq). Willcocks 
juxtaposes a wide variety of late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century 
observations with interpretations of the biblical epoch.
In Joseph’s day, the Pyramids were standing, the basin irriga-
tion of the Nile valley had been functioning for some 3500 
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years, the low lands of the Delta had been reclaimed 600 years 
before, and all this wealth had been insured against inundation 
by the Lake Moeris escape, one of the wonders of the an-
cient world. We to-day have not succeeded in reclaiming one-
tenth of the low lands of the Delta, and that tenth is uninsured 
against inundation. Three thousand five hundred years ago the 
Egyptian question was the irrigation question, even more thor-
oughly than it is in our day.15
Although Willcocks’s text was published two decades after the construc-
tion of the 1902 dam, situating Egyptian history within a biblical narrative 
was firmly entrenched within strands of the British historical imagination. 
Egypt’s biblical past was not only imagined as technologically and agri-
culturally advanced; this vision was part and parcel of a larger historical 
imagining that emptied several millennia of Egyptian history of historical 
change. Cast in this light, colonial efforts in irrigation sought to recapture 
the historical glory of the biblical epoch.
 An obsession with biblical Egypt correlated with a similarly intense 
focus on ancient Egypt. European fascination with ancient civilizations, 
especially as manifested by the profession of Egyptology and restoration of 
ancient Egyptian ruins, thrived in the late nineteenth century. As ancient 
Egypt formed the political backdrop for many biblical stories, the imagin-
ing of Egypt as a biblical scape and the fixation on a distant past were inter-
twined. During the colonial period, the ruins of this past were important 
attributes of the Egyptian environment. The colonial fixation on ancient 
Egypt resulted in the conversion of ruins into monuments. Most European 
tourists of the colonial period encountered Egypt through Nile cruises that 
stopped at various ancient Egyptian sites. Images of Egypt from the period, 
especially its south, present an Egyptian environment dotted by ruins and 
inhabited by peasants living through historical practices dating back thou-
sands of years. Both Egyptologists working on restoration projects in the 
south and anthropologists of the period raced to record the lifestyles and 
habits of southern Egyptian peasants because they interpreted them as the 
living embodiments of an ancient Egypt.16 This reading of Egypt’s history 
and environment relegated Egyptian cultivators to an ancient past, erasing 
several millennia of political, economic, and cultural transformation.
 Ancient Egypt was not only a historical reference point; restoration 
projects and tourism reinscribed these sites on contemporary colonial geog-
raphy. When discussions of building a dam began, European Egyptologists 
fumed at the possibility that it would flood the Philae Temple that lay just 
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upstream of the dam. In the lead-up to the dam’s construction, Captain 
H. G. Lyons, an Egyptologist, surveyed the temples of Philae and pub-
lished his findings. With money from the Public Debt Commission, the 
foundations of the temples were shored up in preparation for their partial 
flooding.17 While Philae was ultimately flooded for portions of the year, the 
debate that unfolded about its possible destruction illustrated the integral-
ity of ancient Egyptian ruins within the colonial Egyptian environment.
 Whereas one prevalent conceptual map of colonial Egypt was marked 
by the re-presenting of biblical and ancient Egyptian history, other facets 
of the environment were relegated to a distant past. One such facet con-
cerned the practice of irrigation. As most fertile land in Egypt was confined 
to those areas that bordered the Nile, Egyptian agriculture followed the 
rhythms of the Nile’s annual flood. Until the nineteenth century, a form 
of irrigation known as basin irrigation predominated in Egypt. Basin ir-
rigation spread the waters of the flood throughout stretches of agricultural 
land bordered by the Nile on one side and desert on the other. During the 
flood, the waters of the Nile were directed through large manmade canals 
connected to series of basins formed by earthen dikes running both 
Figure 5.2. “The Island of Philae.” D. S. George and William E. Garstin, The Nile Res-
ervoir Works at Aswan and Asyut, Cairo, 1902. Reproduced with the permission of The 
Harry Ransom Humanities Research Center, The University of Texas at Austin.
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parallel and perpendicular to the Nile. Regulated sluices directed water 
into each of the basins, where it soaked the soil in preparation for sowing. 
High dikes running parallel to the Nile protected against direct inundation 
while transverse dikes made possible regulated gradual inundation. Basins 
were filled with water for approximately forty-five days of the year with an 
average depth of one meter when each basin was full. When this period 
had elapsed, the remaining water was drained to another basin or canal 
and farmers planted their crops in the basins that had been evacuated.18
 As the process of colonizing Egypt entailed the creation of a new 
geography of water and agriculture, colonial technocrats were first charged 
with understanding the map of existing practice and infrastructure. They 
deployed a historical frame of reference derived from an imagination of 
a biblical and ancient Egyptian past, and naturalized preexisting irriga-
tion methods, specifically basin irrigation, and the practice of agriculture. 
Colonial technocrats elided the relationship between Ottoman provincial 
politics and irrigation management, describing the basins of Egypt as if 
they belonged to an ancient geography.
Considering the times of flood and low supply, the climate of 
Egypt, the turbidity of the Nile flood, and the deltaic formation 
of the Nile Valley, no better system than basin irrigation as prac-
ticed in Egypt could possibly have been devised. If the flood had 
come in April or May and been followed by a burning summer, 
or if the actual autumn floods had been followed by the frozen 
winters of Europe or the warm winters of the Sudan, basin ir-
rigation would have been a failure or a moderate success; but, 
given the Egyptian climate, basin irrigation has stood without 
rival for 7000 years. . . . King Menes made his first dyke when the 
Egyptian nation was in its infancy. Egypt, in Roman times, sup-
ported a population denser than that of to-day.19
Technocratic visions of Egypt rendered static the system of basin irrigation 
managed by the Ottoman and Mamluk regimes that predated Mehmed 
Ali’s rise to power in the early nineteenth century. The effect of this read-
ing of the Egyptian landscape was to renaturalize Egypt’s landscape de-
spite the existence of complex historical practices tied to irrigation and 
cultivation. During the three centuries of Ottoman-Mamluk rule, irriga-
tion management was an important element of local provincial politics. 
Although ancient Egyptian civilizations practiced complex irrigation meth-
ods, these practices and the geographies that they produced evolved in the 
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millennia separating the rise of Islamic polities in Egypt and Mehmed Ali’s 
nineteenth-century state. A similar imagining of the agricultural popula-
tion complemented this naturalization of basin irrigation. Descriptions 
of irrigation and agriculture were curiously devoid of human actors. As 
conceived in these narratives, agricultural geography was made up of fixed 
and passive crops, water usage patterns, and irrigation infrastructure. 
Agricultural communities, harvest, and consumption were absent, as they 
would have exposed the dynamism of this agricultural geography and the 
weaknesses of a static map.
Structuring a Colonial Agricultural Geography
A particular(ly) colonial imagination of the Egyptian environment framed 
the construction of the 1902 dam. This conceptualization not only under-
stood the composition of the “natural” environment to contain and exclude 
certain components; it interpreted the Egyptian environment as funda-
mentally malleable and ripe for manipulation. Although the objective mo-
tivating the construction of the dam was increased cotton production, this 
manipulation also resulted in the production of a new, regionally differenti-
ated map of water. Because cotton was centered in Egypt’s northern half, 
perennial irrigation as associated with the state did not spread into south-
ern Egypt until the 1930s. Although the dam was at Aswan, near Egypt’s 
southernmost border, the land that benefited from the newly available 
water lay in northern and central Egypt. Of the areas that remained under 
basin irrigation (not irrigated by the dam), Lord Cromer estimated in 1904 
that 750,000 of the two million acres lay in Egypt’s south, between Asyut 
in central Egypt and Qina to its south.20 During this same period, none of 
the lands lying between Qina and Egypt’s southernmost city of Aswan were 
perennially irrigated by the state. The situation of the south with respect to 
irrigation water remained much the same in 1915 after the first heighten-
ing of the dam. Sir Murdoch MacDonald, a prominent colonial engineer, 
reported that while water was available during the summer months to the 
agricultural regions lying between Cairo and Asyut, the 560,000 feddans 
lying between Asyut and Baliana (south of Asyut), did not have access to 
summer water.21 In short, the initial construction of the dam and its first 
heightening only provided perennial irrigation to those regions that lay to 
the north of Asyut. The project to irrigate the remaining areas of southern 
Egypt via state infrastructure did not become a priority until the dam was 
raised for a second time (1929–33) and a barrage constructed at Naj) Ham-
madi (1927–30), which facilitated the watering of the region between Asyut 
and Baliana without the use of privately funded mechanized irrigation.22
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 The 1902 Aswan dam transformed water from a local resource into one 
that could be controlled and allocated at the level of the central state. The 
agricultural economy structured by the dam was intimately tied to the co-
lonial state’s capacity to employ newfound environmental infrastructure to 
reconfigure its environment and physical territory in dramatic new ways. 
The fact of Egypt’s intimate relationship with cotton under Cromer’s rule is 
well documented.23 What this story omits is the impact of this agricultural 
formation on regions of the country spatially situated outside the geog-
raphy of cotton and perennial irrigation. As one traveled south along the 
Nile in Egypt, export-oriented cotton cultivation decreased dramatically 
until it eventually became nonexistent.24 Limited by climate and geogra-
phy, most experiments cultivating long-staple exportable cotton south of 
Asyut did not succeed. Those areas that did not cultivate cotton remained 
on the periphery of Egypt’s agricultural economy in the early years of the 
century. The overwhelming dominance of cotton in Egypt’s agricultural 
economy produced an irrigation infrastructure in which southern Egypt 
(between Asyut and Aswan) was the last region to be watered by the state.
 The new map of irrigation not only included temporal changes related 
to the frequency of cultivation and watering; it plotted an expansion of 
the overall agricultural surface area. One explicit objective underlying the 
dam outlined by colonial irrigation engineers was to expand the area of 
cultivable land through land reclamation.25 A number of land reclamation 
companies formed in the early twentieth century and sought to reap the 
profits of an expanding agricultural economy. At the end of World War I, 
the capitalization of land mortgage companies amounted to 45 percent of 
the total capitalization of joint-stock companies operating in Egypt.26 One 
of the most successful land reclamation schemes was the Wadi Kom Ombo 
Company. Purchased in 1904, the Kom Ombo plain, located north of Aswan, 
became a center of sugarcane cultivation and industry in Egypt’s southern-
most region. However, while the boom in land reclamation illustrated the 
primacy of agriculture as profitable business, it also demonstrated a flawed 
understanding of the environmental processes framing agricultural pro-
duction. At first, when land reclamation processes were still being tested, 
faulty procedures and techniques caused the majority of these ventures to 
fail. However, by 1913, the failure of most rural land reclamation companies 
was due to a complex set of causes that included technical difficulties, such 
as the absence of proper drainage systems, and social and economic issues.27 
In order to effectively progress through the process of reclamation, tracts 
of land needed to be populated as a means of providing agricultural labor. 
Many companies did not offer adequate compensation for peasants to 
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move and settle new land. Moreover, the eagerness to extract a quick profit 
doomed a number of these schemes as companies sold peasants partially 
reclaimed land that subsequently reverted to its uncultivable status.
 Irrigated, crop-producing land was the raw material for Egypt’s colo-
nial economy. However, the colonial map of Egypt’s agricultural geography 
extended beyond concrete physical elements like cultivation patterns and 
irrigation practice to include a more abstract landscape of capital flow. In 
assessing Egypt’s potential productivity, William Willcocks estimated that 
one billion cubic meters of water could convert half a million acres to peren-
nial irrigation and that the newly irrigated land would produce £15,000,000 
of profit.28 British administrators and engineers also employed measures of 
land and crop value to assess the regional gradations of Egypt’s economy.
Again, from the broader point of view of the general riches of 
Egypt, the importance of cultivation in the Delta stands far 
ahead of that of Upper Egypt. Cotton, and especially cotton 
grown in the Delta, is by far our most valuable crop and the 
tracts which may be reclaimed in Lower Egypt will be far more 
valuable, feddan for feddan, than those in the southern part of 
the country. The best land in the Delta is now worth L.E. 150–
200 per feddan while the best land in Upper Egypt is worth, if it 
has perennial irrigation, L.E. 100–160 per feddan, and if basin, 
L.E. 50–60.29
As the intention motivating the dam’s construction was never to diversify 
Egypt’s agricultural economy but rather to expand cash crop production, 
measures of land value directly correlated with the flow of irrigation water 
and the potential for cotton production.30 Thus, the geography of irriga-
tion that emerged after 1902 was also marked by a new terrain of value.
 As preference was given to Egypt’s north, much of the south continued 
to follow the system of basin irrigation with its single annual crop. In some 
respects, this was preferable for peasant cultivators. In the Nile Delta, cot-
ton production was associated with the consolidation of property under 
elite landowners and the trend toward sharecropping among increasing 
numbers of once independent peasants. The (izba system, in which peas-
ants provided the labor necessary to cultivate cash crops on large estates in 
exchange for a small plot of land, represented the dominant unit of produc-
tion in cotton-growing areas of the Nile Delta.31 In southern Egypt, land 
tenure patterns varied depending on the crop grown and the local history 
of property sales. In south Minya and north Asyut (central Egypt), large 
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landowners held more than 50 percent of the cultivable land, peasant wage 
labor on large farms was prevalent, and cotton covered more than 30 percent 
of farmland. Much of this land belonged to the former khedivial estates, the 
Daira Sanieh, and was purchased by large landowners in colonial auctions 
in the early twentieth century. However, as one moved south of Asyut and 
the colonial irrigation frontier, cotton cultivation decreased dramatically, 
eventually becoming nonexistent. Property ownership and labor patterns 
in southern Egypt were mixed: In some areas, sugarcane was cultivated as a 
monoculture, and property ownership was characterized by small holdings. 
In others, landowners possessing large estates predominated.32
 Although the two regions were separate in many respects, the demands 
and fluctuations of the northern cotton economy influenced the economic 
realm of southern Egypt. The manpower that fueled the northern cotton 
economy was in part supplied by southern laborers.33 In the second half of 
the nineteenth century, the expansion of cash crop production, industrial-
ization, and construction associated with growth in Cairo and Alexandria 
attracted southerners to northern Egypt in search of wage labor as com-
parable projects in southern Egypt were relatively sparse. Because many 
southern peasants cultivated crops according to the seasons of basin ir-
rigation, the agricultural calendar facilitated a certain amount of labor mi-
gration in the dry season preceding the flood. An interconnected colonial 
economy developed, in which cash crop production depended on migrant 
labor from the south. However, the coalescence of this broader economy 
did not extinguish local economic networks, especially as they thrived in 
peripheral areas of the state. Portions of Egypt’s south cultivated sugarcane 
and a distinct economic realm associated with sugarcane cultivation and 
industry emerged in this region.34
The New Colonial Environment
For technocrats and political administrators, the dam served as a tool with 
which to rearticulate the colony as a physical territory, mapped according 
to irrigation patterns, cotton cultivation, and capital flow. In this sense, 
the dam represented a means of colonizing the Egyptian environment, 
partially through its organization of a cash-crop producing economy. The 
production of colonial geography was also colored by a series of unantici-
pated interactions among pieces of infrastructure, environmental forces, 
cultivation patterns, and Egyptian peasants. The irrigation frontier that 
divided more northern cotton-producing regions from Egypt’s deep south 
demarcated regional differences in the character of the land itself, includ-
ing its relationship with peasant cultivators. A shift in the temporality of 
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irrigation—cultivators now watered the land more frequently throughout 
the year—literally soaked the Nile Delta with irrigation water. The land did 
not respond with the anticipated increased productivity as technocrats failed 
to account for the importance of drainage and the impact of the changed 
relationship between water and soil. The spread of perennial irrigation in 
the Delta meant that canals that once functioned as drains for lands under 
perennial irrigation before the dam’s construction were now filled with 
water and no longer facilitated drainage.35 The absence of drainage mecha-
nisms resulted in a rising subsoil water table in the north of Egypt. The 
continuous presence of water on perennially irrigated lands interfered with 
processes that had promoted soil fertility. In the dry season associated with 
the seasons of flood agriculture known as sharaqi, fallow lands had heated, 
dried, and cracked. These processes aerated the soil, broke up colloids, and 
promoted the growth of nitrifying bacteria.36 However, colonial technocrats 
believed that sharaqi lands reflected wasted agricultural productivity and 
thus discouraged the practice through new irrigation regimes.37 Finally, as 
it was no longer rinsed by periodic flooding over the higher banks of the 
Nile, the salinity of the soil increased. Problems with drainage, soil fertility, 
and salinity not only stunted agricultural production;38 as these problems 
especially plagued the Nile Delta, they signaled the extension of a regionally 
differentiated colonial geography to the character of the land itself.
 The reconfiguration of agriculture stemming from new irrigation pat-
terns also involved the severing of relationships between cultivators and 
local agricultural environments. The construction of the first Aswan dam 
initiated a pattern of land expropriation from predominantly Nubian vil-
lages that culminated with the High Dam and the destruction of historical 
Nubia in 1964. In 1902, the Egyptian government issued a decree declaring 
particular villages part of the public domain. The primary victim of this 
initial expropriation was the village of Shallal—reconstituted under the 
same name at a nearby site in the 1930s—and portions of other neighboring 
villages.39 A special commission composed of a representative from the Min-
istry of Finance, two representatives from the district, and an additional ap-
pointed member assessed individual holdings and compensation payments. 
Entirely expropriated by the state, the inhabitants of Shallal were compen-
sated for the value of their land, in addition to buildings, date palms, and 
henna plants. The inhabitants of villages only partially incorporated into 
the public domain were offered compensation for land and property both 
inside and outside of the new state domain.40 The process of expropriation 
and isolation that began with the 1902 dam continued with future projects 
to heighten the dam. Some villages were totally submerged by the Nile’s 
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new geography near Aswan, but many others faced decreasing agricultural 
opportunities as portions of their farmland were partially submerged, only 
accessible for both sowing and harvesting for brief periods of the year.41
 The archival trail mapping displacement emphasizes its significance as 
a process of geographic reconfiguration rather than community rupture. 
In colonial thought, Egyptian peasants were conceptually figured as either 
agricultural producers or as vessels of ancient tradition. They possessed 
specificity of neither time nor place. For technocrats like Willcocks, the 
imagining of a historically stunted rural Egypt facilitated the conceptual 
transformation of Egyptian peasants into the simplest of agricultural pro-
ducers. The absence of debate concerning the 1902 displacement of Shal-
lal stood in marked contrast to the controversy surrounding the Philae 
Temple. Whereas international outrage erupted at the prospect of destroy-
ing an ancient monument, Egyptian peasants existed as mobile pieces of 
an agricultural landscape. Although the landscape itself was locally differ-
entiated, the imagined simplicity of Egyptian peasants prevented colonial 
technocrats from grasping the significance of the human components of 
that landscape.42 Following the construction of the dam, financial com-
pensation was meant to erase the pain of displacement in communities like 
Shallal, but colonial officials did not recognize the importance of localized 
agricultural relationships associated with specific plots of land.
 Changes in irrigation practice also sparked new struggles with disease. 
In an April 11, 1927, address to l’Institut d’Egypte, Willcocks attributed ris-
ing subsoil water levels to increases in the prevalence of particular diseases, 
specifically bilharzia and “anklyostoma,” among peasants in northern Egypt 
farming land under perennial irrigation.43 Bilharzia, also known as schisto-
somiasis, is a parasitic infection that results from the exposure of skin to in-
fected freshwater containing aquatic snails. “Ankloyostoma” (ancylostoma), 
or hookworm infection, is transmitted by direct contact with contaminated 
soil. Willcocks argued that the incidence of both of these conditions among 
peasants working the land had increased dramatically since the construction 
of the 1902 dam and the spread of perennial irrigation. He claimed that 95 
percent of the peasants working perennially irrigated land in the Delta were 
infected with ancylostoma and 65 percent with bilharzia.44 Although the ac-
curacy of Willcocks’s statistics is questionable, that the dam and the spread 
of perennial irrigation resulted in the increased prevalence of waterborne 
infections among rural populations is not.
 Despite the fact that perennial irrigation was uncommon in southern 
Egypt, peasants in this region faced the threat of malaria. The damming of 
the Nile produced changes in the physical composition of the river and its 
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annual cycles. The river’s ecosystem consequently evolved. Curly pondweed 
(Potamogeton crispus) thrived in this new environment and large traveling 
islands of weeds formed on the river. The Anopheles gambiae mosquitoes 
that transmitted malaria laid eggs on these mobile islands, thus moving 
the disease along the river.45 Because of shifts in the physical environment 
of the dammed river, malaria moved easily into southern Egypt where it 
found a vulnerable human population. In 1942, there was a large malaria 
outbreak in southern Egypt centered in regions devoted to sugarcane cul-
tivation. Timothy Mitchell argues that a changing natural environment, 
market changes produced by World War II, specifically the shortage of 
artificial fertilizers, malnutrition among Upper Egyptian peasants, and the 
consumption of sugarcane lay at the root of this epidemic.46
 These environmental changes and their effects on rural communities 
highlight the failure of irrigation engineers to fully appreciate the impact 
that the dam would have on the ecosystems of the Nile and the lands that 
bordered it. This stemmed, in part, from their conceptualization of the dam 
and the ecosystem in which it was constructed. The engineers who built 
the dam envisioned it as a piece of technology designed to control and aug-
ment a natural, that is, nonhuman, environment. Therefore, the dam was 
represented by sets of technical diagrams composed of pressures, angles, 
strains, and materials. This abstraction resulted from an active process of 
conceptually emptying Egypt’s geography of complicating and dynamic 
variables. As the relationships between different human communities and 
the Nile could not be expressed and stabilized in quantifiable terms, they 
were excluded from the conceptualization of the project. However, above 
and beyond this conceptual absence, the engineers who built the dam did 
not grasp the complexity of the river’s ecosystems and the transformative 
potential of slight changes to the environment. The “natural” ecosystem 
associated with the river included many factors outside of the river itself. 
In this case, the dam’s construction did not cause a minor environmental 
change, but rather dramatically altered the river and its riparian envi-
ronment. Intended as a demonstration of humankind’s ability to harness 
science to manipulate the environment to its own advantage, this project 
ultimately demonstrated this ecosystem’s infinite complexity and its inter-
connectedness with a more broadly defined environment.
Producing the Colony
The history of the 1902 dam illustrates the complex set of relationships 
binding colonial practice to the physical territory of the colony. Just as 
Egypt was imagined culturally and politically, it was also conceptualized as 
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a distinct natural and agricultural environment. The technocratic imagin-
ing of the Egyptian environment rendered particular manipulations of this 
environment plausible: Altering the flow of the Nile across the space of the 
colony was premised on a distinct, if problematic, understanding of the 
relationship between the river, the practice of agriculture, and the human 
communities that inhabited this space. Interpreting this matrix of rela-
tionships was rooted in a reading of the Egyptian environment, including 
its human components, that included a certain history, or in this case, an 
ahistoricity. As increased cotton production fueled the project to build the 
dam, regionally differentiated shifts in cultivation patterns, capital flows, 
and levels of agricultural productivity resulted. Finally, the separation of 
north and south within colonial geography was reinforced by an evolv-
ing physical geography in the north driven by new irrigation practices. 
The processes constituting the production of colonial geography in Egypt 
extended beyond cultivation patterns and the concentration of irrigation 
water to include the physical transformation of the land itself.
 The practice of the colonial state in Egypt intersected with that of the 
natural environment. Infrastructure and irrigation regimes configured the 
Nile’s flow and its relationship to cultivation. The experience of colonial-
ism was, for many cultivators, tied to their interactions with the environ-
ment, especially as framed by agriculture. Irrigation infrastructure was 
not a passive manifestation of colonial policy. Rather, this infrastructure 
played an active role in rearticulating the physical territory of the colony 
and the agricultural spaces with which Egyptian cultivators interacted. As 
infrastructure modified the river and its interactions with the lands and 
communities along its banks, the experience of colonial authority inter-
faced with larger environmental and agricultural trends.
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(DWQ).
38. Richards, “Technical and Social Change in Egyptian Agriculture,” 728.
39. British Embassy, Cairo, to R. S. Scrivner, North and East African Depart-
ment, Foreign Office, London, 16 May 1964, FO 371-178650, BNA.
40. Majlis al-Wuzara), Nitharat al-Ray, 22 January 1881–31 August 1920, al-
Nil, 2/4/b, DWQ.
41. British Embassy, Cairo, to R. S. Scrivner, North and East African Depart-
ment, Foreign Office, London, 16 May 1964, FO 371-178650, BNA.
42. This dynamic began to shift in the 1930s when a debate concerning a 
much larger Nubian displacement emerged as a result of the second project 
to heighten the dam. In this debate, at least two members of the Egyptian 
chamber of deputies, although eventually outvoted, objected to the ease with 
which the Egyptian government sought to uproot and relocate Nubian com-
munities. Despite this limited official objection, communities were displaced 
in 1933, and much of historical Nubia destroyed after the construction of the 
High Dam. Report of the meeting on 13 February 1933, Chambre des Députés, 
FO 141-699-3, BNA.
43. Willcocks, Egyptian Irrigation and the Public Health, 3.
44. Ibid.
45. Timothy Mitchell, Rule of Experts: Egypt, Techno-Politics, Modernity 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002), 24. For an in-depth discus-
sion of the politics surrounding the treatment of the 1942 malaria epidemic, 
see Nancy Gallagher’s Egypt’s Other Wars: Epidemics and the Politics of Public 
Health (Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 1990).
46. Mitchell, Rule of Experts, 23–25.
Bibliography
Archival Sources
The British National Archives, Kew Gardens, United Kingdom.
The Egyptian National Archives, Dar al-Watha)iq al-Qawmiyya, Cairo, Egypt.
Primary and Secondary Sources
Baring, Evelyn, First Earl of Cromer. Modern Egypt. London: Macmillan, 1908.
Blackman, Winifred. The Fellahin of Upper Egypt. 1927. Cairo: American Uni-
versity in Cairo, 2000. 
Drafting a Map of Colonial Egypt: The 1902 Aswan Dam  | 157
Caton-Thompson, Gertrude, and E. W. Gardner. “Recent Work on the Prob-
lem of Lake Moeris.” Geographical Journal 73, no. 1 (1929): 20–58.
Derr, Jennifer L. “Cultivating the State: Cash Crop Agriculture, Irrigation, and 
the Geography of Authority in Colonial Southern Egypt, 1868–1931.” PhD 
diss., Stanford University, 2009.
Gallagher, Nancy. Egypt’s Other Wars: Epidemics and the Politics of Public 
Health. Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 1990.
George, D. S., and W. E. Garstin. “Descriptive Note.” In The Nile Reservoir 
Works at Aswan and Asyut. Cairo, 1902.
Gilmartin, David. “Imperial Rivers: Irrigation and British Visions of Empire.” 
In Decentering Empire: Britain, India and the Transcolonial World, edited by 
Dane Kennedy and Durba Ghosh, 76–103. London: Orient Longman, 2006.
Marlowe, John. Cromer in Egypt. New York: Praeger, 1970.
Mitchell, Timothy. Rule of Experts: Egypt, Techno-Politics, Modernity. Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 2002.
Owen, Roger. Cotton and the Egyptian Economy, 1820–1914. Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1969.
Richards, Alan. “Land and Labor on Egyptian Cotton Farms, 1882–1940.” Agri-
cultural History 52, no. 4 (1978): 503–18.
———. “Technical and Social Change in Egyptian Agriculture, 1890–1914.” 
Economic Development and Cultural Change 26, no. 4 (1978): 725–45.
Schulze, Reinhard. “Colonization and Resistance: The Egyptian Peasant Rebel-
lion, 1919.” In Peasants and Politics in the Modern Middle East, edited by 
Farhad Kazemi and John Waterbury, 171–202. Miami: Florida International 
University Press, 1991.
Tignor, Robert. “The Economic Activities of Foreigners in Egypt, 1920–1950: 
From Millet to Haute Bourgeoisie.” Comparative Studies in Society and His-
tory 22, no. 3 (1980): 416–49.
———. Modernization and British Colonial Rule in Egypt, 1882–1914. Princ-
eton: Princeton University Press, 1966.
Willcocks, William. The Assuan Reservoir and Lake Moeris: A Lecture Delivered 
at a Meeting of the Khedivial Geographical Society, Cairo, 16 January 1904. 
London: Messrs E. and F. N. Spon, 1904.
———. Egyptian Irrigation and the Public Health, Communication présenté 
à l’Institut d’Egypte dans sa séance du 11 Avril 1927. Cairo: Nile Mission 
Press, 1927.
———. From the Garden of Eden to the Crossing of the Jordan. London: E. and 
F. N. Spon, 1929.
———. Sixty Years in the East. Edinburgh; London: W. Blackwood, 1935.
———. The Wadi Rayan Reservoir and the Drainage of Egypt. Cairo, 1932. 
Willcocks, William, and J. I. Craig. Egyptian Irrigation. London: E. and F. N. 
Spon, 1913.
C h a p t e r  6
Remapping the Nation, 
Critiquing the State
Environmental Narratives and Desert Land Reclamation in Egypt
Jeannie Sowers
IN 1998, the Mubarak regime announced that it would build the largest 
water-pumping station in the world, taking Nile water from behind the 
Aswan High Dam reservoir to irrigate portions of the southwestern desert. 
The government declared it would convert millions of acres from desert 
to arable land, transforming the largely arid New Valley province into 
cultivated fields. The goal of this massive exercise in land reclamation 
was ostensibly to attract Egypt’s multiplying population from the densely 
populated “old” Nile River Valley and Delta to the desert periphery. The 
New Valley Project, or Toshka Project as it was usually called in the Arabic 
press, was thus justified in terms of a perceived demographic imperative.
 The “Mubarak Pumping Station” began operation in 2005, with twenty-
four turbines capable of pumping 1.2 million cubic meters of water per 
hour.1 By winter 2008, however, demand for irrigation water was so limited 
that only one of the installed turbines was in use at a time. Out of an initial 
540,000 acres targeted for reclamation, agribusiness managers in the area 
reported that only a few thousand were under cultivation.2 Far from being a 
celebrated achievement of the Mubarak government, the New Valley Project 
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increasingly embodied its failures. The New Valley Project came to be seen as 
the paradigmatic example of corruption, inefficacy, and squandered national 
resources under Mubarak’s rule. As such, the project served as another nail 
in the coffin of the regime’s exhausted, hollow claims to act in the interests 
of ordinary Egyptians. By January 2011, the depth of this mass discontent 
became clear when popular protest broke out across Egyptian cities, and 
Mubarak’s thirty-year reign ended in a mere eighteen days.
 While senior figures of the Mubarak era have been deposed, debates 
over how to allocate land and water in the context of Egypt’s growing 
population remain. As this chapter explores, state and private initiatives 
to “green the desert” have long been central to popular and elite concep-
tions of Egypt’s developmental options. Nor has Egypt been alone in this 
emphasis on land reclamation. Converting desert land to cultivation has 
figured centrally in nation-building projects in countries as disparate 
as the United States, Australia, India, Pakistan, China, Central Asia, and 
the former Soviet Union.3 Colonial and nationalist regimes alike have at-
tempted to “green the desert” for a variety of political, economic, and social 
reasons. In the Middle East, Egypt, Israel, Turkey, Libya, and Saudi Arabia 
established generous incentives for land reclamation to promote economic 
development and national integration.4
 In Egypt, land reclamation was a long-standing practice in the colonial 
period, producing significant revenue for land-holding elites from crops 
such as cotton, sugarcane, and rice. By the postcolonial era, state discourse 
increasingly portrayed land reclamation not simply as an economic invest-
ment, but as a social endeavor and a political imperative. New agricultural 
land would provide employment and physical space for Egypt’s rapidly 
expanding population. Although Egyptian nationalists and social reform-
ers articulated key elements of this demographic imaginary during the 
colonial period, it was not until the construction of the Aswan High Dam 
in the 1960s that the government began to conceive of large-scale, state-run 
land reclamation projects. The High Dam offered the Egyptian govern-
ment the ability to store the full flow of the Nile River, without relying on a 
system of barrages in upstream states. More water storage capacity meant 
the possibility of converting more desert land to irrigated acreage. Reli-
ance on large-scale infrastructure and state-driven development planning 
in Egypt thus echoed the faith in “high modernist” development schemes 
prevalent across developing and industrial countries alike.5
 Even in its heyday during the 1960s, however, the gap between the 
government’s lofty rhetoric and the realities of land reclamation were sig-
nificant. Whereas state narratives about land reclamation were hegemonic 
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in official propaganda, the situation on the ground—as documented in 
reports by various government agencies, international donors, and field 
studies—identified recurrent challenges. Problems with salinity, rising 
water tables, inadequate drainage, and poor water quality compounded 
inadequate provision of education and other services.6 State-sponsored 
land reclamation efforts thus never attracted large numbers of people away 
from existing urban areas.
 When the Mubarak government announced the Toshka Project in 
1998, many Egyptian water experts, public intellectuals, and journalists 
were skeptical of resurrecting land reclamation as a solution to Egypt’s 
grave developmental dilemmas. Most of these concerns, however, were 
voiced either in private, for fear of political reprisal, or in the pages of 
sanctioned opposition papers. These critical voices argued that the deci-
sion to undertake the Toshka Project epitomized the regime’s opaque, 
unaccountable, and sclerotic system of rule. These critical accounts were 
eventually amplified by the independent media7 and aired in a variety of 
public forums, including parliamentary debates, international book fairs, 
and university symposia. In recent years, agribusiness managers tasked 
with actually reclaiming land in the New Valley have produced their own 
critical claims about the state’s role in land reclamation. The proliferation 
and amplification of critical narratives regarding the New Valley Project 
were thus part of a broader, cumulative critique of the Mubarak regime’s 
development policies that emerged during the 1990s and 2000s. 
 This chapter examines the evolution of Egyptian narratives about 
environment, population, and development through the prism of land 
reclamation. I show how different actors—state officials, environmental 
experts, and agribusiness managers—created distinctive yet interrelated 
story-lines around the notion of converting desert land to irrigated crop-
land. For Maarten Hajer, story-lines are discursive constructions that 
combine different (often highly specialized and complex) discourses into 
legible, simplified framings of an environmental problem that appeal to 
differently situated actors.8
 The dominant story-line in Egyptian environmental history and 
policy, as outlined in the next section of this chapter, has been an eco-
logical-demographic narrative of crisis, in which limited arable land 
and the pressure of an increasing population require ongoing horizon-
tal expansion of arable lands. This narrative still infuses governmental 
planning and investment, but I suggest it is increasingly dissociated from 
two key developments. First, Egyptian water experts circulate a parallel 
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crisis narrative, highlighting Egypt’s scarce and polluted water resources. 
These water crisis narratives have in the past few years sparked questions 
about using such a scarce resource to cultivate desert land. Second, while 
official discourse highlights the role of the state in promoting land recla-
mation, reclaiming desert land has instead proceeded largely through the 
cumulative investments of agribusiness firms and peasant farmers, not 
the state.
 In order to explain the staying power of the official demographic-
ecological crisis narrative despite these dissonances, the third section 
of this chapter explores the historical construction of this foundational 
environmental imaginary as it was elaborated during the interwar and 
early postcolonial period. For Egyptian reformers, land reclamation 
would remake the lives of the peasantry by physically relocating them 
to a new cultural, social, and natural “environment.” This populist and 
paternalistic framing of land reclamation persisted in official discourse 
through the Sadat period. In the fourth section, I show how key elements 
of this narrative were recast in the Mubarak era, as modern environ-
mental idioms were introduced into the old neo-Malthusian narrative 
about a demographic crisis. These official justifications for the New Val-
ley Project, however, encountered critiques launched by environmental 
scientists, journalists in opposition papers, and leading officials, which 
are traced in the fifth section.
 Whereas in the Nasser period, newly irrigated lands were to benefit 
poorer peasants directly through ownership, in Mubarak’s New Valley 
Project, agribusiness was to be the principal beneficiary of newly irrigated 
land. These firms were supposed to conserve water through the use of new 
technologies and produce high-quality, organic products for export. In the 
sixth part of the chapter, I turn to the largely private narratives produced 
by agribusiness managers, who link the problems of desert land reclama-
tion with the government’s opaque policy-making and unclear commit-
ment to property rights.
 Despite the proliferation of critical narratives since the inception of 
the New Valley Project in 1998, however, the long-standing ecological-
demographic imaginaire remains a key element of political discourse in 
Egypt. At the end of this essay, I note how the story-lines produced by offi-
cials, scientists, public intellectuals, and journalists continue to share some 
key assumptions about the desirability of reclaiming desert land. I then 
sketch the key elements that might inform a more fundamental rethinking 
of Egypt’s dominant environmental imaginary.
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Narratives of Ecological-Demographic Crisis,  
Policies of Complacency
Most Egyptians live in the increasingly urbanized Nile Delta and Nile Val-
ley. The Egyptian government maintains that moving people to the desert 
is essential to deal with urban encroachment on old agricultural lands and 
high rates of population growth.9 From 1975 to 2005, Egypt’s population 
expanded from 39.599 million to 77.154 million.10 As a result, by the 1990s, 
per capita arable land was among the lowest in the world, at 0.12 feddan 
(slightly over 1 acre) per person.11 
 The New Valley Project was the most ambitious but not the only large 
land reclamation project initiated by the Mubarak regime during the late 
1990s. Together, projects in the northern Sinai and southwestern desert 
aimed to increase Egypt’s total arable land by 3.4 million feddans by 2017.12 
Maps produced for the Cabinet of Ministers report “Egypt’s Development 
Strategy until 2017” graphically portray these future irrigated areas as new 
bands of green space cutting dramatically across Egypt’s desert peripheries 
(See map 6.1).
 Several scholars have critiqued the substance and representation of this 
demographic-environmental imaginaire. Timothy Mitchell showed how aid 
agencies and the Egyptian government reproduce a pervasive visual imagery 
in reports and documents, in which a burgeoning population is confined 
within a narrow habitable river valley amid vast deserts.13 Ray Bush captured 
the essence of this imaginary when he noted that “Egyptian environmental 
policy discussion focuses almost exclusively on the relationship between 
population pressure, scarce water resources and limited cultivable land.14 These 
and other critics have suggested that focusing on an imminent ecological-
demographic crisis allows the government to avoid grappling with the more 
difficult social problems of rural poverty and unequal landholdings.15
 A parallel crisis narrative has also been circulating in Egypt. This nar-
rative focuses on the scarcity and degradation of Egypt’s water resources, 
highlighting the country’s dependence on the Nile River. Egyptian water 
experts have long argued that Egypt’s 55 billion cubic meters quota of Nile 
water is fully utilized and that with population growth, Egypt will soon 
face significant water scarcity. Not surprisingly, in light of these assertions, 
Egypt has adamantly refused to renegotiate the 1959 treaty that reaffirmed 
the British colonial allocation of the full flow of the Nile River to Egypt 
and Sudan. Upstream states have declared their intention to reallocate 
Nile flow, with or without Egypt’s participation, producing acrimonious 
exchanges in the World Bank–sponsored fora of the Nile Basin Initiative.16
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 In arid lands, water is the principal constraint on the expansion of 
irrigated land. Yet there has been little serious public debate and few policy 
shifts regarding limiting water for agricultural use in Egypt. As Tony Allen 
has argued, the global trade in food, especially cereals, allowed Middle 
Eastern political economies to quietly address water deficits through food 
imports.17 Importing virtual water perpetuated a myth in which “econo-
mies have enjoyed stability and expansions because of efforts by farmers 
and managers to manage an adequate supply.”18 The perception that sup-
ply was manageable, and that existing uses could be made more efficient 
Map 6.1. Land reclamation in Egypt’s master plan until 2017. “Agriculture until the 
year 2017,” in Egypt and the Twenty-First Century (Cairo: Arab Republic of Egypt, 
Cabinet of Ministers, 1997), map no. 2, p. 191 (in Arabic).
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through water conservation and new technologies, allowed policymakers 
to remain complacent about, and wedded to, large-scale land reclamation.
 Perceptions of adequate water supply were reinforced during the late 
1990s, when the New Valley Project was announced. Historically high lev-
els of rain in the Ethiopian highlands (which accounts for 85 percent of 
the Nile’s flow) during the prior decade resulted in high flows behind the 
Aswan High Dam. For the first time, in 1997, the government preemptively 
released water through the dam’s spillway, creating temporary lakes in the 
southwestern desert and sparking domestic criticism about the “wasteful” 
use of water. The perception of rising water behind the dam, like imported 
cereals, allowed Egypt’s political leadership to retain visions of large-scale 
land reclamation. Thus, the regime and commercial farmers alike have, in 
practice, been relatively complacent in the face of mounting water scarcity 
in subsequent years.
 Land reclamation has proceeded steadily in Egypt since the 1950s. This 
reclamation has taken place, however, not primarily in large-scale, state-
sponsored projects in the desert peripheries. Instead, small agricultural 
producers and a mix of state and private commercial operations brought 
significant areas of land under cultivation in areas bordering the existing 
Nile Delta and Valley, close to population centers and transport networks.19 
The total amount of agricultural land as a result of these reclamation activi-
ties increased from approximately six million acres in 1972 to eight million 
acres in 2003.20 This increase occurred despite the rapid urbanization of the 
“old” arable lands of the Nile Delta, which constitute 60–65 percent of the 
total agricultural land in Egypt.21 One recent study put urban encroachment 
on “old” Delta agricultural lands at a net loss of 28.43 percent (32,236 acres) 
between 1972 and 2003, with an annual loss of 1,040 acres.22 Predictably, 
urban expansion has been most rapid around Cairo and its satellite cities.
 Not surprisingly, newly reclaimed lands are not as productive as the 
old lands of the Delta; these show less biomass in remote sensing analysis 
than old Delta land or land under reclamation for decades.23 The expansion 
of irrigated agriculture to new lands has accelerated the depletion, saliniza-
tion, and pollution of groundwater resources, requiring donor and state 
interventions to deal with deteriorating groundwater quality and aquifer 
subsidence.24 Both “new” and “old” reclaimed lands thus require ongoing 
government, multilateral, and private investment to ensure that cultivation 
remains viable.25 The principal issue for Egyptian officials, peasants, and 
donors is thus not whether the state should support land reclamation, but 
in what ways, where, and for whose benefit.
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Land Reclamation: Building a New Rural Society Under Nasser
Land consolidation in large-scale estates and along the fringes of the Nile 
Delta expanded in the wake of the construction of the first dam at Aswan, 
built between 1899 and 1902. The dam facilitated perennial irrigation in 
the Old Delta, while the stored floodwaters could also be used for land 
reclamation. The European and Egyptian investors involved in land rec-
lamation were considered at the forefront of reclamation technologies 
and practices. In the early 1900s, for instance, a soil scientist from the U.S. 
Bureau of Soil published detailed descriptions of experimental techniques 
used in Egypt to address problems of salinization of reclaimed land under 
perennial irrigation, arguing that similar techniques could work in the arid 
West of the United States.26
 During the interwar period, wealthy elites and political parties began 
to focus on land reclamation as a means to address rural poverty and 
“overpopulation” in the Nile valley by expanding the arable land base of 
Egypt. The precarious position of much of the peasantry in the wake of 
World War I, the rural revolt in Egypt in 1919, and further impoverishment 
during the Great Depression served to fuel an interest in “peasant stud-
ies” abroad and an array of social reform proposals targeting the peasantry 
within Egypt.27
 In the interwar period, liberal reformers called for more extensive land 
reclamation to solve the shortages of arable land vis-à-vis a burgeoning 
population, while avoiding calls for significant redistribution of the highly 
inequitable landholdings concentrated in large estates.28 Foreshadowing 
contemporary developments, private business groups undertook land 
reclamation on a modest scale throughout this period, particularly in the 
northern and western Delta provinces.
 With the advent of Nasser’s military regime in the 1950s, land reclama-
tion was increasingly elevated as part of a new populist “contract” with the 
peasantry, even as new institutions such as cooperatives sought to demo-
bilize the rural population.29 In 1958, Nasser used his speech commemorat-
ing the 1956 Suez crisis to announce that the government was undertaking 
land reclamation projects in the New Valley governorate.
Today, brethren, we turn to the Western Desert to establish 
there a New Valley, parallel to the valley of the Nile. We are 
endeavoring to utilize the water of the wells in order to create 
new lands. . . . [T]here are cultivable lands there estimated at 3 
million feddans which are being left uncultivated.30
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 In May 1959, the regime created a new government agency, the Egyptian 
Public Organization for Desert Reclamation; one of its first approved bud-
getary expenditures was in the New Valley.31 These projects relied on wells 
accessing large fossil groundwater aquifers, as does much of the ongoing 
land reclamation in the oases of the western desert.
 It was the construction of the Aswan High Dam, however, that made 
large-scale land reclamation in the desert more promising to Egyptian 
engineers and agronomists, since the Aswan High Dam made multiyear 
storage of the Nile flood possible.32 Leading government technocrats dis-
agreed about the extent of land reclamation the dam made possible. Rosy 
projections of the amount and quality of land to be reclaimed, however, 
prevailed, and military officials established land reclamation companies 
expecting to capitalize on a bonanza in land creation.33
 The most ambitious of these plans envisioned building a “parallel Nile,” 
diverting the waters of the Nile River from the newly created Lake Nasser 
to the southwestern desert. This idea became the core of the New Val-
ley Project undertaken under Mubarak. When initially circulated in the 
late 1960s, however, the parallel Nile project was deemed infeasible and 
uneconomical, consigned to the files of the Ministry of Planning.34 In 
1978, the idea was briefly revived, when the ministry estimated that 1.3 mil-
lion feddans could be reclaimed through diverting Nile water via a canal 
to the New Valley.35 These project proposals generated soil classification 
studies, surveys of groundwater and drainage issues, and other planning 
documents produced by a variety of governmental institutions, including 
the National Water Research Center, the Academy of Scientific Research, 
the Agricultural Research Center, and the Desert Research Center.36 In 
several of these reports, Egyptian experts accurately highlighted many of 
the profitability, administration, and ownership issues that would plague 
state-promoted land reclamation efforts.37
 Official discourse of the Nasser period suggested that land rec-
lamation would transform workers and peasants by changing their 
environments. Model communities established by the government in 
newly reclaimed lands would create new citizens by granting them land 
ownership, imbuing residents with modern mentalities and work ethics, 
and providing training and support services.38 These themes echoed no-
tions made decades earlier by Labor Zionists in Palestine, in which new 
citizens would be forged through the conquest of desert land.39 Whereas 
early Zionists, drawing on their roots in reformist socialism, emphasized 
collectively owned communal labor to green the desert, Egyptian plan-
ners invoked a significant role for the state along Soviet lines, first in 
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establishing model communities and then, by the late 1960s, by creating 
large state-owned farms.
 One of the largest government-owned projects was Tahrir (Libera-
tion) Province, where the regime envisioned large-scale “modern” farms 
employing mechanization and scientific planning, staffed by model settlers 
living in modern communities.40 Settlers were required to attend lessons in 
hygiene, religious instruction, physical exercise, and familial and personal 
responsibility; Western dress was compulsory.41
 As in the Soviet system, central directives for land reclamation often 
focused on bureaucratic units achieving fixed numerical quotas, regard-
less of the quality or viability of the land reclaimed. By 1965, for instance, 
the end of Egypt’s first “Five-Year Plan,” only 47 percent of reclaimed land 
was actually under cultivation.42 This prompted the government to largely 
abandon plans for extending model communities.
 The pace of land reclamation further slowed as a result of the 1967 and 
1973 wars. However, in 1978, Nasser’s successor, Anwar Sadat, called for an 
“invasion” of the desert to ease population pressures in the Delta. “Why 
should we not emerge from this narrow valley to new horizons in the land 
where there is space and water?” Sadat asked rhetorically in 1978 in the pages 
of the World, the monthly publication of the oil company Saudi Aramco.43
 Land reclamation remained costly and difficult to sustain in the Western 
desert, however. In his memoir, the well-known Egyptian geologist Rushdi 
Said recalled the effects of shifting political priorities—and overextrac-
tion of groundwater—on efforts to reclaim land in some of the oases of 
western desert: “I have seen thousands of feddans that were abandoned and 
the dozens of wells that dried up or suffered a substantial decrease in their 
discharge.”44 He also enumerated a set of problems that continue to make 
desert agriculture costly: the high costs of groundwater extraction and de-
livery, ineffective drainage systems, increasing salinity, moving sand dunes, 
harsh winds, and a lack of effective support services for new residents.
 When state-owned farms proved inefficient and costly, the govern-
ment established a program to allocate reclaimed land to unemployed 
university graduates in the late 1970s. This program was extended to high 
school and non-university graduates after 1981.45 Privatization of the re-
maining, highly indebted state-owned farms accelerated during the 1980s. 
The 56,810-acre Salhiyya land reclamation project, another project begun 
during the Nasser period, was 250 million LE (Egyptian pounds) in debt 
when it was finally transferred from the Ministry of Agriculture in 1992 to 
its public-sector creditors. No private sector investor stepped forward to 
pay the government’s asking price.46
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The New Valley Project and the Mubarak Regime
Given past experience with state-sponsored land reclamation, many Egyp-
tian public intellectuals and technocrats were surprised when the Mubarak 
regime announced the New Valley Project. Until then, the government had 
focused its rhetoric and finance on the Al Salaam (Peace) Canal project to 
expand arable land in northern Sinai, with little attention to the western 
desert.47 Many suggested that the project was an attempt by Kamal Ganzo-
uri, then prime minister, and Yousef Wali, then minister of agriculture, to 
provide the president with a monumental legacy.48
 While the project’s location and scale were surprising to observers, 
many of the key tropes employed by the regime were familiar staples of 
Egyptian environmental narratives. These were recast, however, in the 
idioms of contemporary environmentalism. State rhetoric attempted to 
construct diametrically opposed visions—a polluted, crowded Old Valley 
versus a pristine, pure, and unpolluted “New Valley.” This framing sought 
to capitalize on widespread public concern with contaminated drinking 
water, pesticides, dirt, garbage, and industrial pollution in the Delta con-
trasted with the tabula rasa of desert areas to be reclaimed. As the pro-
government columnist Ibrahim Nafie wrote, the New Valley was far away 
from the “over-population, environmental pollution and the consequent 
attrition on our current urban, industrial and agricultural infrastruc-
ture.”49 The government-owned weekly Roz al-Yusuf justified the project’s 
remote location far from the inhabited Valley in similar terms: “The stra-
tegic Egyptian chooses a site in which the environment is not polluted.”50 
Government papers also carried personal testimonials from visitors to the 
New Valley attesting to the pure drinking water obtained from wells and 
organic crops produced without fertilizers or chemicals.51
 As in colonial discourses about the peasantry, the Mubarak regime’s 
propaganda linked a clean and sanitary environment with the creation 
of a new citizenry.52 This theme was reiterated in numerous government 
speeches and publications. President Mubarak, at the opening of a main 
canal, stated: “The New Valley Project will create new lives, cities, villages 
and societies for Egyptians. . . . The environment does not carry one iota 
of pollution—the water is clear and the land is untouched by fertilizers. It 
is the project of the future.” Similarly, a journalist for the state-owned daily 
Al Ahram echoed these sentiments on a visit to the area in 2003.
When I sampled the organic crops growing on the farms there, 
they were like nothing I had ever tasted before. . . . I also saw a 
new kind of Egyptian citizen. . . . The Toshka resident believes 
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in his work, gives his best according to a clear and organized 
plan, puts his patriotism at the service of the project, and wants 
to live in Toshka once it is completed.53
The government’s campaign to stress the environmental cleanliness and 
amenities of the New Valley targeted domestic and international investors 
as much as ordinary Egyptians. The General Authority for Investment 
touted the area as “pristine and free from pests. The water supply is of the 
highest quality, without any pollutants.”54 Yousef Wali, then the long-time 
minister of agriculture and general secretary of the National Democratic 
Party (NDP), called for keeping the area “free from pollution by insecti-
cides” to facilitate exports to Europe.55 Mubarak reiterated this theme in the 
New Valley at a ceremony for the pumping station, noting that “Toshka’s 
products are ideal for exporting to Europe because they are organic crops 
grown in healthy, unpolluted soil.”56
 The government further sought to contrast the “wasteful” excess of water 
by small farmers in the old Delta lands with the “efficient” use of water by 
large-scale investors planned for the New Valley. In governmental framings, 
small cultivators applied excess water because they lacked access to modern 
technologies, did not pay for the resource, and were risk averse, accustomed 
to “traditional” methods of basin irrigation. These claims were reiterated, for 
instance, in a public relations campaign launched by the Ministry of Pub-
lic Works and Water Resources and United States Agency for International 
Development (USAID) in 1997 to educate farmers about water scarcity. The 
goal, noted one of the project publications, “was to transform farmers from 
being the ‘problem’ to being the solution to water scarcity concerns.”57
Figure 6.1. The 
Sheikh Zayed 
(Toshka) Canal 
conveys Nile water 
from the Aswan 
Dam reservoir (Lake 
Nasser) to the New 
Valley land reclama-
tion project. Photo by 
Jeannie Sowers.
170  |   Jeannie Sowers
 The government argued that “wasteful” water use by cultivators in the 
Delta allowed for improvements in water efficiency, to make water available 
for use in the New Valley Project. Egyptian officials were adamant that water 
for land reclamation could be found within Egypt’s legal allotment of Nile 
water. The government accordingly touted a range of measures to increase 
water efficiency, including fines and bans on exports of water-intensive crops 
such as sugarcane and rice, reusing ever more drainage water, and investing 
in modern irrigation technologies and drainage systems. Domestic critics 
of the New Valley project, however, questioned whether Egypt could save 
enough water to warrant large-scale expansions in irrigated agriculture.
Controversies and Criticisms of the New Valley Project
Many water experts, like public intellectuals and journalists for opposition 
newspapers, saw the New Valley Project primarily as an example of closed, 
nontransparent decision-making by the Mubarak regime. However, at the 
inception of the project, many of these critiques were aired privately or 
in the pages of opposition newspapers, as the regime embarked on a sus-
tained propaganda campaign to market the project. This section explores 
the critiques that circulated when the project was announced in the late 
1990s, when the regime’s rhetoric and expenditures on the New Valley 
Project took center stage in Egyptian political life.
 Egyptian experts and intellectuals shared the conviction of state officials 
that some land reclamation was necessary. At the same time, however, experts 
called for limiting plans for land reclamation given scarce and increasingly 
polluted water resources. Upper-level bureaucrats within the Ministries of 
Irrigation and Agriculture privately expressed doubt in interviews with the 
author about the New Valley Project’s feasibility and costs. They stress their 
limited access to information and exclusion from policy-making. These 
doubts were often expressed by commenting on the political origins of the 
project versus more objective considerations of technical feasibility. As a top 
adviser to then minister of irrigation Mahmud Abu Zeid commented:
There was a strong political push for the Toshka (New Valley) 
Project. It was part of a policy decision taken by the Cabinet to 
develop the Western Desert, Sinai, and Upper Egypt. We have 
some technical studies, which are not public information, but 
even I don’t have that much information. If we were deciding 
on cost-benefit grounds, I would be reluctant to pursue it. If it’s 
just agricultural, the project will fail. If there are no investors, 
it will fail.58
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 Egyptian critics generally argued that scarce water and limited fi-
nancial resources would be better spent on land reclamation or other 
economic activities near existing centers of transport and population. “It 
is true that the Nile Valley is overcrowded,” argued an outspoken former 
chairman of the parliamentary housing committee. “But why this project, 
and why now? Toshka will be a sponge, a sponge for investment funds that 
could have been used more productively elsewhere in the country.”59
 During the project’s inception, environmental scientists were publicly 
circumspect in their criticisms about the possible environmental implica-
tions of the project. In professional journals and in private discussions, 
however, several cited common concerns. The Ministry of Public Works 
and Water Resources initially estimated the amount of water required 
by the New Valley Project to be 5.5 billion cubic meters (BCM) annually, 
which constituted 9–10 percent of Egypt’s annual Nile water allocation. 
Water and agriculture experts argued that this water should be used more 
productively elsewhere, particularly as drainage and salinity problems 
would undermine large-scale land reclamation efforts.60 They argued that 
using water to grow crops in the western desert offered few opportunities 
for reuse, unlike using water in the Delta, which is typically recycled as it 
flows through the system.61 More cost-effective approaches should focus 
on improving the old lands, they suggested, and include substantive efforts 
to provide rural sanitation, control industrial pollution, and implement 
further technical improvements to the irrigation system.62
 The opposition press incorporated some of these expert critiques but 
emphasized the authoritarian nature of decision-making. They depicted 
the New Valley Project as yet another example of exclusionary and irratio-
nal decision-making by an increasingly ossified circle of political insiders. 
Opposition papers and journalists challenged the regime’s cost estimates 
for the project and argued that these projects were marred by high-level 
corruption, enriching contracting and construction firms close to the re-
gime. The daily Al-Wafd newspaper embarked on a vociferous campaign 
attacking the project on the grounds that the government had presented 
no budgetary information to Parliament and had not released feasibil-
ity, cost, and environmental impact studies to the public.63 Throughout 
1998 and 1999 Al-Wafd escalated its criticism of the project as a slush fund 
for government contractors and their affiliates close to the regime. The 
government’s response was swift: it arrested an Al-Wafd editor and several 
journalists under a new and restrictive Press Law (#93).64
 Leading Egyptian intellectuals and former officials also criticized 
the costs and uncertain returns associated with the New Valley Project 
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in interviews and specialized reports. One external estimate put the costs 
for water infrastructure at approximately LE5.5 billion, with total costs 
estimated between LE300 and 500 billion (US$90–150 billion).65 For 
1999–2000, official figures show that planned investment in the New Valley 
Project accounted for 53 percent of the state’s total budget for the Minis-
try of Agriculture, and 63 percent of the total planned expenditures of the 
Ministry of Agriculture.66
 The Mubarak regime financed these costs through the state-owned 
National Investment Bank, a $100 million contribution from Sheikh Zayed, 
the ruler of Abu Dhabi, and using additional funds for land reclama-
tion provided by Gulf-funded development institutions.67 Egyptian crit-
ics argued that these funding sources did not meet the relatively rigorous 
standards used by the World Bank, and pointed to the numerous technical 
and feasibility studies produced by international consulting firms and aid 
agencies for other megaprojects, such as the Aswan High Dam and the 
Al-Salaam Canal. “The decision should be discussed openly, and a neutral 
committee should be formed to decide its economic feasibility,” observed 
a former prime minister who helped author the 1974 investment liberaliza-
tion laws.68
 The Mubarak regime widely publicized that the World Bank had 
undertaken an environmental impact assessment (EIA), and that it had 
contracted for its own EIA with CEDARE, the Center for Environment and 
Development in the Arab World.69 Neither impact assessment was publicly 
released, however, nor did the Egyptian environmental experts I inter-
viewed succeed in obtaining copies. Similarly, domestic cost-benefit analy-
ses were not available. A few were attempted by outside experts: one U.S. 
academic calculated the infrastructure and investment costs per feddan of 
the New Valley Project at $4,337, while expected revenues over twenty-five 
years were projected at $2,589 per feddan.70 As the author noted, private 
firms would invest in such a scheme only if the government subsidized the 
full infrastructure costs.
 In the absence of cost-benefit analyses or impact assessments, the New 
Valley Project was quickly linked in Egyptian political life with the reluc-
tance of the Mubarak regime to democratize. The late public intellectual 
Tahsin Bashir christened the New Valley Project the “stealth project,” argu-
ing that Mubarak and his appointees embarked on a colossal national proj-
ect rather than acquiesce to a democratic transition.71 In 2008, a respected 
environmental scientist asked, “How, in Egypt, can the decision to do a 
20–30 billion dollar project have been taken by only a few people? Only 
because high-ranking persons have tried to stay in power forever.”72
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Agribusiness Narratives in the New Valley
Environmental experts, opposition journalists, and public intellectuals were 
not the only actors critical of the New Valley Project. Unlike the state-
sponsored reclamation projects of the Nasser period, which targeted small 
farmers as beneficiaries, Mubarak’s New Valley Project was supposed to at-
tract large-scale private investment in commercial farms. The state prom-
ised large-scale engineering works to the borders of private land, but the 
task of leveling land, building irrigation and drainage networks, and cul-
tivating crops was delegated to agribusiness. As a 2004 World Bank paper 
noted, these projects “renew the nineteenth-century tradition of close 
cooperation with the state by national and foreign investors to develop 
export-based agricultural production.”73 The key difference, however, was 
the source of external capital. Rather than European firms, external invest-
ment largely flowed from the Gulf region, particularly Saudi Arabia and 
the United Arab Emirates.
 Prioritizing large-scale investors was congruent with the regime’s 
larger macroeconomic policies of privatization and neoliberal restructur-
ing. As in tourism and industrial zones, the government offered investors 
a twenty-year tax holiday, cheap land prices, long-term concessions, tax 
exemptions on imported equipment, and guaranteed allocations of irriga-
tion water.74 Officials justified the privileged position accorded to large-
scale investors by arguing that they would employ water-conserving irrigation 
technologies, such as pivot irrigation.
 While promoting agribusiness in the New Valley, the Mubarak govern-
ment dismantled Nasser-era policies supporting small-scale peasant agri-
culture in the old Delta during the 1980s and 1990s. Land tenure protec-
tions were repealed, subsidies on fertilizers, pesticides, and diesel fuel were 
reduced, and the system of cooperatives was left largely unfunded.75 These 
changes put significant pressures on Egypt’s small-scale farmers, many of 
whom have limited access to credit, cannot afford sufficient quantities of 
fertilizers, gypsum, and other soil amendments, and who are not consulted 
in the planning or delivery of government-sponsored rehabilitation and 
drainage projects.76
 This neoliberal restructuring of Egyptian peasant agriculture reflected 
broader regional trends. Egyptian and Arab agribusiness firms pursued 
consolidation among agricultural companies and sought vertical integra-
tion of supply chains to enhance competitiveness during the 1990s and 
2000s. New investment vehicles for private and public capital, such as 
private equity firms and sovereign wealth funds, also began to target the 
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Egyptian agricultural sector.77 As a result, foreign companies accounted for 
37 percent of agro-industrial investment in Egypt in 2008.78
 Despite government incentives and increasing foreign investment in 
agriculture, private investors were reluctant to invest in the New Valley 
Project.79 By 2008, only five companies had acquired plots in Toshka, and 
of these, only three firms were cultivating crops.80 With rapidly increas-
ing global food prices in 2007–8, a number of Saudi and Gulf investment 
groups were reportedly interested in acquiring land in the New Valley Proj-
ect, but few details of finalized deals emerged.81 Eager to deflect criticism, 
the government declared that it would start selling 2,900 feddans in the 
Toshka area to new graduates and young peasants as early as 2002,82 yet few 
of these transfers have been evident.
 Of the three companies cultivating crops in the New Valley Project, 
two were privately owned and one was majority state-owned. The state-
owned South Valley Company for Development, created in 1999, was al-
located 160,000 acres and had reportedly cultivated about 7,000 of these 
by 2006.83 One of the private companies, Green Valley Association, was an 
Egyptian joint-stock company established in the early 1990s. It owned a 
total of 7,000 acres devoted to peanut cultivation for export and served as 
the local agent for multinational manufacturers of pivot and drip irriga-
tion systems.84
 The second private company, Kingdom Agricultural Development 
Company (KADCO) was wholly owned by Prince Al-Waleed bin Talal 
Al-Saud of Saudi Arabia, the first private investor in the New Valley Proj-
ect. The nephew of King Fahd of Saudi Arabia, Prince Al-Waleed’s hold-
ings included ownership of the Saudi Kingdom Holding Company, and 
significant shares of such global conglomerates as Apple, Citigroup, the 
Four Seasons hotel chain, and others. Al-Waleed had a reputation for busi-
ness acumen by investing in well-known companies during hard times 
and then reaping the benefits as companies restructured and stock prices 
climbed.85 In 2009, he was ranked as the twenty-second wealthiest person 
in the world, despite steep declines in his net worth as the result of the 
global banking and financial crisis.86
 KADCO, incorporated as an Egyptian joint-stock company, initially 
planned to cultivate 100,000 acres over a seven-year period, investing 
US$500–650 million total. The acquisition was part of what Al-Waleed de-
scribed as a limited investment strategy in Egypt targeting only “real estate, 
tourism, and agriculture, all fields with high rates of return.”87 Al-Waleed 
already had significant investments in Egypt’s tourism and real estate sec-
tors when he purchased land in the New Valley Project.88
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 KADCO’s reclamation efforts in the New Valley began with an ex-
perimental farm, drawing groundwater from wells in order to determine 
the viability and profitability of export agriculture. Al-Waleed also sought 
to link KADCO with global agro-industrial firms through joint ventures. 
KADCO sought to create a joint venture with CADIZ, a subsidiary of the 
California-based agro-industry firm Sun World International, one of the 
largest vertically integrated agricultural development companies in Cali-
fornia. The venture collapsed, however, when CADIZ declared bankruptcy 
in 2002.89
 By the winter of 2008, when the author visited KADCO’s fields, the 
company had cultivated 600 acres out of their initial 100,000 target.90 They 
employed 70–100 permanent workers, and at peak packing and harvesting 
times employed 250–1000 temporary laborers. Even permanent workers, 
however, commuted from the nearby city of Aswan, and no permanent 
settlement had been created.
 These modest acreage and employment figures troubled the Mubarak 
government. For the regime, Al-Waleed’s investment was a crucial mar-
keting device to justify their estimated LE5.5 billion (US$1.6 billion) 
investment in the pumping station and main canals. The slow pace of 
land reclamation in the New Valley had become fodder for parliamentary 
debates,91 newspaper editorials, satirical cartoons, and public jokes. As a 
result, the government threatened to suspend KADCO’s operations and 
revoke their land title.
 Although managers admitted that Al-Waleed’s commitment and in-
vestment in KADCO had fluctuated, their story-lines about land reclama-
tion focused on obstacles created by weak domestic markets, poor gover-
nance, inadequate infrastructure, and unpredictable policies. In short, they 
argued that poor economic returns on land reclamation were in large part 
the result of government policies and practices.
 Farm managers took the inadequacies of government planning as the 
starting point for their narratives. Investors like Al-Waleed bought New 
Valley land based on government soil classifications that proved inaccurate. 
In the case of KADCO, only half of their 100,000-acre parcel could be cul-
tivated, according to their soil surveys. Both KADCO and the state-owned 
firm reported encountering a stratified salty clay layer, locally termed tafla, 
that was difficult to cultivate. One of the expatriate agronomists working 
for KADCO noted:
Our land was supposed to be class one and two agricultural 
soils, but the government didn’t get the topography and the 
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soil right. This was because the layout and design of the branch 
canals was done from an engineering perspective, not an agri-
cultural one. The canal layouts were designed to take advantage 
of gradients, to go down into the Toshka depression. But as 
you go down, you encounter more tafla. From an agronomist’s 
perspective, it is better to pump the water up to better soils.92
The state-owned company reportedly shifted to flooding fields, in the old 
style of basin cultivation, as well as growing salt-tolerant rice, in order to 
cope with tafla in their soils. Rice is a water-intensive crop, and thus the 
Mubarak government’s claims about conserving water in New Valley agri-
culture rang increasingly hollow.
 Some Egyptian experts involved in planning the irrigation infrastruc-
ture had anticipated such problems. These employees of governmental 
research institutes published articles in academic journals describing alter-
native routes for the canal system to access better quality soils in the New 
Valley.93 Yet their recommendations went unheeded.
 Agribusiness managers highlighted a number of other difficulties. The 
government failed to provide needed infrastructure and transport invest-
ments, which made it difficult to get horticultural produce to overseas 
markets in a timely fashion. Faced with difficulties in export opportuni-
ties, KADCO managers found that their certified organic, labor-friendly 
produce was too costly for domestic markets. Cold nights in winter require 
greenhouses, and blisteringly hot days in summer require shaded cultiva-
tion with the ongoing use of sprinklers, but neither export nor domestic 
prices were sufficient to recoup these kinds of production costs. KADCO 
and other farms in the area have thus increasingly turned to growing for-
age and fodder crops, particularly alfalfa.94 Alfalfa is salt tolerant, breaks up 
clay soils, and produces a crop every twenty to twenty-two days.
 Most important, demand for fodder from the United Arab Emirates 
and Saudi Arabia has escalated rapidly in recent years. To conserve deplet-
ing fossil groundwater aquifers, Saudi Arabia imposed limits on extracting 
groundwater in recent years, while subsidizing the import of fodder to sus-
tain existing dairy and meat operations.95 Other Saudi investors see similar 
opportunities for cereal production in the New Valley Project. Suleiman Al 
Rahji, who controls Saudi Arabia’s largest publicly traded bank, Al Rahji 
Bank, reportedly acquired 100,000 acres in the New Valley for wheat and 
corn production.96
 Shifting to fodder for export, however, poses a significant risk: namely, 
that the Egyptian government, with its own needs for domestic fodder and 
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cereals, will impose export bans. Export duties on wheat and corn exports 
were already in place, and in 2008, faced with skyrocketing global food 
prices, the government imposed an export ban on rice, one of the most 
lucrative crops for Egyptian farmers.97
 Given these issues, agribusiness firms have dramatically lower esti-
mates for economically viable land reclamation than the government. In 
interviews, one manager noted, “The New Valley Project will not even 
reach half of the 540,000 acres that the government has been touting as 
its first phase.” Another noted that “we have been telling this to the min-
isters, but they don’t believe us. The Minister of Agriculture threatened 
to take our land back, even though we have paid for it, because we have 
not cultivated it. I told him, ‘I will give half of it back to you, for free, 
because you cannot grow anything!’ And that is when I think he started 
to listen.”98
The Prince and the President: Land Reclamation as Political Theater
Managers at KADCO and the handful of other New Valley firms were well 
aware that their firms were not established purely on economic rationales, 
and that their land reclamation activities were periodically invoked as set 
pieces in larger dramas of political theater.99 Managers recounted periodic 
visits by cabinet ministers, Prince Al-Waleed, and President Mubarak with 
a mixture of humor, resentment, and dismay. One supervisor recalled that 
“for the official visits, the Ministry of Irrigation built a six-helicopter pad, 
so that the prince and the president could arrive by helicopter. They paved 
the farm roads for the Mercedes to come through; they didn’t care what 
they destroyed.” Another remarked, “We don’t like when officials come, 
especially during harvests, because they bring 1,000 soldiers who strip the 
harvest. The soldiers do it quickly because they know they are stealing, 
so in their haste they destroy the plants. Last time, by the time President 
Mubarak arrived, much of the crop had been destroyed by security forces, 
so we had to transplant anything into the area around the platform they 
had built for media appearances.”100
 As these accounts suggest, private investors faced political as well as 
economic challenges in the New Valley Project. As a result, many agribusi-
ness firms chose to locate outside the New Valley.
ALL ENVIRONMENTAL-ECOLOGICAL arguments are arguments 
about society, and therefore, complex refractions of all sorts of struggles 
being waged in other realms.
—David Harvey, “The Environment of Justice”
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ANALYZING EGYPTIAN land reclamation through the prism of the New 
Valley Project reveals change as well as continuity in environmental nar-
ratives. Key elements of state-produced discourses about land reclamation 
have remained prominent since the Nasser period, though the extent to 
which the regime pursued land reclamation in practice waxed and waned 
with changing financial resources and political priorities. The 1990s marked 
a new intensification of land reclamation efforts, as the Mubarak govern-
ment positioned the New Valley Project and other megaprojects as a solu-
tion to Egypt’s enduring environmental imaginary, in which population 
outstrips available arable land. The Mubarak government recast this nar-
rative in modern environmental idioms, contrasting the pollution of the 
old agricultural lands with the prospects for cultivating organic, clean, and 
high-value crops for export in the New Valley. Land reclamation retains a 
prominent place in Egyptian agricultural policy, particularly with recent 
increases in the prices of basic foodstuffs. These spikes in global food 
prices have reinvigorated long-standing concerns about food security in 
Egypt and much of the Middle East.101
 From its inception in 1998, the New Valley Project catalyzed dissenting 
views from Egyptian water and agricultural experts, opposition party mem-
bers, and journalists. These actors argued that water is scarce and would be 
used by more people, more productively, elsewhere than in the uninhabited 
parts of the southwestern desert. And indeed, the Mubarak government’s 
megaprojects failed to attract sufficient private investment or significant 
settlement to justify their significant costs. As presciently suggested in the 
critical discourses of the late 1990s, the New Valley Project came to represent 
the flaws of Mubarak’s reign, rather than his crowning achievement.
 During the 2000s, agribusiness firms and their workers were the primary 
actors actually present in the New Valley Project lands. Managers at these 
farms framed land reclamation in terms of how to cope with various kinds 
of political and economic costs. In addition to conventional economic costs, 
such as those associated with transport, input, and production, they empha-
sized how unpredictable policies, poor infrastructure design, uncertain prop-
erty rights, and political spectacle decreased returns to desert agriculture.
 Although critical of large-scale state projects, neither expert nor busi-
ness narratives about land reclamation addressed broader questions of 
rural development, ecological degradation, and social equity. Instead, criti-
cal narratives around land reclamation generally promoted “repairing” it, 
rather than transforming the terms of debate.102 For environmental experts, 
“repairing” land reclamation entails making more efficient use of water at 
the farm level and throughout the irrigation system. For agribusiness firms, 
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international donors, and government officials, repair entails accelerating 
agricultural restructuring in favor of larger firms and consolidated land-
holdings in order to compete in changing regional markets. Firms and 
experts alike thus favor water/agricultural policies that privilege capital-
intensive, large-scale technologies to “conserve” water and produce crops 
competitively. This approach is clearly at odds with the rhetorical focus of 
the government on generating rural employment, yet is fully consonant 
with liberalizing agricultural production. In contrast, little governmental 
attention has been paid to enacting social insurance or welfare policies to 
assist Egypt’s thousands of small agricultural producers, buffeted by price 
volatility, rising costs of inputs, and mounting environmental problems.
 Ecological critiques, derived from the perspective of the Nile River 
basin as a whole, have similarly made little discernible headway in do-
mestic narratives of land reclamation. River basin considerations, across 
the ten riparian countries of the Nile, suggest that governments limit land 
reclamation, tackle increasingly grave problems of water pollution, ensure 
that water goes to high value uses after satisfying basic needs, and maintain 
sufficient flows and adequate water quality to sustain ecosystem services.
 During the 2000s, however, local concern and activism around water 
scarcity and pollution became more prominent in Egypt. A diversified 
public sphere and independent media increasingly linked pollution and 
public health crises to authoritarian rule and centralized, opaque decision-
making. Critiques of government initiatives, such as the New Valley Proj-
ect, once aired principally in conversation and on the pages of opposi-
tion newspapers, circulated in national and regional satellite broadcasts, 
independent daily papers, university forums, and parliamentary debates.103 
Similarly, protests about low wages, high prices, water shortages, labor 
conditions, foreign policy, and other grievances became commonplace. 
The revolutionary moment that spread across Egypt in 2011 was thus an 
intensification of existing dynamics of protest, overturning Mubarak’s rule 
and starting a significant restructuring of the political order.
 With the ouster of the president and the imposition of military rule, it is 
far from certain, however, whether deeper changes in Egypt’s environmental 
narratives will emerge. Government ministries in Cairo will likely continue 
to issue centralized plans for remaking the nation’s landscape through land 
reclamation, with little reference to existing patterns of urbanization or ag-
ricultural practice and little communication with farmers or agribusiness. 
Should the military council eventually oversee relatively free national elec-
tions, one may see more effective parliamentary oversight of the costs and 
benefits of large-scale, state-sponsored projects. Devolution of authority to 
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provincial governments, however, may well result in a proliferation of land 
reclamation projects, spun off to well-connected agribusiness interests. If 
political reform allows cities, towns, and rural communities to articulate 
local priorities, raise and spend funds, and experiment with various inno-
vative approaches to land reclamation, we may eventually see significant 
change in Egypt’s dominant environmental narratives.
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C h a p t e r  7
Salts, Soils, and  
(Un)Sustainabilities?
Analyzing Narratives of Environmental Change in Southeastern Turkey
Leila M. Harris
SEVERAL THOUSAND years after salinization led to the abandonment of 
irrigated agriculture among the early settlements of upper Mesopotamia, 
irrigation is emerging anew.1 With a host of technologies now available, 
and careful monitoring of soil and water conditions, planners and scien-
tists are hopeful that a similar fate for contemporary irrigation efforts can 
be avoided and that emergent agro-ecologies will be “sustainable” now 
and into the future. Irrigation is a key component of the massive GAP 
project (Southeastern Anatolia Project), referred to by Turkish planners 
as an “integrated regional sustainable development program.”2 Guarding 
such optimism, major issues of concern have captured the attention of the 
international scientific community. Indeed, preliminary evidence suggests 
that salinization, soil erosion and degradation, and agricultural pests are 
all possible issues that might point to the potential “unsustainability” of 
irrigated agriculture in this context.
 This chapter maps diverse environmental imaginaries connected to 
irrigation-related changes under way in Turkey’s Southeastern Anatolia re-
gion. Although some attention is given to scientific imaginaries and assess-
ments, the focus is on local voices and interpretations of irrigation-related 
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changes. How are ongoing changes and key threats to sustainability for 
irrigation variously narrated, assessed, and attributed? What is the sig-
nificance of the multiplicity of assessments and narratives of change that 
circulate in the region, and more broadly? Bringing scientific evaluations 
of ongoing changes together with narratives invoked by those living and 
working in the region, my aim is to analyze the diverse, contested, and 
convergent environmental imaginaries related to change in southeastern 
Turkey in the contemporary moment. In brief, while many other works 
have sought to highlight local narratives in order to counter top-down 
scientific or state knowledges,3 here I consider why might it be meaning-
ful to analyze diverse narratives relationally rather than positing them as 
distinct or even oppositional (based on positionality, situatedness, or some 
other typology). My argument is that there is value in thinking through 
diverse environmental imaginaries by paying close attention to their mul-
tiplicity, their tensions, as well as their key resonances. Mapping out and 
thinking through key points of divergence and convergence bring out novel 
possibilities for understanding how and why narratives are invoked, how 
they might be strategically deployed given a particular contextual field, and 
how various environmental imaginaries are constituted (or contested) as 
hegemonic in particular times and places.
 Contributing to a wider field of interest on environmental imaginar-
ies, here I emphasize a narrative approach that calls attention to stories that 
are told about environmental issues, allowing analysis of ways that changes 
are attributed as positive or negative, or of the ways that environmental 
conditions are often discussed in relation to other issues—highlighting 
the embeddedness of environmental issues in broader power relations, 
histories, and contexts.4 Thus, a narrative approach shares focus of work 
on “environmental imaginaries” in that both highlight meanings and sys-
tems of signification related to environmental issues, including how those 
imaginaries are mobilized in environmental politics. Within this broader 
framework, a focus on narrative calls particular attention to the plot and 
story-line of stories that circulate, including issues of attribution and cau-
sality. Who is positioned as causing observed changes? Who is to blame for 
the change? And by extension, who or what might be called for to over-
come or respond to particular environmental conditions? Do particular 
story-lines enroll well-known plots that may hold meaning in a particular 
context, or replicate familiar notions of who the heroes or victims might 
be?5 Tracking narratives of change also enables consideration of how vari-
ous actors may situate their own understandings against broader environ-
mental imaginaries. Do various actors accept hegemonic environmental 
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imaginaries and fit their stories within a given plot and set of actors? Do 
they tell stories in order to contest those imaginaries, and thus, to contest 
the power relations that might inhere in them? As this chapter makes clear, 
stories we tell about environments are not always easily predictable but 
rather need to be assessed, evaluated, and understood in relation to key 
contextual issues—whether identity politics or in relation to key political-
economic, cultural, or other historical-contextual issues.6
 It is critical to underscore that an interest in environmental imaginar-
ies and narratives is somewhat distinct from attempts to assess the “truth” 
of changes under way, or to validate the veracity of one claim over an-
other. Regardless of whether stories are “accurate,” they are nevertheless 
important for conditioning responses and mitigation strategies, future 
environmental conditions, or potential for sustainability. Indeed, I argue 
that meanings and associations of changes assigned by those who trans-
form, negotiate, and interpret environments on a daily basis are as crucial 
for agro-ecological sustainability, if not more so, than understanding the 
contours of changing agro-ecological conditions themselves.7 To make this 
case, the analysis provided pays particular attention to divergences and 
convergences between environmental narratives and emphasizes contex-
tual factors that may help account for this complex mapping. Specifically, 
I argue that narratives of environmental change in evidence cannot be 
understood without an appreciation of broader geographical imaginaries 
that hold importance for this region—whether they be imaginaries related 
to the Kurdish southeast that has been forgotten as part of Turkish mod-
ernization efforts, or imaginaries related to the need for Turkey to “catch 
up” to the West that have been present since before the establishment of 
the Turkish republic in 1923 and remain salient today as frequent refrains 
in ongoing debates related to possibilities for Turkish accession to the 
European Union.
 Before launching into the case study, a few additional notes on the 
context of southeastern Turkey may be helpful. The southeast region, a 
border region between Turkey, Syria, and Iraq, is one of Turkey’s most 
impoverished areas. It is also inhabited by several of Turkey’s significant 
minority populations, including Kurdish and Arabic speakers. This part of 
the country has also been at the center of several decades of intense conflict, 
largely associated with Kurdish separatist movements and state response. 
There are many other features of the region that are notable;8 however, 
these brief notes highlight a few key features of the context that will be 
further elaborated below. I now turn to a treatment of diverse narrations 
of change in the region and more generally, beginning with the ways that 
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ongoing changes have been discussed and attributed by scientists, then 
turning to narrations and understandings more common to those living 
and working in the affected region.
Contested and Multiple Environmental Imaginaries: Divergent 
Narratives of Change, and Assessing Sustainabilities through Science
In the first decade since irrigation implementation in the Harran plain in 
the 1990s (see map 7.1), it is estimated that salinization has already forced 
retirement of as much of 15 percent of agricultural lands, most notably in the 
plain’s southern reaches.9 Exacerbating such trends, the cropping pattern is 
now estimated to be 90 percent cotton, leading to difficulties associated with 
near monocropping, and also issues specific to cotton as an input-intensive 
Map 7.1. The Harran Plain, pilot irrigation area for the Southeastern Anatolia Project 
(GAP). Modified from original map in Southeastern Anatolia Project (Ankara: Harita 
Genel Komutanligi, 1996).
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crop (see figure 7.1). The overapplication of irrigation water has further 
contributed to salinization as well as soil erosion and degradation. Given 
the topography of the plain, this has also led to the creation of pools of 
stagnant water in many villages during the irrigation season (referred 
to as lakes, see figure 7.2), contributing to increased risk of malaria and 
other water-related diseases. Understanding these issues, among others,10 
is clearly critical for any attempt to evaluate future irrigation potential, 
associated health risks, livelihood securities, or other concerns commonly 
brought to light with evaluations of “sustainability.”
 It is notable, however, that even with recognition of these issues, 
many planning documents and scientific assessments maintain a spirit of 
optimism with respect to the potential for the sustainability of irrigation 
in the region. In an evaluation of water use based on remotely sensed 
data Mutlu Ozdoğan writes of the need to decrease rates of evaporation 
in future projects: “Incorporating this decrease in overall planning of the 
irrigation projects currently under construction should lead to improved 
management [and], by extension, sustainability of water resources in the 
region.”11 Analysis of this type recognizes vulnerabilities of the region 
related to histories of irrigation, soil conditions, topography, and even 
climate change, yet remains optimistic about the potential of engaging 
science and technology to improve outcomes and avoid worsening deg-
radation. University economists Fikret Adaman and Gokhan Özertan 
Figure 7.1. Cotton bales brought back to a village following harvest in the Harran 
plain. Photo by Leila M. Harris.
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similarly provide a comprehensive treatment of threats to sustainability 
in irrigated areas of the GAP region from a socioeconomic perspective, 
pointing to difficulties associated with virtual monocropping of cotton, 
the lack of price signals to discourage overuse of irrigation water, and 
the inadequacy of furrow irrigation techniques, among other factors.12 
Nevertheless, they suggest that with the proper education of farmers, 
water pricing, incentives for crop diversification, the establishment of 
democratic water-user associations, and modernization of irrigation 
techniques, many of these issues can be countered. Although these types 
of assessments offered by independent scientists are less rosy than the pic-
tures often painted by GAP planners and government agents,13 they still 
share an identifiable story line: degradation is occurring, yet, better un-
derstanding and science together with adaptation of new technology can 
minimize threats to sustainability and improve success of such projects 
over the long term. Consequences of this shared story-line are to validate 
several related interlinked efforts: to observe, monitor, and assess ongoing 
changes, to implement improved technology, and to teach farmers or pro-
vide incentives to conduct appropriate farming to achieve sustainability. 
This story thus validates a strong role for the scientific community and for 
the Turkish state as entities that must continue to monitor conditions and 
encourage particular changes.
Figure 7.2. Rising groundwater due to heavy application of irrigation water forms 
“lakes” such as this in many villages in the southern part of the Harran plain, inundat-
ing houses and posing health risks from stagnant water. Photo by Leila M. Harris.
198  |   Leila M. Harris
Fixities of Place: Sociocultural Attributes and Unsustainable 
Farming Practice
Although sharing similarities with scientific assessments, somewhat different 
narratives circulate among actors living and working in the Southeastern 
Anatolia region. In an interview with sociologists at the GAP administra-
tion regional offices in Urfa, one state agent explained ongoing difficulties 
related to irrigation adoption in the plain:14 “The people there used to be 
nomads, and then they earned a living as seasonal workers, picking cot-
ton in Çukurova. No pre-study has been carried out about the people of 
Harran and how they will adapt to living with water. Before they didn’t 
even have drinking water, now they have (irrigation) water and they can 
grow their own cotton. However, they are not prepared to live with water, 
and to earn big money.”
 In this narrative, residents of the Harran plain are portrayed as fac-
ing difficulties with irrigation, unable to adapt to new conditions. In the 
same meeting, it was noted that local people “don’t change easily; it is not 
clear how this will proceed.” Another said, “They don’t want to change. 
One reason might be that they have doubts toward the state, since the state 
never brought them any service prior to the water development projects.” 
In another conversation, a state engineer summed up the obstacles related 
to crop diversification this way: “People know how to grow cotton; they 
are not eager to learn any new crop, and this shows how closed the so-
ciety is to change.” In all such statements, emphasis is given to the idea 
that farmers are resistant or unable to change, even as recognition is given 
that this might stem from skepticism toward the state. In narratives of this 
type, threats to sustainability are attributed to the people or cultures of 
the region. Following such logic, if sustainability is not achieved, it can 
be readily attributed to the obstinacy or the ignorance of the local farm-
ers. Such narratives of change (and the inability of farmers themselves to 
change) are necessarily read through long histories of inequality between 
the Turkish state and the Kurdish and Arabic-speaking populations in the 
southeast region. Thus, the way that these issues are narrated is as much 
about cultural politics as it is about environmental conditions or irriga-
tion technologies.15 Narratives along these lines also clearly demonstrate 
consistencies with “expert” and “state” narratives that have been evaluated 
in other contexts, “blaming” local populations and attributing degradation 
to local culture or livelihood practices.16
 Another narrative of degradation that is fairly common relates envi-
ronmental problems to high percentages of sharecropping among farmers, 
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which is directly linked to high rates of landlessness. State agents, techni-
cians, and landowners explain that because sharecroppers do not own the 
land, they have no interest in maintaining long-term soil productivity or 
in learning appropriate irrigation techniques. As one state agent explained, 
referring to sharecroppers, “They don’t have the initiative to implement 
a new program for the land.” As part of such explanations, the fact that 
sharecroppers often farm different land parcels from year to year is invoked 
to demonstrate that they have little investment and interest in protecting 
the soil and mitigating further damage.
 Related to these discourses, outreach efforts of state extension agents 
currently focus on “teaching” local farmers, for instance, by telling them to 
use less water, or by investing in demonstration farms to show farmers the 
value of planting orchards, tomatoes, or other crops. These portrayals and 
policy directives often cast farmers inter alia as practicing inappropriate 
agriculture, having insufficient knowledge, or suffering from illiteracy or 
other conditions that might impede sustainable agricultural potential. In a 
focus group of irrigation engineers employed at irrigation unions similar 
ideas were reinforced. The engineers note, for instance, that not knowing 
any better, farmers add water in excess of what is needed to grow the crops, 
leading to degradation.17 In other narratives, the overreliance on cotton 
was directly connected to high rates of illiteracy among farmers.
 Although sociocultural obstacles and farmer illiteracy are often blamed 
for inappropriate farming, narratives also frequently emphasize the know-
how and good intentions of the state. For instance, one irrigation exten-
sion agent said: “We tell people the aim of the project. Our aim is to invest 
in people, to benefit from natural and human resources in the best way. 
However, because of wrong irrigation practices, the most fertile layers of 
soil are degraded and carried to Syria. Four hundred years are required for 
the formation of a one-centimeter-thick layer of fertile soil. What we are 
trying to do is implement sustainable use of water resources.”
 With this statement, the planner asserts his own scientific understand-
ing of soil fertility, suggesting that state agents have the knowledge to make 
“sustainable use of water resources” possible. Here it is of interest not only 
that farmers lack the knowledge of appropriate farming or familiarity with 
science, but that the state in general, and irrigation engineers in particular, 
would be able to achieve sustainability were it not for this deficit. Through 
a litany of similar statements encoded in state planning documents and 
conveyed in interviews, the kernel that is common to these narratives is 
that again sustainability is possible and could be achieved through further 
reliance on state agents or investment in scientific knowledge and practices. 
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On the flip side, lack of agricultural knowledge, landlessness, and illiteracy 
are all discursively linked to unsustainabilities, connecting contemporary 
environmental imaginaries to long histories and policies related to socio-
cultural attributes of this “backward” region dominated by Kurdish and 
Arabic speakers.18
 It is important to note that farmers too echo such narratives, for in-
stance highlighting their own ignorance or identifying the need for more 
farmer training, illustrating that these narratives are not exclusive to state 
agents and scientists.19 This type of hybridized knowledge is of particular 
interest, both to illustrate that farmer and state knowledges are not discrete 
categories20 as well as to consider how hegemonic environmental imagi-
naries are consolidated, in part through support, iteration, and buy-in 
from diverse agents.
 Although some farmers reinforce these narratives, others expressly 
contest such framings, demonstrating awareness that their knowledge 
of farming and irrigation is actively questioned. Consider the state-
ment made by an Arabic-speaking farmer in the southern reaches of the 
Harran plain.
Many agricultural engineers and others come to talk with us 
about water use, fertilizer, etc. . . . but every farmer is as knowl-
edgeable as an engineer right now. The engineers just study 
with the books in his hand, but we, the farmers, live with the 
soil. So, we know better than the engineer what the soil needs.
 Quite apart from commonly accepted framings of sustainability as 
contingent on soil or water conditions, these narratives clearly affirm that 
“environmental politics are always entangled with a cultural politics of 
knowing,”21 with contestations over what constitutes appropriate knowl-
edge, or farming, at the core.
Farmer’s Narrations: Recognizing Change and Complex Drivers
What is needed is to ensure that the irrigation lasts a long time. 
I don’t know how many years the state has assumed for this 
irrigation system to last, but I expect that it will be fifty years. 
Then we will see what will happen. There is a lack of infrastruc-
ture, such as drainage canals. Also, the slope of the canalets is 
incorrect in some places, creating places where the water flows 
over. (Subyan, irrigation technician and farmer)
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 This quotation, by a rural resident employed as an irrigation techni-
cian for one of the irrigation unions, provides a worthwhile starting point 
to consider narratives of environmental change more common to rural 
residents living in the plain. Subyan accepts that irrigated agriculture in 
the plain may have finite possibilities. Consistent with other assessments 
already noted, yet in contrast to the idea that farmers need to be told that 
degradation is occurring, rural residents demonstrate considerable recog-
nition of environmental degradation occurring with irrigation implemen-
tation. A strong majority of survey respondents identified issues related to 
agricultural pests, soil erosion, rising ground water, salinization, and other 
issues as problems in their village (over 65 percent of survey respondents 
identified these issues). Validating claims made by engineers, farmers also 
generally recognize environmental degradation associated with overreli-
ance on cotton and heavy irrigation application. For instance, Subyan (the 
same technician quoted above) explained that at first farmers applied 
excessive irrigation water. Noticing their harvest didn’t do well, that the 
fields degraded, and the groundwater table rose, he explained, farmers re-
sponded by applying less and requesting that drainage canals be installed. 
Despite these changes, Subyan notes that problems persist.
 In terms of other convergences between narratives, one village headman 
echoed statements made by several state agents, blaming cotton monocrop-
ping on farmers’ illiteracy. He said, “It is because of the farmers’ illiteracy that 
they only plant cotton since 1997.” In the next breath, however, he added, “It 
is a problem though because the state lends support when you plant cot-
ton,” thereby relating another cause for heavy reliance on cotton production 
among farmers—state crop subsidies. At the time of initial research, the state 
provided both a nine-cent per kilo subsidy for cotton (U.S. dollar terms, in 
2001) and support for cotton-related pesticides, not necessarily available for 
other crops. In repeated interviews with state agents the issue of state sub-
sidies for cotton was offered unprompted only once, and this was off the 
record. By contrast, when farmers spoke about environmental changes in 
the plain, the issue of state subsidies was noted readily. When a DSI
.
 (State 
Hydraulic Works) engineer was asked directly about the subsidy, he noted: 
“The subsidy for cotton is a political issue. The government says it does not 
want people to grow cotton here but still provides the subsidy; they should 
change this; I’m not sure why they do it.”
 In terms of the implications of the subsidy, it was mentioned at sev-
eral points that the predominance of cotton is a result of state support, 
and without it, some mentioned they would prefer to grow wheat or some 
other less demanding crop. One farmer complained, “The state only gives 
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us support for cotton, so we grow only cotton.” Another explained, “Surely, 
the subsidy becomes a secondary income for cotton. We don’t receive 
subsidy for any other crop. . . . [Also] cotton is better because it is useful 
to the country’s economy.” These and similar statements clearly attribute 
predominance of cotton not to the ignorance of the farmers but to specific 
state policies.22 As such, these stories offer different dimensions to assess-
ments of emergent irrigated agro-ecologies of the plain. With respect to 
cotton pesticide subsidies, one farmer noted: “We don’t have white fly or 
green worm this year, but nearby villages are struggling with it . . . the 
state gives us 30 percent toward the bill for pesticides associated with cot-
ton. . . . We don’t like pesticides if there are not too many pests because it 
destroys 5 to 10 percent of the product and decreases the harvest.” Not only 
are subsidies encouraging cotton production, they are also contributing to 
the use of certain pesticides, with the implicit suggestion that this is how 
appropriate agriculture is practiced.
 With respect to multiscalar considerations, these types of statements 
made by farmers clearly connect their local practices (e.g., crop choice or 
pesticide use) to state practices, as well as to scales and notions of national-
ist belonging (e.g., the idea of benefiting the national economy through 
cotton production). As such, although perhaps counterintuitive, it is in-
teresting to note that themes among narratives offered by rural residents 
tend to situate changes under way within wider fields of political, eco-
nomic, and ecological processes, offering a challenge to what is meant by 
“local knowledges.” By contrast, a number of the portrayals by state agents 
tended to fix these problems geographically, defining them in terms of par-
ticularities of place (e.g., in relation to local sociocultural attributes or soil 
characteristics).23 Such tendencies further challenge neat binaries separat-
ing local from expert knowledge, particularly confounding common scalar 
and spatial associations with each.
 Exploring diverse narratives of ongoing changes provides some initial 
insights to enrich our understanding of the complex issues at play with 
respect to crop choice, water use, changing soil conditions, and other key 
dimensions of environmental change in Turkey’s southeast. The issues that 
come to light by evaluating diverse narrations of change clearly displace 
attention from the need to convince farmers to grow other crops (and to 
explain to farmers why monocropping is detrimental, as many state agents 
and independent scientists suggest), to the need to more actively encour-
age other types of agro-industrial investment or create flexible scheduling 
arrangements to enable alternative cropping choices.24 Juxtaposing these 
narratives, which highlights certain points of tension and overlap, also 
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reaffirms other research that has suggested that that categories of local, 
farmer, or state knowledge are much more elusive and hybridized than 
we may assume. Although it might appear that previous sections have 
replicated artificial separations between categories of state, expert, or local 
knowledge, in the next section I consider hybridities and elisions across 
these categories more fully. Part of the purpose of the next section is also 
to consider broader geographical and environmental imaginaries through 
which these narratives must be understood and evaluated.
Multiple and Overlapping Narratives: Toward Understanding 
Divergences and Convergences
To some, reading the above sections might seem frustratingly familiar—
many others have convincingly brought local knowledges to bear to enrich 
understanding of socioecological changes, for instance drawing on farm-
ers’ or herders’ knowledge to contest statist narratives of peasant backward-
ness,25 or drawing on historical and ecological data to correct biases inher-
ent in colonial environmental narratives.26 Resonant with studies of this 
type, the work here validates that attention to diverse and contested knowl-
edges is crucial in assessing environmental or developmental changes. As 
I have shown, without incorporating multiple knowledges, and especially 
local knowledges, an understanding of potential for (un)sustainabilities 
of irrigated agriculture is at best incomplete, and at worst misdirected. 
Without considering how farmers assess and narrate these issues, the state 
is likely to continue misdirected policies of “teaching” appropriate agricul-
ture, without considering marketing, state subsidies, or other key issues. 
My goal is to move beyond these insights. I ask: What can be gained by 
more fully considering diverse environmental imaginaries relationally, fo-
cusing on the complex interplay, and points of convergence and divergence 
between different narratives of environmental change? How might evalua-
tion of environmental imaginaries not only provide insight related to envi-
ronmental conditions or changes but also provide valuable lenses through 
which to better understand the broader sociocultural or economic context 
in which environmental imaginaries are necessarily embedded, especially 
power dynamics across scales?
 The analysis above reveals that there are indeed key points of diver-
gence across the narratives of change, only some of which might be antici-
pated by positionality of the actors. More important, I argue, there are also 
key convergences and shared elements across the narratives that also require 
attention. Although situated knowledge approaches appear to suggest an 
infinite array of possibilities,27 I am suggesting here that it is crucial also 
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to explicitly theorize key convergences among environmental knowledges 
and imaginaries. How and why do certain elements of plot, story-line, or 
attribution hold together across narratives from diverse actors, or why do 
narratives tend to diverge in some ways, but not others? What do these 
convergences and divergences suggest with respect to the range and scope 
of environmental imaginaries that might be possible in particular times 
and places? And relatedly, how do different actors reinforce or contest ele-
ments of familiar or hegemonic environmental imaginaries?
 Across the narratives from southeastern Turkey, notable convergences 
include the fact that most people living and working in the region recog-
nize that considerable degradation is under way—awareness of the issues 
is not lacking. Another key convergence that is perhaps more illuminating 
is that even with this widespread recognition, few if any of those living and 
working in the region appear to question the suitability of irrigated agri-
culture in this context. Indeed, for most, irrigation is long overdue, and any 
problems relate mostly to the need to continue implementation (e.g., with 
land leveling and drainage). Across diverse imaginaries, sustainability is 
maintained as possible, even if there are significant hurdles to be overcome 
in getting there (whether implementing new technologies, getting the 
prices right, or teaching farmers). As such, the evidence from southeastern 
Turkey appears to validate insights offered elsewhere28 whereby farmers do 
not cast off technoscientific interventions as inappropriate for local life-
ways or as ecologically devastating,29 but rather they insist on the need for 
continued engagement with technoscientific approaches. It is particularly 
striking that even initial evidence related to environmental degradation is 
not taken as a reason to question the appropriateness of statist or techno-
scientific interventions. The opposite appears to be true—narratives reveal 
that farmers and state agents engage the evidence of environmental degra-
dation to argue for more technoscience,30 and more state intervention, not 
less. This convergence across narratives reveals an intriguing puzzle: Why is 
it that precisely when there is broad recognition of losses and degradation 
associated with irrigated agricultural implementation that those living and 
working in the region appear to valorize and retrench technoscientific and 
statist solutions and approaches?
Unlikely Convergences: Recognizing Degradation yet Valorizing 
Technoscience?
The widespread valorization of technoscientific approaches, of irrigation, 
and of state implementation invites further elaboration, even if only specu-
lative. Unlike other accounts of similar processes,31 farmers and state agents 
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in this region do not appear to long for a return to traditional livelihoods 
prior to irrigation.32 Further, as noted, the evidence of degradation is not 
taken to question the appropriateness of irrigated agriculture or to challenge 
state practices and development efforts in the region (over 80 percent of re-
spondents assess irrigation-related changes as “very positive” or “positive,” in 
contrast to less than 10 percent of respondents who consider changes to be 
“very negative” or “negative”).33 Instead, farmers in the Harran plain request 
new and better seeds, more effective pesticides, irrigation training, land 
leveling, and drainage works—all amounting to demands for more state 
involvement, and more technoscientific engagement.34
 Considered together, a foundational aspect of many narratives from 
southeastern Turkey is that they appear to maintain faith that the appro-
priate scientific knowledge is available and only needs to be more effec-
tively conveyed and implemented. Even though degradation is observed, 
hegemonic and shared environmental imaginaries convey an implicit faith 
that the appropriate technology can, and will, be applied. Thus, a com-
mon theme is that sustainability remains possible, even if elusive for the 
moment. For many state agents, it is a matter of teaching appropriate tech-
niques to farmers. For many farmers, it is a question of the state following 
through on land leveling, drainage works, or other applications.35
 The convergences between lay-knowledges and state or expert opinion 
in this case study also raise the question of situated knowledges beyond the 
acknowledgment that there are diverse knowledges, dependent on social or 
physical location or positionality to consider what factors, processes, and 
relations account for, or enable, differential, and shared, environmental 
imaginaries and representations. For farmers in the Harran plain, many 
have no choice but to remain hopeful about the potential for irrigation 
to bring improvement to their lives. The relative poverty and underdevel-
opment in the region, as well as histories of Kurdish and Iraqi conflicts 
that have plagued the region, bring this possibility into relief.36 The south-
east has long been one of the poorest regions of the country, and these 
retrenched differences have long contributed to tensions between east and 
west in Turkey (as well as between notions of Kurd and Turk that map onto 
those geographies). To garner support for their cause Kurdish separatists 
have long invoked discourses about the southeast being “left out” of Turk-
ish state efforts. 37
 This background may help, in part, to situate and understand why 
farmers in the region appear to welcome Turkish state intervention, viewing 
it as long overdue and perhaps even key to stemming the long-term con-
flict and associated problems in the region.38 Thus, the current receptivity 
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to state intervention may be understandable precisely given the field of 
conflictual relations that have existed previously, particularly given dis-
courses that have circulated about the need for greater state attention to 
the southeast and for modernist development in particular. Consistent with 
this, after decades of conflict and the associated underdevelopment, some 
environmental degradation may also be understood as a small cost to pay 
in contrast with other costs that have been borne in the region.39 To take 
this a step further, perhaps the situation is one where ongoing degrada-
tion simply cannot translate into skepticism or distrust more generally. To 
consider these development efforts as unsustainable or ineffective would 
constitute a loss of hope and even greater uncertainty about future pos-
sibilities for survival and well-being. A loss of hope might be too much to 
ask of a population that has suffered through decades of conflict and other 
hardships. In sum, the fact that the Turkish state is finally investing in mod-
ernist development in the Kurdish southeast has a great deal of symbolic 
value, and indeed, this symbolism may overshadow any particular evidence 
related to degradation associated with irrigation and associated changes.
 For state agents as well, given that it was the Turkish state that imple-
mented delivery of irrigation to the region, it is perhaps not surprising 
that the negative effects of irrigation are not taken as referenda on the suit-
ability of irrigated agriculture. Thus, while farmers and state agents appear 
to focus on divergent obstacles to sustainable irrigated agriculture in the 
region, neither appears to take the evidence of degradation to mean that 
one should be pessimistic about irrigated agricultural potential in general.
 Related to these striking convergences between narratives, it is also no-
table that at times while talking with residents in southeastern Turkey, irri-
gation and technology seem to be elevated to mythic proportions. Farmers 
made statements that conveyed a sense that irrigation was a change that 
was a long-awaited improvement in their lives. As one farmer said, “When 
water came to the village, life came as well. . . . [B]ut we will have to work 
hard. Then we will be rich, but we will need to work hard.” As mentioned 
above, and discussed in more detail elsewhere,40 despite many negative ef-
fects of irrigation, an overwhelming majority of farmers view irrigation on 
the whole very positively (with over two-thirds of farmers on the survey 
noting that irrigation has been either “beneficial,” or “very beneficial”). 
Clearly, irrigation technology is taken for more than the ability to water 
fields and grow different crops; it is also considered to be a point of entry 
for other possibilities, perhaps even viewed as an opening for broader as-
sociations with modernity or wealth. Indeed, before widespread canalet 
irrigation in the plain, only those farmers who were already well-off were 
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able to afford pumped irrigation water to grow cotton. As such, irrigation 
generally and cotton cropping specifically appear to remain symbolically 
linked to wealth and prestige. Thus many living and working in the region 
now believe that since irrigation is available to everyone, wealth and pres-
tige will surely follow.41 This adds yet another layer to the contextual speci-
ficities of the region that matter to how ongoing environmental changes 
are understood and interpreted.
 These types of associations also point to the possibility that irrigation 
and associated technology are symbolic of modernity and rapprochement 
with the West. Specifically, irrigation in this region appears to symboli-
cally transgress divides between the West and non-West, industrialized and 
nonindustrialized, developed and nondeveloped, or European and non-
European (both within Turkey and more generally). These constellations 
of difference and related associations with progress and wealth have long 
marked Turkish cultural politics and the relative underdevelopment of the 
Kurdish southeast in particular. Given the centrality of these construc-
tions to the history and geography of Turkey, and to the southeast region, 
the potential of these binaries to mark contemporary environmental and 
developmental imaginaries cannot be understated. Indeed the frequency 
with which these types of binaries continue to be invoked in Turkey-EU 
discussions only adds further to the saliency of these constructions to con-
textualize environmental imaginaries that circulate, and take hold, among 
diverse actors in the contemporary moment. Certain types of degradation 
may be considered the necessary price on the path to realizing certain life-
styles and systems of production more in line with those of the West.42 
In this sense, environmental imaginaries of state agents and farmers are 
certainly distinct but also very similar to the extent that they share identifi-
cation and investment in transcending notions of West–non-West or other 
divides that have been so central to the histories and geographies of Turkey 
and of the southeast.
Toward Contextualized Understanding:  
Situating Environmental Imaginaries
With the analysis offered here, I have endeavored to take seriously Cronon’s 
suggestion that we need to tell not only the stories about nature but also 
the stories about stories about nature.43 While we invest millions of dollars 
to measure and assess biophysical dimensions of ongoing changes, calcu-
lating rates of change, or endeavoring to predict future conditions under 
climate change scenarios, too often we ignore the complex terrain of en-
vironmental imaginaries. From the analysis above, and from the literature 
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generally, it is increasingly clear that rates of salinization or measurements 
of soil runoff hold little relevance for sustainability debates without a sense 
of how those changing agro-ecological conditions are understood, inter-
preted, negotiated, and conveyed by farmers, irrigation engineers, or others 
living and working in affected regions. Given the complex interpretations 
and meanings attached to changes in southeastern Turkey, it is clear that 
sustainability of irrigation is dependent on meanings attached to ongoing 
changes at least as much, if not more so, as it is on the soil and water char-
acteristics of the region.44 Further, these narratives overlap in key ways to 
reveal how environmental conditions and changes are necessarily inflected 
with meaning, symbolism, and other complex associations.
 I have also argued for a contextual approach, attentive to social, cultural, 
and economic processes as crucial for interpreting the complex mapping 
of narratives and imaginaries (including their overlap and dissonance). As 
Proctor warns with respect to the need to more fully situate our knowledges 
of environments with respect to the particularities of context and in rela-
tion to the sociopolitical dimensions of knowledge production, “Alarming 
biophysical facts and seemingly self-evident values concerning nature do 
not stand outside of a social context, and that context itself must be inter-
rogated, even in what appears to be an incontrovertible case.”45 In the case 
examined, we can only begin to appreciate the shared faith in technosci-
ence, and the shared interest among actors in state involvement, when we 
evaluate narratives in relation to broader power dynamics, histories, and 
contextual issues. These include specificities regarding the Southeastern 
Anatolia region and the ongoing Kurdish conflict, as well as contemporary 
EU accession debates. As such, changing agro-ecologies in Turkey’s south-
east cannot be abstracted from histories of difference: West–non-West, 
European–non-European and industrialized–non-industrialized divides 
and the uneven relations of power implicit in each.
 Apart from attempts to bring in local knowledges that have been the 
currency of political, ecological, anthropological, and developmental lit-
eratures over the past several decades, I have also argued for an analytic 
that explicitly theorizes key convergences and divergences between narra-
tives of change. It is only by doing so that we can begin to understand the 
construction and consolidation of particular environmental imaginaries 
and their effects. The case adds force to calls to focus more precisely on 
the portrayals of environments themselves as objects of analysis, and what 
sort of insights analysis of this type might afford.46 Among other insights, 
consideration of diverse narratives of change in this region offers a stark 
contrast to general crisis narratives, including those imaginaries that cast 
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the Middle East as arid, water scarce, degraded, or unsuitable for agricul-
ture. Although analysts may read ongoing degradation and unsustain-
abilities as suggestive of the need to abandon irrigated agriculture in this 
context, it is clear that this interpretation is not shared by many living and 
working in the region. It is only by taking seriously the seeming consensus 
across narratives told by scientists, state agents, and farmers that we can 
begin to consider the complex meanings assigned to changing conditions. 
In this case, notions of modernity, technoscience, and crises linked to con-
flict and underdevelopment together underwrite shared commitments to 
particular environmental imaginaries, and thus particular agro-ecological 
possibilities and futures.
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C h a p t e r  8
Hydro-Imaginaries and the 
Construction of the Political 
Geography of the Jordan River
The Johnston Mission, 1953–56
Samer Alatout
SHORTLY AFTER the establishment of the state of Israel in 1948, disputes 
over unilateral plans for utilizing the Jordan River and its tributaries 
erupted between Israel and the riparian Arab states of Jordan, Lebanon, 
and Syria. Conflict became especially intense between Syria and Israel when 
the latter began construction on its drainage project on Lake Huleh in 1950 
and, more so, when Israel began its construction of the National Water 
Carrier in the demilitarized zone in 1953. Compounding these problems 
was the seemingly explosive situation of more than 800,000 Palestinians 
who became refugees as a result of the 1948 war and who settled, for the 
most part, along the Jordan River banks. Interventions on their behalf for 
repatriation to their homes in Palestine were rejected by the Israeli state. In 
addition, their permanent resettlement in the Arab states where they took 
refuge was resisted by the refugees themselves and their political organiza-
tions, fearing the dissolution of their political rights of return.
 Both of these problems became especially critical in the early 1950s. In 
response, then U.S. President Dwight Eisenhower dispatched his personal 
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envoy, Eric Johnston, to the Middle East to negotiate a water development 
plan among the Jordan River riparian states. With such a plan, the U.S. 
administration wanted to address three issues at once: conflict over the 
water resources by promoting a regional approach to water management, 
the Palestinian refugee problem by encouraging the settlement of Palestin-
ian refugees in host countries, and underdevelopment by providing a re-
gional development plan funded by the United States and other members 
of the international community. In order to negotiate such an agreement, 
Johnston visited the area four times between 1953 and 1955. The context of 
this episode of international diplomacy, the actors behind it, its politico-
environmental imaginaries, assumptions, and representations, the debates 
that surrounded it, and its conclusion constitute the story of this essay.1
 In a nutshell, Johnston and his team constructed the water resources 
of the region as a self-evident, unified watershed and used that concep-
tion to underwrite the political project of building a cooperative region. 
Articulating the watershed with the region in such a way, Johnston did not 
only naturalize and thus legitimize the emergence of cooperative regional 
politics; he also naturalized the very politics of containment toward the 
Soviet Union, at the heart of American diplomacy during the 1950s. This 
politico-environmental imaginary based on the conflation of a watershed 
(nature) and a region (politics) was met by resistance, or counterimaginaries, 
in both the Arab states and Israel. Not only was the regional politics of 
Johnston disputed, but also his very understanding of regional water re-
sources. Upon arrival, Johnston faced two different politico-environmental 
imaginaries that rested on two different conceptions of the hydrology of 
the water resources in the area, overlapping with two drastically different 
political imaginaries. One of those was the Arab Technical Committee’s ar-
ticulation of the Jordan River with the primordial nation and its territorial 
expression and the other was an Israeli imaginary that situated the Jordan 
River within the narrow confines of the nation-state.2
 These three different politico-environmental imaginaries of the river 
and its management proved incommensurable. Hence, it only makes sense 
that the final agreement was not formally ratified. However, despite that, 
the argument of this essay, consistent with much scholarship on the sub-
ject, is that the final revised Johnston agreement, which resulted from three 
years of negotiation, was not a total failure either. As a matter of fact, the 
revised agreement became the de facto framework followed by all states in 
the region until the war of 1967. The revised plan was instrumental in de-
politicizing the Palestinian question and in defining the Palestine refugees 
issue in economic and humanitarian terms. This particular outcome was 
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immensely important for all of the states in the region, most particularly 
Israel and Jordan.3
 The argument of this essay rests on two decades of scholarship in sci-
ence studies that emphasize the co-production of science and politics.4 
Along those lines, particular understandings of the natural order (e.g., 
how scientists define the watershed, what constitutes evidence in the pro-
duction of knowledge, what are the facts about water resources, and what 
interventions are deemed necessary) often overlap with particular under-
standings of the political order (e.g., what political units are appropriate 
for the management of water resources and what scale is appropriate for 
political intervention). In the case of the Johnston mission, we had three 
competing politico-environmental imaginaries that respectively linked a 
watershed approach with a political region (the original Johnston plan), 
differentiated water resources with a primordial nation (Arab plan), and a 
river with the nation-state (the Israeli plan).5
 In what follows, I discuss all three plans (Johnston, Arab, and Israeli) 
with special attention to the ways each of these plans conceptualized the 
water resources and articulated that conceptualization with a particular 
political vision. I conclude by bringing the themes of the chapter together 
and by briefly describing current water-sharing regimes, or lack thereof.
The Johnston Plan
In September 1953, Israeli construction started at a point on the Jordan River 
known as Jisr Banat Ya’aqub to divert the river away from its course to Lake 
Tiberias.6 This was the initial stage of diverting the Upper Jordan River to 
the Negev Desert in the south of Israel. However, the point of diversion was 
within the demilitarized zone between Syria and Israel and thus without 
clear sovereignty status.7 Within a few days the Syrian government protested 
to the Security Council of the United Nations, which issued an order to the 
Israeli government to halt construction work. Even though the Israeli gov-
ernment rejected the order, an American threat of freezing financial aid to 
Israel forced the Israeli government to halt its operations. In October, a little 
more than a month later, work on the diversion canal stopped. 
 Although the United Nations Security Council decided to look into 
the matter at a later stage, it never did. Given the fact that the United States 
was preparing for a mission of negotiations, the Security Council opted to 
wait for the results of this intervention. The U.S. president dispatched Eric 
Johnston, the chairman of the U.S. International Development Advisory 
Board, as a special envoy to the Middle East with a mission to “explore with 
the governments of the countries of that region certain steps which might 
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be expected to contribute to an improvement of the general situation in 
the region.”8 As mentioned previously, there was an agreement by all par-
ties that the main cause for tension was the Palestinian refugees situation, 
which was subsequently defined as an essentially economic problem.9 The 
Johnston plan, therefore, centered on an economic development program 
for the Jordan Valley and, more particularly, on reaching an agreement on 
a water-sharing regime among riparian states of the Jordan River—Jordan, 
Israel, Syria, and Lebanon.10
 Johnston and his teams visited the Middle East four times between 
October 1953 and October 1955.11 During his first visit, Johnston offered the 
development plan sponsored by the Tennessee Valley Authority that came to 
be known as the Main Plan of 1953, after the consulting firm C. T. Main. This 
plan proved to be only a starting point for negotiations. The Arab Technical 
Committee, composed of water experts from each of the four Arab coun-
tries, and the Israeli Technical Team each offered a counterproposal, the Arab 
and the Cotton plans respectively.12 These proposals were negotiated back 
and forth until the beginning of 1956, when all technical teams agreed on one 
plan that came to be known as the Johnston Unified Plan.
 Even though all teams agreed on the technical merits of the plan, the 
Arab states decided to turn the plan back to the technical team for fur-
ther study. Many considered this move a rejection of the plan for political 
reasons. The important point to recognize, though, is that the Johnston 
Unified Plan became the de facto sharing regime for the Jordan River, even 
though it was never ratified.13 All the states in the region limited their water 
use to their share of the plan until the war of 1967 when all the headwaters 
of the Jordan River came under the control of the Israeli forces.
Water Bodies in Question?
Let us begin with a brief description of the bodies of water with which the 
Johnston negotiations were concerned.14 To begin with, the Jordan River 
has four main tributaries, of which three form the Upper Jordan: the Ba-
nias originating in Syria; the Hasbani in Lebanon; and the Leddan, which 
originates and runs its whole course within the boundaries of Israel.15 
These tributaries converge and form the Upper Jordan about 25 kilometers 
north of Lake Tiberias. The Jordan then flows into Lake Huleh and, later 
on, into Lake Tiberias. Before the river flows out of Lake Tiberias, it loses 
some of its waters to evaporation.
 Another tributary of the Jordan River, indeed the largest, is the Yarmuk 
River, which originates in Syria and forms the boundary between Jordan and 
Syria for more than 90 percent of its course. More than six kilometers south 
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of Lake Tiberias, the Yarmuk joins with the River Jordan. Before discharg-
ing into the Dead Sea, the Jordan River gains some water from wadis and 
perennial flows along its route. The Litani River, which runs its full course 
within the Lebanese boundaries and which discharges in the Mediterranean, 
was not included in the Johnston plan. As will become clear in later sections, 
Israel requested that the Litani River be part of any regional agreement.
The Johnston Plan: Naturalizing the Region
Johnston adopted in full the Main plan for the development of the Jordan 
River basin. The Main plan was supervised by the Tennessee Valley Author-
ity in response to a request by the United Nations Relief and Works Agency 
for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA). Rephrasing the UNRWA 
directive, Gordon Clapp, the chairman of the TVA, argued that the plan was 
“to establish, disregarding political boundaries, a broad plan for the effective 
and efficient use of the water resources of the Jordan Valley emphasizing, 
first, irrigation and, second, the production of hydroelectric power.”16 He 
went even further in distancing the plan from any political meaning: “The 
report describes the elements of an efficient arrangement of water supply 
within the watershed of the Jordan River System. It does not consider political 
factors or attempt to set this system into the national boundaries now prevail-
ing.”17 It was assumed, of course, that this disregard of political boundaries 
produced the most objective technical plan possible. The “engineer,” “ob-
serving and using the lay of the land and the natural and potential stor-
age areas in the watershed, gathers, saves, adds to, and divides the available 
water of the system economically and lets water run to the areas where it can 
be made useful for human beings.”18 The assumption was that any politics 
resulting from this objective study of nature should be fair politics. Clapp 
told us what exactly that politics ought to be: “The optimum development 
utilization of the water resources of the Jordan-Yarmuk watershed could 
only be achieved by cooperation among the states concerned.”19
 This should be surprising given the fact that the reverse position was 
taken by Clapp himself earlier in 1949, when he was the chairman of the 
United Nations’ Economic Survey Mission (ESM). His mandate then was 
to survey Palestine and the broader region for possible economic recovery 
projects. Then, the report of the ESM argued against regional cooperation 
in river development: “The region is not ready, the projects are not ready, 
the people and Governments are not ready for large-scale development of 
the Region’s basic river systems or major undeveloped land areas. To press 
forward on such a course is to pursue folly and frustration and thereby 
delay sound economic growth.”20
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 Nevertheless, regional cooperation as reflected in Clapp’s letter of 
transmittal, claimed to be the natural outcome of engineering practices 
that observe and gather data—in this scheme, the engineer is never active 
in constructing a natural phenomenon; s/he merely observes it. Regional 
cooperation was legitimized not as a political strategy, which is by defini-
tion disputable; it was legitimized by the constant reference to a nature 
that is undisputable, to a Jordan-Yarmuk watershed that makes regional 
cooperation the only natural (read rational) politics to be had. So, what are 
the properties of this nature that produced regional cooperation as a natu-
ral outcome? What is it about the natural order, as perceived by Johnston 
and his team, that made the politics of regional cooperation preferable or 
perhaps even necessary? And, how did the plan articulate the watershed 
with regional cooperation in a way that produced the former as a natural 
hydrological boundary and the latter as legitimate political practice?
The Depoliticization of Watershed Boundaries21
As mentioned above, the plan proclaimed its nonpolitical character from 
the start: “Political boundaries have been completely ignored and legal 
limitations involving water rights have not been considered.”22 Even more 
significant, the plan was to become the basis for political intervention; as 
the report noted, the “facts presented in this study should assist in solving 
these [political] problems.”23 In fact, the plan was to become a source of 
legitimacy for a certain political imagination—an imagination that was at 
once regional and cooperative.24
 First and foremost, the plan constructed the Jordan-Yarmuk water-
shed as a unit of study and intervention (see map 8.1). As can be seen from 
the map, the watershed includes “the drainage area of the Jordan River 
including the inflow to Lake Huleh and Lake Tiberias, and all the tributar-
ies and wadis entering the Jordan River.”25 It spans an area of 17,300 square 
kilometers that is distributed among all states of the region: Israel, Jordan, 
Syria, and Lebanon.
 Included in the watershed were the river basins of the Hasbani, Leddan, 
Banias, and Yarmuk. However, it is clear from the map that constructing 
a Jordan-Yarmuk watershed that includes all of these river basins was far 
from necessary. Engineering interventions could have been limited to 
many notions of watershed that were smaller, or larger, in scale. These 
interventions, in turn, would have entailed different political consequences 
with respect to resource use.26
 For example, one intervention could have taken the Yarmuk water-
shed as its basic unit, which was exactly what the Bunger plan did in 
Map 8.1. The Jordan River watershed as seen by the Johnston mission. Chas. T. Main, 
The Unified Development of the Water Resources of the Jordan Valley Region (Boston: 
Chas. T. Main, 1953). With permission of Parsons Corporation.
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1952. Mills E. Bunger was an engineer from the United States working for 
the Technical Cooperation Agency (TCA) in Amman, Jordan. During one 
of his trips to the United States, flying over the Yarmuk River, he noticed 
a suitable site for a dam on the Jordanian side that could be used in order 
to feed a suggested East Ghor Canal. This would have eliminated the need 
to cooperate with Israel in the development project. Jordan, the UNRWA, 
and the TCA each provided some funds in order to carry out the necessary 
studies.27 The rejection of the plan was immediate from the Israeli side, 
arguing that Israel was a riparian on the Yarmuk River and that it deserved 
a share of its waters. What might be surprising for some, however, is the 
fact that the most vocal opposition to the plan came from the United States, 
with the immediate result of killing it. The main objections were that the 
plan was neither economic nor practical. For example, the secretary of 
state, John Foster Dulles, who visited the area in May 1953, later commented 
that available funds “can well be spent in large part on a coordinated use of 
the rivers which run through the Arab countries and Israel” instead of uni-
lateral development plans.28 Others at the State Department pointed to the 
fact that a regional approach to water development would be substantially 
cheaper.29 U.S. intervention against the Bunger plan seems to have come 
at the time when news of the Main plan came out. It seems the United 
States, faithful to the notion of regional cooperation in post–World War 
II politics, chose to give the Main plan a chance. On the other side of pos-
sibilities, one could have imagined including the Litani River itself as part 
of the watershed, which is what the Israeli plan tried to achieve.30
 Another example of this seemingly arbitrary construction of the water-
shed is the Main plan’s exclusion of groundwater resources that lie within 
the boundaries of the watershed. Many, especially in the Arab technical 
committee, questioned the legitimacy of such a move.31 In a word, concep-
tualizing the Jordan-Yarmuk watershed as the basic unit of intervention 
was an active process that involved a large degree of selections, inclusions, 
and exclusions. The watershed was, however, claimed to be a natural scale 
that came out of disinterested observation that was neither political nor 
conscious. This supposed depoliticization legitimized the plan, at least for 
those who put the plan together, as natural and thus politically neutral.
 Even though the proclamation was otherwise, this construction of the 
boundaries of the watershed also depoliticized the problem of the Pales-
tine refugees—and its resolution. In particular, the United Nations, and 
the United States as the major funding party, tried to resolve the problems 
within the area “where more and more souls are crowding a scant water 
supply, [where] there is a tragic need to develop, conserve, and dispense the 
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waters of the Jordan Valley on a unified and impartial basis.”32 This neutral 
description of the problem, as if the “bodies” involved were void of ethnic, 
national, and political identities, compounded with the neutral construc-
tion of the boundaries of the watershed, removed the plan, or such was the 
hope, from dealing head-on with the politics of the region.33
 One of the main effects of this politico-environmental imaginary was 
that the plan left out the Negev desert, which was out of the reach of the 
watershed. The watershed was the basic unit of analysis rather than the 
state. If one is to carry the Johnston mission’s hydro-imaginary to its con-
clusion, then the connection between the Galilee Hills in the north of Israel 
was much stronger with the eastern and western Ghor, at the time part of 
Jordan, than with the Negev desert.34 The sovereignty was established as 
one of nature, not one of politics. In this sense, the watershed naturalized 
the union between many lands and waters spanning Israel, Syria, Lebanon, 
and Jordan. The watershed provided the legitimacy needed to create a po-
litically cooperative region.
Nature as Potential and the Engineer as a Facilitator of Potential
One of the contested points in the report turned out to be its “fundamen-
tal” principle: to utilize “the topography of the watershed advantageously to 
conserve the surface water yield by natural storage where possible, together 
with gravity transportation of irrigation water.”35 The report’s preoccupa-
tion with the topography of the watershed and, especially, the use of grav-
ity becomes obvious in the following quote:
As a problem of engineering the most economic and the quick-
est way to get the most use from the waters of the Jordan River 
System requires better organization of the headwaters on the 
Hasbani and in the Huleh area to serve the lands by gravity 
flow within that part of the Jordan watershed and use of Lake 
Tiberias as a storage reservoir for the flood flows of the Jordan 
and Yarmuk Rivers. From Lake Tiberias these waters would be 
made available by gravity flow to irrigate lands on the east and 
west sides of the Jordan Valley to the south. Gravity flow elimi-
nates expensive pumping facilities. . . . A quantity of water is 
suggested for each area of use within gravity reach of the supply 
made available and at the lowest cost.
 However, there was no reason why economic efficiency through grav-
ity, so dear to American participants, should have been respected more or 
less than efficiency through other means, such as irrigating the most fertile 
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lands or those lands that required a lesser water duty.36 In fact, this was 
precisely the critique leveled against the plan by the Israeli technical team, 
which argued for considering other routes to efficiency.37
 What needs to be emphasized here is the fact that gravity was as 
much, if not more, a politically efficient construct as it was a technically 
efficient one. It functioned in mysterious ways not only to convey water 
from one area to another, but also to connect, to suture together many 
disparate lands. Gravity naturalized the construction of a region. Liter-
ally and figuratively, gravity worked for the conveyance of water and the 
construction of a region. In a word, gravity was the force behind the 
political necessity of a cooperative region.
 Although the Main plan advocated a series of concepts that attempted 
the naturalization and depoliticization of the plan, nature was not an easy 
ally. In order to achieve the maximum benefits of the project (to irrigate all 
the arable lands within the watershed using the force of gravity), the plan-
ners had to resort to the engineer. Many dams, canals, structures, storage 
areas and diversion canals needed to be constructed in order for nature to 
play the part of nature. In order for the force of gravity to work, another 
force was essential, that of diversion.
Naturalizing Water Storage Areas
Rainfall varies in the area from north to south, from season to season, and 
from year to year.38 In order to deal with this complexity and to regulate 
such variations, all water management schemes in the region came up with 
plans to increase existing storage capacity.
 The Main plan insisted on using Lake Tiberias as the regional storage 
reservoir in which not only seasonal and annual variations could be regu-
lated, but also the Yarmuk winter floodwaters could be stored.39 One stipula-
tion to this arrangement, however, was the establishment of an international 
water authority, a water master, that would be responsible for the execution 
of the plan. At the same time, the Israeli interim plans, until 1956, repeatedly 
focused on the use of a “natural reservoir” at a place called Beit Nattaufa in 
order to regulate the flow of water in the Israeli system,40 especially from the 
Jordan River in the north to the Negev desert in the south.
 Even though the Israelis had no immediate plans for the use of Lake 
Tiberias, they vehemently rejected the Johnston plan’s intention to use it as 
a regional storage area. Given the suggestions of the water master, the im-
mediate concern was that of sovereignty. The Israeli side argued repeatedly 
that the use of Lake Tiberias as a regional storage site would threaten Israeli 
sovereignty over the lake.
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 American insistence on storing winter floodwaters from the Yarmuk 
in Lake Tiberias envisioned constructing a diversion dam on, and a diver-
sion canal between, the Yarmuk River and the lake. In addition, the plan 
also envisioned the release of water to the west and east Ghor Canals dur-
ing the summer dry months. From the point of view of the Johnston team, 
this would have been a truly regional project as well, for it would have con-
nected Jordan, Israel, and Syria through the material interdependencies of 
machinery, pipelines, and water transport and irrigation works.
The Arab Plan of 1954
It is important to stress that the Arab plan was a negotiated settlement on 
the local and regional levels. Its design reflected and embedded the strug-
gle over many visions of what the Arab world should look like, what the 
Palestinian problem meant, and how a legitimate politico-environmental 
imaginary in the area should be constructed.
 The United States’ rejection of the Bunger plan mentioned earlier 
meant that the ability of the Arab states to finance the project was almost 
nonexistent. To start with, the policies of the Bank of Development and 
Reconstruction prevented it from funding unilateral development proj-
ects on shared water systems, unless other riparians acquiesced. Second, 
the United States had already announced its commitment to a regional 
approach to water development and was therefore unwilling to pay for 
unilateral development projects. However, the United States also commit-
ted itself to paying most of the costs involved in constructing the regional 
project, estimated at more than $135 million.41
 Water development, meanwhile, was successfully constructed as the 
only answer to the economic stress felt by the Arab countries. However, 
some Arab states were more eager to participate in a regionally negotiated 
scheme than others. For example, Jordan and Egypt were in favor of trying 
out the negotiation route, more so than Syria and Lebanon. In the end, an 
Arab League technical committee was established in 1953 with members 
from the four concerned Arab countries and headed by the secretary-gen-
eral of Egypt’s National Production Council, Muhammed Salim. From the 
very beginning, oppositional voices were strong. The Arab League Refugee 
Office in Beirut, for example, did not see any reason why the Arab states 
should share their waters with Israel, especially given the fact that water 
resources could more or less easily be diverted away.42
 The technical committee submitted its report in January 1954. The 
Arab plan walked a fine line that conditionally accepted the Johnston plan, 
while posing three challenges: first, redefining the concept of the watershed; 
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second, stressing the legitimacy of the concept of gravity; and, third, adjust-
ing the water duty determined by the Johnston plan.
Reintroducing Political Boundaries: From a Watershed to an Arab Nation
As was demonstrated in the previous section, the Johnston plan constructed, 
deployed, and articulated the category of a watershed and extended its bound-
aries as was deemed necessary for a regional plan to be workable. One im-
portant consequence of this politico-environmental imaginary was that all 
the lands within the watershed were deemed equal in terms of their access 
to irrigation water—as long as the gravity principle held true. The Arab plan 
agreed on the gravity principle, namely, that water should be used to irrigate 
lands that can be reached by gravity. However, it also insisted that water re-
sources that originate in an Arab state belong to the Arab nation. In this sense, 
the Jordan River headwaters that originate in Lebanon or Syria and flow into 
Israel were deemed Arab property that could be diverted by those Arab states 
as they saw fit—particularly away from Israel and into Jordan, for example.43
 The Arab plan argued that the watershed should be understood ac-
cording to the political boundaries that already existed. However, it had a 
different, nonstatist conception of political boundaries that differentiated 
between the Arab nation and its other, in this case Israel. Water that falls 
within Israel, on the one hand, and Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon, on the 
other, should be identified as Israeli and Arab, respectively. The source of 
water defined priorities of irrigation. In that sense, the plan imagined a 
hierarchy of lands whose access to irrigation water was relative to their 
national contribution to the rivers in the form of rainfall. The following 
example might make this point clearer. As can be seen in table 8.1, the 
Johnston plan distributed the Jordan River water (according to its water-
shed and gravity principles) in the following fashion (1,213 million cubic 
Table 8.1. Water distribution from each plan  
Quantities in million cubic meters
Plan Israel Jordan Syria Lebanon Total
Johnston
   (1953) 394 774 45 0 1,213
Cotton
   (1954) 1,290 575 30 451 2,346 
Arab
   (1954) 182 698 132 35 1,047
Source: Data compiled by the author from the three proposals: Johnston 1953, Cotton 1954, and 
Arab Technical Committee, 1954.
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meters per year—mcmy): Jordan, 774; Israel, 394; Syria, 45. This translated 
into a different calculation in the Arab plan: 819 mcmy for the Arab na-
tion (constituting three countries) and 394 to Israel. This distribution was 
deemed unfair, given national contributions to the river.44 Even more, what 
was important for the Arab plan was not the watershed argument. Rather, 
the important issue was the political identity of the water: “Most of the 
sources of the Jordan River waters come from Arab districts (Lebanon, 
Syria, and Jordan) and from other springs and sources that lie on the two 
banks of the river (most of which are in Jordan).”45 The Arab plan went 
on to claim that of the 1,213 mcmy of Jordan River, 1057 mcmy came from 
Arab sources and thus should be reflected in water distribution.46
Conceptualizing Lake Tiberias as an Enemy Space
The Johnston plan included a project aimed at diverting water from the 
Yarmuk River and storing it in Lake Tiberias. Then water was to be trans-
ported back to Jordan during the summer months to the east and west Ghor 
canals for the irrigation of lands on both banks of the lower Jordan Valley. 
The Arab plan, by contrast, rejected the idea of storing the Yarmuk waters 
in Lake Tiberias. One of the main reasons was the different salinity between 
the Yarmuk waters (88 particles per million, ppm) and that of Lake Tiberias 
(more than 300 ppm), which threatened to decrease Yarmuk’s water quality.
 The Johnston plan estimated water loss to evaporation from Lake 
Tiberias at 300 mcmy. It further argued that the Jordan-Yarmuk plan 
would not increase that loss. However, the Arab plan countered that even 
though water loss would be almost the same as before, it would come after 
the diversion of the Banias and the Hasbani waters for the irrigation of 
the Galilee Hills. In other words, the loss would be added to that of the 
Hasbani and the Banias Rivers, at least inasmuch as the lower Ghor was 
concerned. The alternative, according to the plan, was the construction of 
a dam on the Yarmuk River on a site called Maqarin, which would have no 
significant increase in water loss to evaporation (7 mcmy).
 In addition to what were deemed technical objections to establish-
ing Lake Tiberias as a regional storage space, there was the political issue 
of sovereignty over Lake Tiberias and the project. Lake Tiberias was, and 
still is, located within the boundaries of Israel. Control over the diversion 
schemes was of much importance to the Arab side: “This condition will 
place Jordan under the mercy of the Jews and their Government in as 
much as storage and diversion to the Ghor is involved” (28). This situation 
was not to be allowed in any form, for it would confirm the legitimacy of 
Israeli control over Palestine, its waters, and its lands.
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 The Arab plan constructed a clearly demarcated region, one in which 
there was, on the one hand, a clear, interstate Arab identity that spans 
populations, rivers, lands, and even states and, on the other, there was a 
clear Other, what was considered the illegitimate Israeli state.
 However, the Arab plan agreed with the Johnston plan on one important 
issue: limiting irrigation projects to land within the watershed that could 
be served by the force of gravity. This, from the Arab perspective, meant 
casting a shadow of illegitimacy over the Israeli National Water Project to 
divert the Jordan River water to the Negev. Only natural forces construct 
and link legitimate political boundaries. Pipes, plants, and physical 
constructions are a sign of artificiality that diminishes political legitimacy. 
In his elaboration on the Arab plan, Kahhalah gave this position the force 
of the obvious: “The Arab project, given the fact that its waters run in the 
comfortable contours of nature, is the natural one, while the Israeli project 
that needs, in order to deliver its waters, hundreds of meters of canals is 
the unnatural one.”47 He went on to argue that “Israel’s diversion of any of 
the basin’s water out of its geography constitutes stark aggression on the 
Arabs’ rights and the stealing of their waters, which justifies all actions that 
preserve these rights and regain what was stolen of their waters.”48
The Israeli (Cotton) Plan of 1954
Each of the previously discussed plans conceptualized a different politico-
environmental imaginary in the region. Whereas the Johnston plan constructed 
a politically cooperative region the basis of which lay in its naturalized 
conception of the Jordan-Yarmuk watershed, the Arab plan constructed a 
hierarchy of lands within the watershed, based on articulating the source of 
water and irrigable lands with national identities—Arab or Other.
 The Israeli plan, known as the Cotton Plan of 1954, constructed a wholly 
different politico-environmental world that was based on the nation-state.49 
The legitimacy of such a world rested on the constant reference to effi-
cient utilization of water and land resources within the state: the guiding 
principle for water distribution should be the “careful determination of 
the location of the most suitable lands for irrigation regardless of loca-
tion or watershed, with a view of optimum combined utilization of land and 
water resources.”50 Water planning for irrigation not only should optimally 
combine land and water resources, it should also “insure optimum crop 
production from the available water resources.”51 By deploying a technical-
rational argument of efficiency, the Israeli plan paved the way for legiti-
mizing the nation-state as the basic political category in a water-sharing 
regime, rather than the region, as the Johnston plan envisioned, or the 
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nation, as the Arab plan envisioned. How was that done and what func-
tions did it achieve and serve?52
Constructing the Nation-State as Necessary while Expanding the Watershed
The Johnston mission started at a time when Israeli attempts at divert-
ing the Jordan River to the Negev had already been halted.53 However, the 
Johnston plan’s construction of a cooperative region and a certain concep-
tion of the watershed met with strong Israeli resistance, which was based 
on political as well as technical-rational reasoning.54
 The first Israeli objection was critical of the exclusion of the Litani River 
from the plan: “This report, although it claimed to offer an unbiased regional 
solution benefiting all the Jordan Valley States, had neglected to include the 
utilization of one of the principal water resources of the area, i.e., the Litani 
river.”55 The strategic significance of including the Litani River notwithstand-
ing,56 it is important to notice the way in which the Cotton plan redefined the 
Johnston plan’s objective as “benefiting all the Jordan Valley States.” In fact, 
the Johnston plan constructed a watershed empty of political boundaries, 
one that was ruled by topographic constructs rather than political ones.57 It 
was precisely the absence of political boundaries of nation-states that gave 
the Johnston plan its definitive character.58 However, the Cotton plan was 
determined to articulate the watershed of the Johnston plan with the nation-
states within the watershed at every step of the way.59 In fact, the Cotton plan 
stressed the following feature as most important: “It respects operational 
independence of the participant states.”60
 Another Israeli objection had to do with one of the material effects 
of the Johnston plan’s construction of the watershed: excluding the Negev 
as a potential beneficiary of the regional plan. This meant that the main 
focus of Israeli water policymaking and immigrant settlement planning 
was in danger.61 Those were never exclusively technical matters for the Is-
raeli team—they were significantly imbued with politics, especially with 
the politics of legitimacy.
 Taking these two critiques of the Johnston plan into account, the Cotton 
plan claimed to be based “upon the basic principle that in a water deficiency 
area all water and power resources should be utilized without undue waste, 
and that the volume of crops that can be grown in the region should be 
the paramount criterion of desirability.”62 However, in order to do just that, 
the plan needed to engage what the Johnston plan called the water duty 
of agricultural lands, i.e., the annual water requirement for the irrigation 
of one dunam of land. In estimating water needs of each type of land, the 
Johnston mission followed historic practices. The Israeli plan, however, was 
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more interventionist: it envisioned the construction of a new, “modern,” ag-
riculture that depends on new irrigation technologies and new crop regimes. 
In a word, the Israeli plan envisioned redefining agriculture, and thus the 
economic and social orders of the area, in technical-rational terms.
From an Insignificant Technical Detail to a Worldview: Water Duty, 
Efficiency, Land Salinity, and Water Use
In order to decide the water requirement for irrigable lands within the 
watershed, the Johnston plan classified those lands into nine types and as-
signed each type a specific water duty (table 8.2). The classification of lands 
into types depended on many categories: the salinity of soil, the crops 
grown, and the hydrographic conditions.
 In its classification scheme, the Johnston plan used historic and cur-
rent agricultural practices as a yardstick for the measure of water duty. 
In that sense, the Johnston plan was not prescriptive, it did not demand 
a change in the agricultural practices of the present population—at least 
insofar as water duties were involved, the Johnston plan chose to err on the 
side of contemporary practices.
 The Cotton plan, in contrast, was based on the primacy of efficiency for 
water utilization in agricultural development. The most important function 
of agricultural planning thus was to determine the best possible combina-
tions of lands, crops, and water. Because of these different priorities, the 
Cotton plan contested the Johnston plan’s water duties (see table 8.2). If 
Table 8.2. Water duty according to the Johnston and the Israeli plans
Location Water duty  Water duty 
 according to the according to the 
 Johnston plan Israeli plan
Lower Jordan Valley, North (Jordan and Israel) 1,330 1,000
Lower Jordan Valley, Central (Jordan) 1,440 1,250
Lower Jordan Valley, South (Jordan) 1,860 1,250
Upper Huleh (Israel) 770 1,000
Ayalet Hashahar (Israel) 890 1,150
Lower Galilee (Israel) 780 1,150
Yavneel Valley (Israel) 930 1,150
Afula-Beit Alfa (Israel) 930 1,150
Yarmuk Plateau (Jordan and Syria) 1,500 800
Negev — 600
Source: Data compiled by the author from the plans: Johnston 1953 and Cotton 1954.
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efficiency were to be the most important technical measure, the Israeli side 
argued, then it could hardly be based on present, “primitive” practices.
 To give a concrete example, the Cotton plan was critical of Johnston’s 
measures of water duty because they were “in part, based on the type of 
farming which was actually practiced at the time of writing his report. In 
the Jordan-Yarmuk Triangle Area, 15–20% of the irrigated area was used 
for banana growing, and another 25% for alfalfa, both heavy consumers of 
water.”63 In a water deficient area, the Cotton plan concludes, “this kind 
of crops cannot be regarded as typical for the whole valley when fully de-
veloped.”64 The plan goes on to suggest that a new regime of crops should 
be utilized, depending on the market value of different crops: grains, veg-
etables, potatoes, and miscellaneous fruits. The line between the technical-
rational measure of water duty and its potential to dictate agricultural 
practices is no longer clear. The technical-rational becomes prescriptive; it 
reconstructs the political economy of the whole region by restructuring its 
agricultural practices.
 For the most part, the Cotton plan was concerned with including the 
Negev desert within the spatial imaginary of any development plan for 
the Jordan River. It was also concerned with establishing the territorial-
sovereign rights of the Israeli state over the Jordan River waters. This is 
at a time when the very legitimacy of the Israeli state was in question. 
In addition, however, Israeli water experts that were engaged in the ne-
gotiations were also concerned about water scarcity. For those experts, 
efficiency should be redefined as a measure of water not a measure cost.65 
The Cotton plan thus articulated together in one politico-environmental 
imaginary the sovereignty of the state and its control over its water and 
territorial resources, the expansion of the watershed to include the Negev 
desert, and the redefinition of efficiency as a measure of resource use per 
unit of land not of cost.
Table 8.3. Comparing different plans’ land distribution. Areas in dunam
Plan Israel Jordan Syria Lebanon Total
Johnston
   (1953) 416,000 490,000 30,000 0 936,000
Cotton
   (1954) 1,790,000 430,000 30,000 390,000 2,640,000
Arab
   (1954) 234,000 490,000 119,000 35,000 878,000
Source: Data compiled by the author from the three proposals.
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Remaking the Political Geography of the Jordan River Basin
By the end of his mission, Johnston’s revised plan did not work as a 
watershed-wide, unified development project as he wished it would when 
he first visited the area. In this sense, the United States’ political program 
of creating a politically and economically cooperative region in the Middle 
East that can defeat perceived Soviet threats failed. However, the plan did 
work on a number of levels.
 First, all riparian states agreed to limit their withdrawals from the wa-
tershed system to the amounts specified in the final technical agreement. 
This meant that tensions between riparian states eased, at least relative to 
1953. I have to qualify my statement here: I am not arguing that disputes 
over the distribution of water resources disappeared altogether, rather that 
those tensions took a backseat until 1964 when they resurfaced after Israel 
started diverting the Jordan River waters to the south. The commitments 
given to the revised plan, however, worked more or less until the 1967 war, 
when Israel occupied the Golan Heights and thus controlled all the head-
waters of the river system. Second, the revised plan worked in the sense 
that it allowed each of the states to proceed with its unitary development 
plans. For Jordan, this meant more agricultural development along the 
banks of the river, which would create jobs and settlement opportunities 
for the Palestinian refugees in the area. For Israel, this meant that water 
could be used out of the Jordan River watershed. Diverting water to the 
Negev allowed the Israeli state to carry out its commitment for the spatial 
dispersal of new Jewish immigrants and their settlement in agricultural 
cooperatives in the south or border towns. Probably more important, at 
least on the symbolic level, is the perceived legitimacy of the state as an 
autonomous actor and as the basic unit of regional politics: it can survey 
its water resources, identify their legitimate uses, and distribute those re-
sources throughout its territory as it sees fit. Third, the revised plan still 
treated the Palestinian refugees as a humanitarian and an economic prob-
lem, thus indefinitely suspending the urgency of dealing with the political 
and explosive question of Palestine.
 This is on the substantive level. On the conceptual level, this essay ar-
gues that technically framed hydro-imaginaries are always and by necessity 
based on, deploy, negotiate, and underwrite political, cultural, and ideo-
logical conceptualizations of the world we live in.
 Upon landing in the area on his first visit, Johnston faced three dis-
tinctly different politico-environmental imaginaries, each of which articu-
lates a different understanding of the hydrological system and the politics 
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that surrounds it. There was Johnston’s own initial plan that advocated 
for the watershed, ruled by gravity, as the appropriate, natural scale for 
managing water resources, that in turn depoliticized water management, 
and legitimized cooperation in constructing a regional development plan. 
The Arab plan deployed a different understanding of the watershed that 
rejected the watershed as a framework for water management and the co-
operative region as a political concept. In the process, the plan deployed a 
certain understanding of water, territory, nation, and nation-state in order 
to argue for Arab national rights in water that falls on or originates within 
Arab territories. The Israeli plan, in contrast, underscored the importance 
of the state and political boundaries in deciding water distribution and 
use, the sovereignty of the state in choosing its use of its water resources, 
and emphasized that under conditions of scarcity, water efficiency would 
be the most important technical detail.
 The negotiations that lasted for three years resulted in the revised 
unified Johnston plan. The different riparian states negotiated a quota for 
each. They also accepted the Israeli demand of allowing each state to use 
its waters as it sees fit, even if away from the watershed. This resolved the 
question of efficiency, which became state-specific: while water efficiency 
remained more important than financial efficiency in Israeli politics,66 fi-
nancial demands for water-efficient projects (cost of power for diversion 
schemes and construction costs for infrastructure) remained a hurdle for 
Jordan and other Arab states.
 However, it is also important to acknowledge the fact that while the 
revised agreement gave something to each of the parties to celebrate, it did 
that at the cost of depoliticizing the Palestinian refugee problem and turning 
it into a humanitarian and economic one. In this sense, the consensus that 
emerged, even in its informal and tenuous status, produced a new politico-
environmental imaginary that was patched up of different frameworks, but 
that fully excluded the Palestinian perspective. This is in part a conceptual 
lesson: consensus does not always mean the rightful resolution of a techni-
cal or a political problem; sometimes it means the successful negation and 
silencing of dissenting voices. But it is also a practical problem: even though 
the revised Johnston plan does not hold any legal authority since it was never 
ratified nor was it even functioning since the war of 1967, it still is the only 
frame of reference in negotiations over shared water resources.
 Although the Jordanian-Israeli peace treaty in the 1990s resolved the 
water dispute between the two parties, it did so again by ignoring Pales-
tinian rights to the Jordan-Yarmuk water.67 Since Palestine, the occupied 
Palestinian territories since 1967, is a riparian party to the Jordan River, it 
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has a claim over some of the water from that river. Jordan, however, insists 
that Palestine has no claim over the water that was allotted it through the 
Johnston negotiations. Israel, on the other hand, claims that since the West 
Bank was part of Jordan during the Johnston negotiations, then the Pales-
tinian share has already been allotted to and should be claimed from Jor-
dan, not Israel. The Palestinians claim that they have a right to 180 mcmy 
from the Jordan River system, and many water experts in the region concur 
with that assessment.68 The question that will have to be examined in the 
coming years is how to resolve this issue while at the same time dealing 
with the Johnston plan as the de facto historical precedent.
Notes
1. In using the term “politico-environmental imaginaries,” I build on the 
concept of “co-production” in political and sociological studies of science. 
Specifically, I use it to emphasize the fact that every technical-rational concep-
tion of environmental issues necessarily implies, rests on, invokes, and under-
writes a political framework for ordering and organizing our lives in the world. 
See Sheila Jasanoff, ed., States of Knowledge: The Co-production of Science and 
Social Order (London: Routledge, 2004).
2. I need to clarify a couple of concepts used throughout this chapter that 
might not be familiar to nonspecialists. Arab nationalism is based on the 
premise that all inhabitants of the Arab states belong to one nation and that 
their division into a number of states is the legacy of colonialism. Unlike other 
cases, such as Germany or France, where the assumption is that the nation and 
the state are coterminous (although this also has been contested), in pan-Arab 
ideological frameworks the Arab states are seen as obstacles for the nation to 
express itself fully, i.e., in one nation-state. Different Arab states, according 
to this line of thought, should be subsumed under one state that unifies the 
nation and extends from Iraq in the east to Morocco in the west. In this story, 
therefore, Arab formal discourse distinguishes between an Arab nation and the 
Arab states, then called districts. In this context, water resources belong to the 
Arab nation in the broader sense, not to one state or another.
3. See for more: Miriam R. Lowi, Water and Power: The Politics of a Scarce 
Resource in the Jordan River Basin (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1993); and Aaron T. Wolf, Hydropolitics along the Jordan River: Scarce Water and 
Its Impact on the Arab-Israeli Conflict (Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 
1995). The revised plan, as will become clearer in the essay, combined some 
elements of the Arab and Israeli plans, as well as some of the original Johnston 
plan. However, by incorporating the Israeli plan’s vision of a state-centered 
river management scheme, the Johnston Unified Plan supported the Israeli 
geopolitical imaginary in which nation-states, rather than the region, were the 
basic units of political relations.
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4. For an excellent review of co-production and its relationship to other 
science studies concepts, see Jasanoff, States of Knowledge.
5. One of the logical extensions of this argument is that recent trends 
toward watershed management in environmental discourse, for example, 
should always be investigated for their political implications. In theorizing 
water imageries, it is probably important to point to an article by Stefan 
Helmreich. Helmreich talks about the ways water imageries are deployed 
through tropes, in his case “currents, flows, and circulations”—tropes which 
are “more common in the talk of globalization.” He suggests that such talk 
can also be reframed as “oceanization.” What Helmreich does for the ocean, 
linking it with the political economy of globalization through water tropes, 
suggests that creative linkages between knowledge, objects, and politics are 
constantly on the move. In the case I cover here, similar processes, but cer-
tainly different tropes, can be gleaned in the creation of these three different 
politico-environmental imaginaries of the river and its management (think 
of watersheds, gravity, and soil). All of these tropes, tweaked here and there, 
deployed wholly or partially, used alone or mixed in hybrid tropes, define the 
horizons of possible politics, all the while grounding that politics in nature. 
See Stefan Helmreich, “Nature/Culture/Seawater,” American Anthropologist 
113, no. 1 (2011): 132–44.
6. In Hebrew that point of diversion is called “Gesher B’not Yaakov,” and in 
English it is “Bridge of Jacob’s Daughter.”
7. After the war of 1948, Syria was in control of a small triangle of land that 
was part of Palestine before the war. As part of the Armistice Agreement of 
1949, the Syrian government agreed to withdraw its forces from the area in 
exchange for designating the area as a demilitarized zone. See United Nations, 
Israeli-Syrian General Armistice Agreement (New York: United Nations, 20 July 
1949), document number S/1353.
8. U.S. Department of State communiqué of 17 October 1953, quoted in the 
Jerusalem Post, 18 October 1953.
9. This was especially true under the influence of the Economic Survey Mis-
sion of the United Nations. For a critique of the economic approach of the state 
department, to which Lowi attributes the ultimate failure of the Johnston mis-
sion, see Miriam Lowi, Water and Power: The Politics of a Scarce Resource in the 
Jordan River Basin (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993). The notion 
that water sharing was crucial for the area was, at the time, ubiquitous. Wit-
ness what the secretary-general, Dag Hammarskjöld, said on one occasion: the 
“development of water resources was a ‘key problem’ which was reflected in par-
ticularly every ‘Palestine’ issue.” Quoted in the Jerusalem Post, 25 February 1954.
10. Even though Egypt is not a riparian to the Jordan River, it was included 
in the diplomatic efforts for its strategic importance in the area.
11. His visits took place in October 1953, June 1954, January 1955, and Octo-
ber 1955.
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12. John S. Cotton was an American engineer who functioned as a con-
sultant for Zionist and, later on, Israeli water projects. All the Israeli plans 
were published by his firm. For the details of the Arab plan see Arab Techni-
cal Committee, Arab Plan for the Utilization of the Waters of the River Jordan 
and Its Tributaries (Cairo: Arab Technical Committee, 1954 [in Arabic]); see 
also Egyptian Economic and Political Review (1955). For details of the Israeli 
plan see John S. Cotton, Plan for the Development of the Water Resources of the 
Jordan and Litani River Basins (Jerusalem: Water Department of the Ministry 
of Agriculture, 1954).
13. The Arab states feared that a formal ratification of the agreement would 
imply the political recognition of the Israeli state—a hazardous proposal at the 
time, to say the least. For the Arab states, recognition of Israel would have had 
to be tied up with other important issues like the Palestinian refugee problem, 
Palestinian rights to repatriation, etc. The path of least resistance was chosen: 
the Johnston Unified Plan was technically sanctioned and the parties agreed to 
abide by its provisions.
14. Almost all works on the Jordan River agree on this description of the 
bodies of water involved. See Helena Lindholm, “Water and the Arab-Israeli 
Conflict,” in Hydropolitics: Conflicts over Water as a Development Constraint, 
ed. L. Ohlsson (London: Zed Books, 1995) , 55–90; Lowi, Water and Power; 
Georgiana Stevens, Jordan River Partition (Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution, 
1965); Aaron Wolf, “Guidelines for a Water-for-Peace Plan for the Jordan River 
Watershed,” Natural Resources Journal 33, no. 3 (1993): 797–839; Aaron Wolf, 
Hydropolitics along the Jordan River: The Impact of Scarce Water Resources on 
the Arab Israeli Conflict (Tokyo: United Nations University, 1995).
15. For consistency’s sake, Arabic names are used throughout the essay. 
Hebrew translations are as follows: Banias is Nahal Senir; Hasbani is Nahal 
Hermon; and Leddan is Nahal Dan.
16. Gordon Clapp, in a letter of transmittal addressed to the director of 
the UNRWA. A copy of the letter can be found in C. T. Main, The Unified De-
velopment of the Water Resources of the Jordan Valley Region (Boston: Chas. T. 
Main, 1953).
17. Ibid., emphasis added.
18. Ibid.
19. In the plan, there is even a visual presentation of this cooperative re-
gion which is hard to reproduce here. Clapp describes how “boundary lines 
are not shown on the maps in this report, but for the purpose of depict-
ing the relationship between boundary lines and the Jordan River System a 
transparent overlay has been added at the back of this volume. This overlay 
can be placed over the maps to show the Armistice and national boundary 
lines. Thus the reader may see the political setting in which the engineering 
plan must be visualized. The present location of national boundaries sug-
gests that the optimum development utilization of the water resources of the 
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Jordan-Yarmuk watershed could only be achieved by cooperation among the 
states concerned.” Ibid.
20. United Nations Economic Survey Mission, Final Report (New York: 
United Nations Publications, Document Number A/AC25/6/28, December 
1949), 3.
21. The depoliticization of public action has been on the minds of analysts for 
a while. Witness how Yaron Ezrahi describes the importance of such practices: 
“The uses of science and technology to ‘depoliticize’ action have been among the 
most potent political strategy in the modern state” (Yaron Ezrahi, The Descent of 
Icarus: Science and the Transformation of Contemporary Democracy [Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1990], 51). In fact most of the literature on boundary 
work in science studies, which conceptualizes the very distinction between sci-
ence and politics as an active political practice in itself, could be seen as literature 
on depoliticization practices. See Thomas Gieryn, “Boundary-Work and the 
Demarcation of Science from Non-Science: Strains and Interests in Professional 
Ideologies of Scientists and on Boundary,” American Sociological Review 48, 
no. 6 (1983): 781–95; Thomas Gieryn, Cultural Boundaries of Science: Credibility 
on the Line (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999); Sheila Jasanoff, The 
Fifth Branch: Science Advisers as Policymakers (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press 1990); Sheila Jasanoff, Science at the Bar: Law, Science, and Technology in 
America (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1995). In development studies 
literature one can also find depoliticization theorized. See James Ferguson, The 
Anti-Politics Machine: “Development,” Depoliticization, and Bureaucratic Power 
in Lesotho (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1990), especially 251–77.
22. Main, Unified Development of the Water Resources of the Jordan Valley 
Region, 3.
23. Ibid.
24. The use of imagination in this context follows the work of Benedict An-
derson. Most essential about this use is that imagining denotes “invention,” it is 
an active process of construction. Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: 
Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism (New York: Verso, 1983), 6.
25. Main, Unified Development of the Water Resources of the Jordan Valley Region, 3.
26. For more on the intersection of the politics of scale with hydropolitics, 
see Samer Alatout, “ ‘States’ of Scarcity: Water, Space, and Identity Politics in 
Israel, 1948–1959,” Environment and Planning D: Society and Space 26, no. 6 
(2008): 959–82; Samer Alatout, “Bringing Abundance into Environmental 
Politics: Constructing a Zionist Network of Abundance, Immigration, and 
Colonization, 1918–1949, Social Studies of Science 39, no. 3 (2009): 363–94; Leila 
Harris, “Water and Conflict Geographies of the Southeastern Anatolia Proj-
ect,” Society and Natural Resources 15, no. 8 (2002): 743–59; Leila Harris and 
Samer Alatout, “Negotiating Hydro-Scales, Forging States: Comparison of the 
Upper Tigris/Euphrates and Jordan River Basins,” Political Geography 29, no. 
3 (2010): 148–56; Christopher Sneddon, “Water Conflict and River Basins: The 
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Contradictions of Comanagement and Scale in Northeast Thailand,” Society 
and Natural Resources 15, no. 8 (2002): 725–41.
27. Stevens, Jordan River Partition.
28. U.S. Department of State, Report on the Near East, bulletin, vol. 28, no. 
729 (Washington, D.C., 1953), 832.
29. Stevens, Jordan River Partition.
30. Cotton, Plan for the Development of the Water Resources of the Jordan and 
Litani River Basins.
31. As will be clear later on, including groundwater resources did not prom-
ise to make the construction of a cooperative region any easier. If at all, it 
would have made the Johnston mission more difficult.
32. Gordon Clapp, in a letter of transmittal addressed to the director of the 
UNRWA. A copy of the letter can be found in Main, Unified Development of the 
Water Resources of the Jordan Valley Region.
33. Rashid Khalidi argues, similarly, that the Johnston plan was an attempt 
at assimilating Palestinian refugees in the Arab countries, especially along the 
Jordan River in the Kingdom of Jordan. See Rashid Khalidi, Palestinian Iden-
tity: The Construction of Modern National Consciousness (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1997).
34. In this context I use hydro-imaginaries in order to point to the technical 
and rational frameworks with which scientists and policymakers understand 
hydrological systems, design policies for their management, and intervene in 
their dynamics. However, I use the term hydro-imaginaries rather than hydro-
rationalities, for example, in order to underscore the political embeddedness 
of any technical imagination of watersheds.
35. Main, Unified Development of the Water Resources of the Jordan Valley 
Region, 2, emphasis added.
36. Water duty is the annual amount of water needed for the irrigation of 
one dunam of land.
37. It should be obvious that this critical examination of the gravity prin-
ciple does not imply agreement with the Israeli critique. As will be clear in 
what follows, the same critique can be offered to the Israeli alternatives. The 
point to emphasize here is that technical legitimacy of the project is always 
mixed with political constructions.
38. Annual rainfall varies from more than 1,000 mm in the North to less 
than 100 mm in the Negev. Most of the rainfall occurs during the winter 
months with very dry summer months (virtually nil). In addition, there is the 
yearly variation from wet to dry years.
39. Main argued that “Lake Tiberias, as far as our engineering program is 
concerned, must be used as a part of the storage of the River.” Main, Unified 
Development of the Water Resources of the Jordan Valley Region, 33.
40. Within the Israeli water community, contentions were high regarding 
the suitability of this site. See Alatout, “‘States’ of Scarcity.”
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41. This figure increased with time. It was about $200 million toward the end 
of the mission. See Munther Haddadin, Diplomacy on the Jordan: International 
Conflict and Negotiated Resolution (Norwell, Mass.: Kluwer Academic, 2001).
42. Stevens, Jordan River Partition.
43. In international water law principles, this doctrine is often called the 
“absolute sovereignty doctrine” and is territorially based. For details, see Ste-
phen C. McCaffrey, The Law in International Watercourses: Non-Navigational 
Uses (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001).
44. Arab Technical Committee, Arab Plan for the Utilization of the Waters 
of the River Jordan and Its Tributaries (Cairo: Arab Technical Committee, 1954 
[in Arabic]).
45. Notice the use of the concept of “district” rather than state in this docu-
ment. Ibid., 26.
46. Ibid.
47. S. Kahhalah, Water Problem in Israel and Its Reflections on the Arab-
Israeli Conflict (Beirut: Institute of Palestine Studies, 1980), 31, emphasis added.
48. Ibid.
49. This is how the Cotton plan describes some of its priorities: “(a) The 
water and power resources of the Jordan and Litani river basins are considered 
in this report. Water resources outside of these basins are not considered. (b) 
Boundaries of the States, i.e., Lebanon, Israel, Syria or the Kingdom of Jordan, 
are taken into account. (c) Utilization of water resources for irrigation and 
power production are not limited by topographic boundaries of river basins. 
(d) Water from high elevation sources are used to irrigate high elevation ir-
rigable lands. Irrigation supply is by gravity, except in a few cases where pump-
ing is necessary or desirable.” Cotton, Plan for the Development of the Water 
Resources of the Jordan and Litani River Basins, 6.
50. Ibid., 40, emphasis added.
51. Ibid.
52. The claim then, of course, was that other plans were strongly po-
litical while the Israeli plan used a technical-rational approach. Lowdermilk 
described it in an editorial in the Jerusalem Post on 19 July 1955: “Engineer-
ing founded on politics of the hour cannot promise as much as diplomacy 
founded on down-to-earth engineering.”
53. As mentioned above, the Israeli plans for the utilization of water re-
sources were halted under extreme pressure from the Security Council and the 
United States.
54. As early as 20 October 1953, it was clear to the Israeli establishment that 
the United States was delegitimizing diverting the Jordan River to the Negev. 
In a cable (X65/594) addressed to the Israeli prime minister at the time, Moshe 
Sharett, the Israeli ambassador to the United States, Abba Eban, pointed to the 
fact that the United States’ plan envisages “the irrigation of the north rather than 
the south.” Document can be found in F3688–11, Israel National Archives (INA).
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55. Cotton, Plan for the Development of the Water Resources of the Jordan and 
Litani River Basins, 66.
56. The inclusion of the Litani River would have meant increasing the an-
nual water potential of Israel (at least according to the Israeli plan) by more 
than 400 mcmy. However, this is not the concern at this point.
57. At one point, Johnston countered that the American project was not 
a regional project and thus should not involve the Litani River. Rather, this 
project was a “watershed development project.” Press release from the USIS—
Daily News Bulletin vol. 6, no. 129, 7 July 1954, F3688–12, INA.
58. Of course the absence of political boundaries from the Johnston plan in 
no way makes it apolitical. After all, as we have seen, the absence of political 
boundaries of nation-states made possible the construction of a region, which 
is also a political category, just as the nation-state is.
59. See, for example, what Cotton, Plan for the Development of the Water 
Resources of the Jordan and Litani River Basins, 6, argues in another location: 
“The objective of this plan is to develop and utilize, without undue waste, 
the large quantities of water now not being utilized in the Jordan and Litani 
river basins, for optimum irrigation and power development in the States of 
Lebanon, Israel, Syria and the Kingdom of Jordan.”
60. Ibid., 85.
61. Alatout, “‘States’ of Scarcity.”
62. Cotton, Plan for the Development of the Water Resources of the Jordan and 
Litani River Basins, 66.
63. Ibid., 45, emphasis added.
64. Ibid.
65. Alatout, “‘States’ of Scarcity.”
66. For the sake of brevity I did not elaborate on the intense politics of 
water within Israel itself, or on the complicated story of the relationship be-
tween local and regional water politics and how each shaped the other. For 
more on that see Alatout, “ ‘States’ of Scarcity.”
67. Neither did Israel and Jordan deal with the question of Syria’s rights to 
the Yarmuk-Jordan waters. In the past few years, Syria, as the upstream riparian 
on the Yarmuk River, responded by increasing its water extraction from the 
Yarmuk River. Interview, Jordan Water Authority, July 2006.
68. For more on this question, see Samer Alatout, “Water Balances in Pal-
estine, Regional Cooperation, and the Politics of Numbers,” in Water Balances 
in the Eastern Mediterranean, ed. D. Brooks and O. Mehmet (Ottawa: Interna-
tional Development Research Centre, 2000), 59–84.
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Environmentalism Deferred
Nationalisms and Israeli/Palestinian Imaginaries
Shaul Cohen
THERE ARE many different ways to think about environmentalism; it can 
be examined sociologically, politically, scientifically, and so on. Perhaps the 
most common themes in relation to Palestinian and Israeli environmental 
issues have to do with the overarching question of power and ideology,1 
and to a lesser extent technical or attitudinal approaches to problem solv-
ing.2 Both of these orientations begin from the premise that there is an 
Israeli environmentalism, and that there is a Palestinian environmentalism. 
Although this is certainly so in the sense that there are NGOs, government 
agencies, regulatory mechanisms, curricular models, and manifestations 
of engagement with the environment, it is my argument that these indica-
tors are in some respects a “false positive,” and that for both communities 
there is, at this time, only one fundamental question, and that is the na-
tional one. Environmentalism in Palestine/Israel operates within a context 
that is bounded by existential concerns, and, as such, it is subsumed by 
a metanarrative that makes it marginal in impact and, in many respects, 
irrelevant in the context of discourses of land, resources, and power. It isn’t 
that environmental voices aren’t heard, but rather that they are measured 
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against a metric of nationhood that can make them significant in symbolic 
ways but politically lacking in power and subject to expedience. Moreover, 
when there are competing needs within the perceived national agendas, the 
environment rarely gets top priority. It is therefore instructive to ask: “Is 
there an Israeli environmentalism? Is there a Palestinian environmental-
ism? Is there a shared environmentalism?” Superficially, at least, the answer 
is “of course,” but at a more complex level it seems that possible answers 
would include “not yet” or “not much.” Thus attention must be directed 
to the functioning of separate imaginaries that guide action—and inac-
tion—in a land that is fractured politically, and both rich and fragile in 
terms of environment.
 In this chapter I discuss the compatibilities and incompatibilities of 
national and environmental aspirations that rub against one another amid 
the contest for hegemony on the ground and the validation of national 
imaginaries that frame the Israeli-Palestinian struggle. To do this, I briefly 
address the place of the environment as a political factor in the past, the 
incorporation of environmental issues in narratives of national aspiration, 
and the fate of environmental efforts during the era of the peace process. 
There are, of course, distinct and noncoincidental stages of development—
political and material—for Palestinians and Israelis, and multiple interests 
and ideologies within each community. For both sides, there is a relevant 
and often romanticized past, a contentious present, and a future that 
blends both pragmatic and idealized aspirations with an evolving anxiety 
about how present actions compromise and circumscribe opportunities 
for a better future. A fundamental aspect of my analysis of environmental-
ism in Palestine/Israel is that I argue that neither side is in a position to 
construct its ideologies and policies free from the shadow of statelessness 
and the fear of annihilation. Though Israelis and Palestinians are in a very 
different place of power and statehood, notions of intrinsic environmental 
value seem to be an unaffordable luxury to all concerned, save, perhaps, 
for a small number of idealists who offer prophetic visions of doom and 
salvation from the sidelines. Indeed, the environmental imperative is a 
utilitarian one, in that resources must serve the national cause now. Is-
sues of land, air, water, sprawl, pollution, sewage, and other constituents 
of the environment press upon both communities with growing urgency, 
but they cannot compete with the chronic obsession with statehood that 
dominates politics and identities in the region and leaves the environment 
as a zero-sum arena.
 Palestinians and Israelis are bound up in imaginings. Many of their imag-
inings are exclusive, others are mutual, and some are parallel. For both 
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communities, existential concerns suffuse and dominate many issues that, 
in other places, are not inextricably linked to questions of nation, sover-
eignty, and legitimacy. Elements in the environment play key roles in both 
constituting identity and metering the practicalities of survival, and yet they 
are backgrounded in relation to other factors that trump the environment 
when identity and survival are challenged. Such challenges can be real or 
fanciful, but either way, the metanarratives of nationalism for Israelis and 
Palestinians deploy the environment as a tool for claiming a moral high 
ground vis-à-vis the other, but also for claiming the mantle of the victim. 
Victimhood in terms of the environment obviously plays a lesser role when 
compared to the violence that each community has brought upon the other 
and upon itself. So long as the permanent status of Israel and Palestine are 
open to question, and violence is a primary tool of the struggle, issues of the 
environment will be consigned to a secondary status (at best), unless and 
until they forge a productive role in the respective metanarratives.
 Inasmuch as land is at the heart of the conflict, it would seem that 
the environment would be a critical arena for contestation and possibly 
accommodation. Instead, its treatment by both sides has, so far, been 
largely two-dimensional. Much of the scholarship on the environment of 
Palestine/Israel treats the national question in a two-dimensional manner 
as well. The obvious condition is that Israel is a sovereign and powerful 
state, whereas Palestinians languish in their frustrated nationalism and are 
at the mercy of the Israeli state. This characterization is accurate, and yet 
it obscures two aspects that have salience in relation to the environment. 
First, for Palestinians, the absence of sovereignty has been narrated as an 
aberration that does not erase their rightful claim to the land, nor their 
historic and future role managing it better than Israelis/Jews do.3 Israe-
lis narrate their current position of strength as something that cannot be 
taken for granted, and their stewardship as both historically legitimate and 
conferring of a current moral claim to be sovereign. Analyses that exam-
ine Palestinians solely in the present tense and those that treat Israel as a 
confident hegemon miss critical forces that shape and suppress nascent 
environmentalism on both sides.
 For Israelis, generally speaking, the environment has been the stage 
upon which the Zionist enterprise has been built, and its features are op-
portunities to showcase good stewardship and the prowess of Jewish 
agriculture, infrastructural development, and the “normalization” of the 
state.4 In Zionist ideology, redemption of the self comes through redemp-
tion, i.e., rehabilitation, of the land, an early precursor to the link between 
environmental health and group rights.5 For Palestinians, the environment 
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is a vessel for the idyll of Palestinian independence and a place that has 
been despoiled by Israeli (de)construction.6 It is also an hourglass that 
shows the erosion of opportunity for (re)creating a garden of Eden that 
Palestinian nationalism has promised will materialize upon the termina-
tion of the occupation.7 Indeed, it has been argued that Palestinians live 
in a sort of suspended animation, unable to realize a life in place.8 In such 
a condition, caring for the environment can seem to be an abstraction, a 
diversion, or a pathetic consolation.
Early Environmental Orientations
A shared component in Israeli and Palestinian narratives is that the other 
community has treated the land poorly. For Israelis, this argument chiefly 
characterizes the period of the Ottoman empire, but it simultaneously draws 
a connection between the landscape of the Bible and the settlement efforts of 
the Zionist movement in the early twentieth century. Stemming from such 
texts as the travel diaries of Mark Twain,9 there was a general perception 
that the Holy Land was degraded under the Ottomans, a view confirmed 
by British forestry experts such as Richard St. Barbe Baker who observed 
in 1931 that “the barren hills of Judea sadly need to be planted.10 Their rain-
washed slopes are bare of humus.” Thus the early builders of the state were 
able to cast their efforts as restoring a lost and rightful fertility that had been 
squandered through neglect and abuse. In a 1951 address to the Knesset (Par-
liament), Prime Minister Ben Gurion issued the following call:
We must wrap all the mountains of the country and their 
slopes in trees, all the hills and stony lands that will not succeed 
in agriculture, the dunes of the coastal valley, the dry lands of 
the Negev to the east and south of Baer Sheva, that is to say all 
of the land of Edom and the Arava until Eilat. We must also 
plant for security reasons, along all the borders, along all the 
roads, routes, and paths, around public and military buildings 
and facilities. . . . We will not be faithful to one of the two cen-
tral goals of the state—making the wilderness bloom—if we 
make do with only the needs of the hour. . . . We are a state at 
the beginning of repairing the corruption of generations, cor-
ruption which was done to the nation and corruption which 
was done to the land.11
 Thus, from a very early stage in the implementation of Zionism, land 
and politics—and security—were indivisible, and the quasi-governmental 
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agency charged with land purchase, the Keren Keyemet L’Yisrael (referred 
to in English as the Jewish National Fund) became the chief architect and 
executive body for both the development of infrastructure and care of 
the environment. The conflation of development and stewardship made 
sense in terms of the ethos of the national movement, which asserted the 
overlap of independence and the praxis of state building: to wit, if you 
did it properly, it validated your right to do it.12 From this perspective, 
the Arab subjects of Ottoman rule shared in the responsibility for neglect 
and abuse of the land, and thereby yielded whatever interest they may 
have had in determining the fate of the territory. Ben-Gurion, perhaps 
the preeminent architect of the state, had an enduring and close rela-
tionship with Yosef Weitz, the head of the Keren Keyemet L’Yisrael, and 
together they shaped their construction of environment as an integral 
part of the national enterprise.
 For Palestinians, a formal agenda of self-rule came later, and under the 
Ottoman empire and the early British Mandate, they were not organized in 
such a way as to develop institutions or an ideology in relation to land and 
environment.13 Instead, they were reactive, and conditioned to suspect the 
role of regimes of outsiders whose interest in the land was largely economic, 
and whose practices blended a mixture of interfering regulation and dis-
tant lack of interest. The salient feature for the Palestinian peasantry was 
the dynamic of taxation, which imposed a significant burden, on the one 
hand, but allowed for the casual expansion of land holdings to bolster the 
tax base, on the other. The environment was a venue of subsistence, but it 
was also a theater of contention. Under Ottoman administration, tax rates 
for some of the different land rights categories, including the communal 
musha’a system, encouraged an extractive approach, with little regard for 
the long-term welfare of the land.14 The regulatory approach of the Brit-
ish followed a colonial model which, as in other places, sought to mini-
mize indigenous land rights in favor of an aggregating system of specific 
classifications and bans that put resources at the disposal of the govern-
ment.15 The result of Ottoman and British policies was that Palestinians, 
for whom land holding was a matter of cultural significance as a source of 
honor, viewed the environment as something to be mediated locally and 
utilized economically. The political connotations of that dynamic gained 
in importance only with the rise and success of the Zionist movement. As 
the two communities followed their overlapping yet increasingly separate 
paths during the Mandate years, the environment, still viewed as a tool for 
advancing individual and communal needs, became increasingly polarized 
and polarizing.
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The Environment as a National Inventory
In the move toward and the transition to statehood, the environment rep-
resented for the Zionist movement a series of projects, challenges, and, 
most of all, opportunity. Indeed, the challenges were the opportunity, in 
that they could help forge and showcase the renewed Jewish spirit of in-
dependence and prowess. This spirit has been dubbed “technological opti-
mism,” a particular brand of Zionist romanticization of the environment 
and its potential to be harnessed into the national cause.16 The draining 
of the Hula swamps, creation of the National Water Carrier to further the 
development of the Negev region, and reforestation of different parts of 
the country were seen as testimony to a productive and harmonious re-
lationship with nature. That attitude would be tested in later decades, but 
in the period of nascent state building, the costs of these types of activities 
were not yet visible.
 For Palestinians, however, those costs were very much evident in the 
landscape, albeit in a retrospective manner. With Israel’s declaration of 
statehood in 1948 and the ensuing assumption of control in the remaining 
Palestinian lands by Egypt and Jordan, there began a process of memorial-
izing what had been lost that was part “factual” and part mythical. By the 
factual component, I mean those events related to political developments 
such as the resolutions of the United Nations, the warfare, and the armi-
stice of 1949 that shaped the territorial status and access for Palestinians. 
The mythical component related, in part, to the character of the land and 
lifestyle that had been lost or disrupted as a result of the Zionist endeavor. 
The pain of loss led to a romanticization on the Palestinian side that sug-
gested that the turn of political events had not only cost them their right 
of self-rule, but also an idealized homeland in which the environment 
was part of a broader Palestinian idyll.17 In many respects this didn’t cor-
respond with Palestinian experience prior to 1948, as conditions under the 
Ottoman and British Mandatory authorities were not seen as particularly 
uplifting according to contemporaneous accounts, but Hobsbawm ob-
serves that links are typically forged to a “suitable” past.18 Parmenter notes 
that in their cultural expression Palestinians often enlist “nature in general, 
and the land in particular, as their last and strongest ally.”19 Thus, with the 
Zionist/Jewish influence and its changes on the land given an overwhelm-
ingly negative valence in Palestinian discourse, all that “was not” subject to 
that influence, whether in the present or the remembered/imagined past, 
came to have a more positive patina by default. Thus a Palestinian “Eden” 
was created and lost as a process of memory, a more proximate version of 
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Zionist recovery of image and context from biblical descriptions of nature 
and land in an earlier era.20
 During the transitional period from the late Mandate years through 
the early state building period of 1950s, events were wrenching, rapid, and 
engrossing. Though profound changes were still to come for both peoples, 
in some respects the templates for discursive patterns were formed in rela-
tion to self, nation, and the other. The environment was a part of these 
discourses, as described above. Indeed, one of the challenges facing both 
communities is that the fundamental orientations toward the environment 
have remained static. As will be discussed below, significant developments 
in the political realm signaled the potential for a new and possibly joint 
environmental ethos, but the lack of successive breakthroughs that could 
lead to an agreed settlement of the conflict left environmental attitudes at 
the status quo ante.
 In such circumstances, the environment serves as a mythic inventory 
of deeds and virtues, triumph and victimization, containing stories for the 
Palestinians of what they have lost, and for the Israelis of what they accom-
plished. The significance of national(ist) narratives of the environment 
is that they help forge identities and provide explanations and justifica-
tions for actions that might otherwise remain apart from the metanarra-
tives of nationhood. A helpful concept here is that of Benedict Anderson’s 
“imagined communities.”21 Ideas of connection that allow for people to 
see themselves as having a common bond can include narratives of the 
environment and the ways in which people act or respond in the context of 
struggles for the disposition of land and stewardship of the environment. 
Thus to be Israeli is to subscribe to the hubris of technology and develop-
ment that is part of the Zionist ethos,22 and to be Palestinian is to identify 
with the loss of a prelapsarian relationship that was to embody the nobility 
of the relationship of the people to the land.23
Behaving Like a State?
According to Alatout, “Israeli [environmental] narratives . . . sidestep 
questions of property rights and sovereignty.”24 This suggestion posits a 
measure of confidence in the physical and political security of the state, 
and dovetails with a period that some have termed “post-Zionist.” From 
this perspective, Israel has fulfilled the goal of Zionism—in that it has 
achieved independence and a sovereign Jewish state—and its government 
and people are beyond the existential questions that drove its early policies 
and ethos. Were this to be the case, then questions of the environment 
could exist alongside, but separate from, issues of national security and 
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identity. Those issues, while still relevant, would not automatically trump 
environmental concerns inasmuch as they would be normalized priorities 
rather than stark choices between life and death. Yet it seems that Israel 
has not managed to separate its current strength from its past—and pres-
ent—anxieties, and as a result, it continues to pursue development as a 
justification for statehood and a method of survival.
 A number of examples shed light on the continuing imperatives that 
bracket environmental questions in Israel. On one hand, they show that 
there is an environmental constituency that is serious, dedicated, and 
persistent. On the other hand, they confirm that environmentalism, per 
se, must accede to appeals to the dominant metanarrative of nationalism. 
Indeed, at times Israelis advocating on behalf of the environment seek to 
tap into the pervasive discourse of the state in order to gain an audience 
or prevent the erosion of support for their cause. To date, however, major 
skirmishes around issues of environmental concern have not resulted in 
significant successes and, indeed, have yielded some symbolically impor-
tant defeats. This illustrates what Newman terms “a form of environmental 
‘schizophrenia’ where the society and its institutions are aware of the eco-
logical problems, discuss them in great detail, but fail to act accordingly to 
prevent further environmental degradation.”25
 One case that shows this tension revolved around the allocation of 
land in the Negev desert. Settlement of the Negev by Jewish Israelis was 
one of Prime Minister Ben Gurion’s signal ambitions, and it led, in part, to 
the construction of the National Water Carrier that created a conduit for 
water from the north to be used for agricultural expansion in the south. 
There are competing interests in the Negev, however, including open areas 
used for military training and wild and scenic areas that may merit pres-
ervation. A further matter of contention in the Negev is the future herding 
patterns of Bedouin communities that Israel has tried to limit in part by 
settling them in towns, and in part through the development of large rural 
land holdings for individual Jewish families. For opposing this settlement 
policy, the very mainstream Society for the Protection of Nature in Israel 
(SPNI) was accused of being anti-patriotic for its attempts to limit a mea-
sure that was depicted as preserving a resource for Jewish use by limiting 
Arab access to the land.26 That accusation had to be taken seriously by the 
SPNI despite its stellar credentials as an institution that had contributed 
to the stewardship of the environment. Indeed, in another Negev dispute, 
the organization had overtly appealed to Israeli security concerns (and 
by implication national patriotism) when it opposed development of a 
Voice of America transmitter in the desert by arguing that construction 
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and operation of the facility would have an adverse impact on the training 
activities of the air force.27
 In the first Negev case, Israelis were attempting to limit development 
by other Israelis against a background of an international threat, and in 
the second case, from competition from a local Arab community. At other 
times, the challenge has come from competing visions held by other Israelis 
in regard to what Israel should be like. Open space is often the issue, as one 
version incorporates a more biblical vision that has a more nature-friendly 
approach to milk and honey, whereas the more powerful model is of a 
robust, industrialized, and prosperous land, despite the associated impacts 
on the land. In a case that I have discussed elsewhere,28 a coalition of green 
interests attempted to check the development of Jerusalem at the expense 
of its urban greenbelt. In order to do so, opponents of sprawl depicted the 
incursion on the forested lands at the city’s margins as being akin to ter-
rorist attacks. Their language was fairly typical in its use of martial terms 
and a binary of attack and defense, as is the case in many other parts of 
the world, but the images deployed in the public materials designed by the 
coalition members were taken from common representations of violence 
carried out against Israeli civilians as part of a political attack against the 
state itself. That effort was part of an explicit recognition that security is-
sues had an automatic salience, and that a successful case for environmen-
tal concerns could not be made on the merits of quality of life issues alone.
 In perhaps the highest-profile case of an environmental dispute in 
Israel, opponents organized to block construction of the Trans-Israel 
(north-south) highway. The scope of the project rivaled the massive in-
frastructural developments of the early state period, and would leave its 
mark on much of the country in terms of day-to-day practicalities and 
a permanent imprint on the landscape. According to Garb, “Opposition 
to the project was keen, and in many ways constituted a landmark in the 
maturation of Israel’s environmental movement.”29 Yet Mazlish notes that 
“the paving of the highway and its subsequent operations are perceived by 
many as proof of the total failure of environmental organizations in their 
struggle against it.”30
 It is not surprising that the green interests proved impotent in their 
effort to block construction of the highway. Quality of life certainly had a 
voice in the discussion and provided a strong appeal (both pro and con, 
for instance shorter travel time, less aggravation, etc. versus prevention of 
sprawl and maintenance of open spaces).31 The notions of progress and 
modernization are part and parcel of the Israeli economy and are viewed 
by many as a measure of the stature of the state and as a reflection of its 
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citizenry. It should also be noted, however, that moving the army rapidly 
and efficiently on a north-south axis was part of the official justification 
for the project, and the security question once again was available to those 
who, for sincere or opportunistic reasons, sought to defang environmental 
objections through the gravity of military necessity.
Waiting for a State
In relation to the environment, Palestinians have had little agency beyond 
the local decisions of individuals, and even these have been circumscribed 
in some respects since Ottoman times. In the breach, there have been ef-
forts to write and narrate things as they were, as noted above, and to de-
scribe what ought to and may be in the present and future. Popular culture 
has been the venue for such imaginings, with a primary focus, understand-
ably, on the land. Both formally and informally Palestinians have created a 
tradition of narrating Palestine, with poetry, theater, art, education, histo-
riography—all contributing to a general oeuvre that posits a more perfect 
Palestine. Prior to the closure of Israeli territory to Palestinians from the 
West Bank and Gaza, individuals, families, and groups sometimes under-
took unofficial “nostalgia tours,” visiting sites such as Sahne (Gan HaShlo-
sha), Bohayrat Tabaraya (the Sea of Galilee or Yam Kinneret) or the coastal 
plain, sharing or implanting reminiscences of what had been and hopes 
for what might yet come.32 Whether they live on the land or elsewhere, 
Palestinians engage in activities in which their homes are “revitalized and 
their existence celebrated.”33
 One of the few ways in which Palestinians could act politically in rela-
tion to the environment was through acts of resistance. Their first itera-
tions may have come during the Ottoman period, when peasants uprooted 
their own trees rather than see the entirety of their profit confiscated by tax 
authorities. A more overt and political manifestation was during the period 
of the Arab Revolt in Palestine, from 1936–39. During the Mandate period 
the British had undertaken afforestation projects and created (sometimes 
phantom) forest reserves that served to alienate a considerable amount of 
land and further restrict use by both Palestinians and Jews.34 The forests 
were thus seen as markers of a restrictive governmental presence. Though 
they could also serve as sources of fuel, forage, cover, and recreation, Pales-
tinians chose to destroy some of these symbols of the British role through 
politically motivated acts of arson.
 In the period after 1948, Palestinians had no jurisdiction over their 
own land, and little to no voice in the disposition of their resources 
and development of the environment. In the West Bank, the Jordanians 
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maintained a number of afforestation projects, primarily to the east of Je-
rusalem and in the northern areas near Jenin and Nabulus, but the signifi-
cant changes were those occurring within the Green Line. It was evident 
that water was a key to the viability of Israel, and disputes with Lebanon, 
Syria, and Jordan accompanied the birth of the state and the ensuing years. 
It is notable that the first attack of the Fatah movement—later a leading 
power in the PLO—was carried out in 1965 against Israel’s National Water 
Carrier. On the Israeli side, this affirmed the link between environmental 
issues and national security. On the Palestinian side, the mobilization of 
water for the massive expansion of infrastructure and community building 
was evidence that Israel’s existence came at the expense of and was medi-
ated through resource use in what was perceived as a zero-sum situation.35 
Overall, the period between the founding of Israel and the inception of 
the peace process was marked by exclusive agendas that concentrated on the 
dynamics of nationalism, and there was little room for protection of the 
environment—for differing reasons—on either side.
The Rise and Fall of Environmentalism
In the heady days following the Oslo Accords, there was a rush to create 
and facilitate joint projects that would foster Palestinian-Israeli cooperation 
and benefit both communities. The environment was an obvious arena 
for such endeavors. Support of various kinds and outside funding agen-
cies and states embraced new partnerships between academics and NGOs, 
bureaucrats and technicians. Issues such as sewage processing, aquifer 
management, wildlife protection, pollution mitigation—all were attractive 
opportunities to move the process forward. Indeed, the environment was 
seen as a passive object that could be tended to by both sides (and the adja-
cent Arab states as well) as a confidence-building measure that would pro-
vide momentum for dealing with the “more difficult” subjects that needed 
to be addressed.36 The Green Line receded as a barrier to environmental 
planning/mitigation, and plans for resource sharing were bandied about 
as part of an “emergent regional environmentalism.”37 The mood was opti-
mistic, and the tone was somewhat celebratory. Politicians inclined toward 
lofty rhetoric, such as Shimon Peres of Israel, called for a new Middle East 
that would change the region from brown to green.38 Activists on both 
sides were able to imagine a future in which the environment would not 
compete with nationalism, and a shared environment would improve in 
tandem with good relations.
 Unfortunately, the peace process gave way to the difficulties of ne-
gotiation and the complexities of the conflict. As the honeymoon period 
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began to fade, the environmental issues maintained their status as a prob-
lem that had an inherent logic for cooperation, given the physical limita-
tions of the small shared territory of Israel/Palestine. Yet to the dismay of 
many and the surprise of some, environmental projects and partnerships 
became increasingly problematic and isolated. According to Chaitlin et al., 
“Palestinian[s] . . . do not see the point of ‘talking environment’ without 
‘talking occupation.’”39 The Israelis, however, tend to see “talking conflict” 
as a detour from “talking environment.” Moreover, the outbreak of the 
al-Aqsa Intifada in 2000 led to increasing practical difficulties for both 
Palestinian and Israeli partners, complicating efforts to foster collaborative 
work, both applied and academic. Each community continued to inflict its 
own particular toll on the environment, and the blame for the damage in 
that polarizing dynamic accompanied feelings of abandonment and even 
betrayal that characterized the broader cooperative framework during 
these years. The derailment of a shared environmental agenda wasn’t com-
plete, and NGOs and some academic partnerships endure. But in the main, 
Figure 9.1. Olive Columns. 1991. By Ran Morin. The sculpture marks the landscape 
near the Green Line dividing Israel and Palestine at Ramat Rachel, Jerusalem. In-
tended as a statement on “natural existence in artificial conditions,” it shows living 
olive trees dissociated from—yet still connected to—the earth. With the obvious sym-
bolisms of the olive, its use in this context invites commentary on the peace process 
and the state of the environment. The olive trees are eighty years old and are kept alive 
via drip irrigation. Photograph by Shaul Cohen, 2008.
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the demise of the peace process took the momentum out of environmental 
projects, which, as noted by Feitelson and Levy, had never been central to 
the agreements reached by the various sides.40
Environmentalism Deferred
For now, Israelis and Palestinians see a chauvinistic zero-sum situation as 
the defining characteristic of their relationship. Both sides, albeit in differ-
ent ways, are insecure and feel themselves to be victimized. Whatever their 
commonalities and differences may be, neither side believes that the other 
relates to the environment in good faith, and each feels the other to be an 
untrustworthy—indeed an unworthy—partner for moving forward to a joint 
resolution of the conflict. The one issue that is clearly critical to both commu-
nities, the supply of water for domestic, agricultural, and industrial purposes, 
is viewed in the context of politics and security, with each side leveling accusa-
tions against the other for endangering a resource that is critical to both sides.
 The environment is thus added to the victimology of the conflict, 
and the damage that is both increasing and increasingly evident is seen 
as a material strike against the welfare of the respective communities, and 
indicative of their moral failing as well. Yet, while violence against people 
is seen as a barometer of the state of relations between the two, actions 
that affect the environment, such as the urban sprawl that can be found 
throughout Palestine/Israel, is viewed differently. The use of land falls back 
to the nationalist tropes, and building is seen as supporting or undermin-
ing discourses of national legitimation, depending on who is offering the 
commentary. A senior official of Israel’s Nature Reserves Authority ob-
served that “the damage to the environment is a tragedy, and yet this is 
what we aspired to: a developed state with cities and roads, like anywhere 
else, so you have to see it as a success.”41
 Given the violence that seems an inherent part of the situation, ques-
tions of open space, the plight of migratory birds, and air quality seem, 
to most, rather pedestrian. Even for many of those who care about such 
matters, environmental issues take a backseat to the pressing concerns of 
the day. Dawson points out that environmental challenges are increasingly 
bundled with issues of environmental justice and, although there is poten-
tial to unite people around such problems, they can also be divisive in and 
of themselves.42 Moreover, she notes that environmental problems may 
seem ephemeral, whereas the underlying identity problems of the broader 
conflict may seem much more enduring. As Tal observes, “In the inevitable 
clash between security and environmental values, it is no surprise that the 
environment comes out the loser.”43
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 I believe that Tal makes a critical contribution in specifying environ-
mental values as distinct from environmentalism. Such values can be found 
on both sides of the Palestinian-Israeli divide, but they cannot successfully 
bridge it, at least for now. Indeed, in the light of the evidence, it is clear that 
environmental issues give way before other needs, and a shared environ-
mental discourse is marginal at best. Separate environmental discourses 
are themselves vulnerable to partisanship and operate only as subsets of 
the overarching nationalist metanarratives.
 Returning to the question posed above concerning the existence of Pal-
estinian, Israeli, and shared environmentalisms, I suggest that, although the 
question is pertinent, the answer has yet to emerge. In saying that, I argue 
that neither community has attained the degree of security necessary for 
there to be a meaningful environmentalism, that is, a movement that engages 
environmental challenges without defaulting to security or identity concerns 
along parochial lines. Land is a central facet of identity for Palestinians and 
Israelis, albeit in somewhat differing ways. Alongside the idea of the land, 
however, has always been its utilitarian value. Palestinian culture holds the 
land, and connectedness with the land, as a national value,44 but also as a way 
to feed one’s family, and, at both levels, land is equated with honor. Israelis 
embrace the land as refuge, but also as a way of shedding the confines of the 
diaspora experience: to have the land is to be Israeli. Both Israelis and Pales-
tinians speak of the rest of the world as being “outside” of The Land. There is, 
however, space between the notional and the concrete in both communities, 
as evidenced by the practicalities of living day by day in and on the sacred, 
and population growth and economic development have inevitable impacts.
 There continues to be a cultural celebration of the environment on 
both sides of the divide. Despite this, it seems that the land has little active 
voice. Yet, at some point, acknowledging the very right of the other to exist 
may compel cooperation of a sort that seems to be a forlorn aspiration of 
a “green” minority or a brief mirage of the peace process. The Palestinian 
poet Husayn Fa’ur wrote that he “made a promise to a beautiful dream, 
certain that your dream is the ruling dream. The path we have chosen will 
bring us to a haven.”45 There are dreams of the past and dreams of the 
future that posit an idyllic environment. A future haven, however, cannot 
be the exclusive territory of one side alone, for that vision has yielded the 
ongoing crisis that is Israel/Palestine. Perhaps it can only be that when 
security and identity concerns have been addressed for both Palestinians 
and Israelis that the existential pressures of a small and bounded space can 
become a priority for both communities, and a shared imaginary of the 
environment can begin to emerge.
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a f t e r w o r d
Are Environmental Imaginaries 
Culturally Constructed?
Timothy Mitchell
THE MODERN history of the Middle East has always been the history of a 
human relationship with nature. The environment appears to define the Arab-
Islamic world more than it does any other major region in world history. It is 
time to ask, as this book does, how this naturalized history came about.
 Stretched in an irregular shape from the Atlantic to Central Asia, the 
region of the Middle East and North Africa was always demarcated by its 
climate. An arid environment was said to produce distinctive forms of his-
tory. Political orders were built upon major river systems, or along narrow 
fertile crescents and coasts. Political dynamics were traced to the difference 
between the desert and the sown, the nomadic and the settled, the tribe 
and the state. Colonial histories, as Diana Davis shows, could describe the 
precolonial order as incapable of managing this difficult human-natural 
balance or maintaining the region’s precarious ecology. Europeans could 
then justify their colonization of the Arab world in ecological terms.
 We write histories of the more recent past as the story of states cop-
ing with fragile environments, limited areas of cultivable land, populations 
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expanding faster than resources, the artificial growth of megacities, and 
strained or disappearing reserves of water. Even the one natural resource 
found in abundance appears as a problem. The region’s large reserves of 
oil are described as a curse whose presence disrupts the normal process of 
political development.
 The forces of nature that define the region’s history typically acquire 
their place in the story as something abnormal and errant. The arid, sub-
tropical ecology of the Middle East and North Africa, as Davis points out, 
is frequently treated not as one of the earth’s several terrestrial biomes, 
alongside the varieties of temperate, boreal, tropical, and other zones, but 
as an aberration and a threat in comparison to the norm of a temperate 
world. Low levels of rainfall and riparian areas of concentrated cultivation 
and settlement are addressed as abnormalities to be overcome, just as the 
curse of abundant oil reserves must be broken. Davis describes this way 
of seeing things as an environmental orientalism. The natural shapes the 
region’s history as something unnatural.
 An unnatural nature appears to determine Middle Eastern history, but 
we have no history of this nature. The natural world stands on one side of 
the account, human history on the other. Academic specialization helps 
keep them apart, with experts on each side working with their own time 
scales, agents, and records. The environmental forces and reserves that 
shape the region’s past and present occur in historical accounts largely as 
an underlying set of resources, restrictions, and risks. Knowledge of these 
elements is produced for the most part by nonhistorians, among specialists 
in the various natural and environmental sciences. Historians specialize in 
studying the human response to those forces, focusing on the tools with 
which humans are said to address, understand, and try to overcome the 
limits of their natural environment: culture, politics, economic and techni-
cal knowhow, and the moral resources of communities and states.
 The first task, as this book explains, is to interrogate and disassemble 
the representations of nature that govern the region’s history. Unpacking 
the environmental imaginaries formed in the colonial period and carried 
over or transformed after colonialism is a large undertaking. The essays 
in this book, and the larger bodies of writing and research on which all of 
them are based, take on this task in a variety of ways. They explore how 
the British in Egypt and Iraq, the French in North Africa, and the Zionist 
movement in Palestine each deployed distinctive visions of environmental 
crisis, neglect, or possibility to help construct a colonial order and justify 
European intervention, settlement, and control. Typically the place to be 
colonized or controlled was described in contrast to a more verdant and 
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fertile past, or a more prosperous, well-irrigated future, which European 
control would restore or bring about. The failure of the native population 
to sustain or bring into being this abundance became one of the primary 
justifications for the colonial occupation.
 In the middle decades of the twentieth century, as European control 
was challenged and transformed, new regimes adopted or developed many 
elements of the earlier environmental imaginaries. They devised schemes 
to make or remake the nation, and eliminate threats to its national co-
herence, on an even grander scale. The initiatives took several forms, but 
the most prominent and frequent were projects to build dams across the 
region’s major rivers, on a scale far larger than the undertakings of the 
Ottoman and colonial periods. The dams would store up the rivers’ waters, 
eliminate systems of flood-basin irrigation, and replace the river and its 
carefully managed seasonal abundance with a permanent arrangement of 
barrages, canals, irrigation channels, and diesel pumps. The Nile, the Jor-
dan River and its tributaries, the Tigris and Euphrates, and many other riv-
ers were dammed up and diverted. It is no surprise that more than half the 
chapters of this book are concerned with the analysis of these schemes, the 
diverse and contested work of environmental imagination they required, 
and the challenges to those visions that flowed from the misjudged or un-
anticipated ecological transformations they engineered.
 What is an environmental imaginary? The chapters in this book make 
clear that in most cases it is more than just a work of imagination. Its force 
and durability derives from the way it is reproduced and extended in re-
built and reordered worlds. The millions of hectares of trees planted to 
reforest Algeria, and the criminalization of grazing and gathering on lands 
expropriated for reforestation; the redirection of the Nile into channels so 
capillary that it discharges into the sea less than 1 percent of its previous 
flow; the remaking of Southeastern Anatolia, as Leila Harris describes, by 
the monocropping of cotton; or the diversion of the Jordan River waters 
outside its watershed area, discussed by Samer Alatout, to enable Israel to 
settle and retain southern Palestine—such projects are as much a contri-
bution to environmental imaginaries as are the travel writings, colonial 
reports, reconnaissance flights, engineering schemes, and court decisions 
that helped manufacture new ways of seeing the natural world.
 The mixture of materials and processes employed in the making of 
environmental imaginaries gives them their scale and what sometimes ap-
pears as their irreversibility. Contributions to this book depict in a variety 
of terms the force and durability that the imaginary often seems to acquire. 
Environmental imaginaries are described as enduring or hegemonic. They 
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are said to underlie forms of social practice, to explain the decisions and 
strategies of colonial powers, and to be the cause of state bureaucracies act-
ing toward nature in distinctive ways. They could never be ascribed these 
powers if they were merely imaginary.
 At the same time, several contributions to this volume suggest that 
environmental imaginaries can sometimes suddenly collapse and give way 
to rival visions. Priya Satia explains how the British imagination of Arabia 
changed quite abruptly after World War I from the image of an unknow-
able and barren void to the vision of a biblical Eden whose prolific fertility 
could be restored by modern technical intervention. Jeannie Sowers shows 
how technocrats and agribusiness managers in contemporary Egypt have 
been able to challenge a dominant understanding of the fecundity of the 
Nile and the proper way to exploit its natural powers. In Palestine/Israel, 
according to Shaul Cohen, no common environmental vision can establish 
itself. For both Palestinians and Israelis, for different reasons and in differ-
ent ways, the effort to place a value on nature is trumped by the national 
question—the question, from each side, of the recuperation, survival, or 
future strength of the nation.
 Assessing the power and durability of an environmental imaginary 
raises the old question of how representations of nature are related to what 
we call nature itself. No one any longer answers this question by assum-
ing we can simply separate two worlds, the realm of ideas and the realm 
of natural facts. The chapters provide many examples illustrating why 
this separation cannot be sustained, from Satia’s discussion of the British 
bombs dropped on Iraqi villages in the 1920s that operated through their 
“moral effect” to Cohen’s description of the decision of the Palestinian 
resistance group Fatah in 1965 to initiate its campaign against the Zionist 
vision of permanently settling all of Palestine by blowing up the canal built 
to claim and colonize the south.
 George Trumbull suggests here, as others have elsewhere, that we 
abandon the “false binary” between images of nature and nature itself. He 
proposes that we speak instead of the tangible environment and the dis-
cursive environment as existing “in superimposition upon one another.” 
However, this sort of answer to the question of the status of imaginaries 
suggests two problems. First, the idea that the environment and the stories 
that we tell about the environment form superimposed worlds still leaves 
these worlds distinct—still understands each as its own world or level. 
However many overlaps, superimpositions, or interconnections we trace, 
we are left with nature as one level and history as another; with dirt versus 
perceptions of dirt; with the environment as an object out there and our 
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ways of imagining and representing it as something different. Yet none of 
the natural worlds or environmental forces encountered in this book occur 
except as worlds or forces formed out of the interaction of the human 
and the nonhuman, the organic and the technical, the programmed and 
the unpredicted. Forms of representation have always formed a part of 
such human-nonhuman, technical-organic interactions. Those modes of 
representing and reporting that we might refer to as an imaginary occur 
as a variety of sociotechnical practices—writing, recording, picturing, and 
referencing—that form aspects of many other sociotechnical operations: 
building dams, planting forests, irrigating desert lands, administering rural 
populations. The imaging and reporting occur in these many forms of 
practice, not as some separate plane of the immaterial.
 My reason for mentioning these well-known arguments is to introduce 
a second problem. Despite what I have just written, it may be misleading 
to dismiss the separation of representation from reality, of history from 
nature, of stories about the environment from the environment itself, as a 
“false” binary. The accusation of falsehood overlooks something central to 
the modern politics of nature. Although representing natural forces forms 
only a part of our ways of building the collective worlds we inhabit, it is 
a mode of sociotechnical practice that has become increasingly more or-
ganized, coordinated, and effective. Over the last century or so, more and 
more work has been done to produce representations of nature and to 
produce what appears as a progressively more distinct separation between 
those interactions we call nature and those we arrange as images of nature. 
The result has been to open up, by a series of removals, detours, and delays, 
what appears as an ever more effective distance between our encounters 
with natural forces and our encounters with reports and images of those 
encounters. It is important to understand the production of these remov-
als and delays and the kinds of separation they effect. To dismiss such re-
movals and separations as a false binary (while better than assuming the 
simple dualism of nature versus representation) risks neglecting the task of 
tracing how they have been brought about.
 The practices that carry out the distancing of modes of representing 
and reporting from the interactions on which they report are perfectly real 
and have their own histories and methods. Richard Grove has shown how 
the emergence of the environment as an object of knowledge was made 
possible by a particular kind of distance, isolation, and reporting. The Brit-
ish, French, and Dutch encounters with tropical islands and the business 
of colonizing and despoiling them made visible processes such as defor-
estation and their interconnected impact on the biota of a place. Remote, 
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self-contained, and fragile, tropical islands appeared to those who encoun-
tered them from afar as worlds-in-miniature, functioning as laboratories 
in which the interaction among life forms could be observed, manipulated, 
and analyzed. The same isolation and difference was later constructed in 
the glass houses of botanical gardens back in Europe. Like nineteenth-
century world exhibitions, the first of which were built as even larger glass 
houses, these miniature worlds, populated with real plants, animals, ob-
jects, and people, were organized as representations of the wider world. 
No less real than the realities they represented, no more or less discursive, 
no more or less imaginary, but more controllable and easier to study and 
report about, such laboratories exemplified the forms of removal, distance, 
isolation, and control that generated the increasingly widespread and per-
suasive effect of a world divided in two: into reality versus representation, 
the environment versus the stories we tell about it, nature versus history.
 The essays in this book provide numerous examples of technical proj-
ects and administrative practices that helped produce the forms of distance, 
separation, concentration, and difference that could be organized into the 
distinction between modern environments and modern environmental 
imaginaries. The novel use of air power by the British to police and subdue 
the villages and tribes of Iraq contributed to and reinforced a new under-
standing of the Mesopotamian environment. The building of two large 
dams across the Nile at Aswan, the first, discussed in detail by Jennifer Derr, 
completed in 1902 and the second on a much greater scale in the 1960s, 
stored up the river’s power at a single site and replaced the thousands of 
dykes and channels that distributed the river’s nutrients and energy under 
the older system of flood basin irrigation. The forms of measurement, 
know-how, and control that were previously dispersed across millions of 
hectares of the floodplain were now increasingly concentrated at a single 
site. This concentration of management and information contributed to 
the development of ways of governing that took the management of nature 
as their object, and the representation of nature as their project.
 To understand what was distinctive about these practices, Alan 
Mikhail’s chapter on Ottoman methods of managing the waters of the 
Nile in the eighteenth century is of great importance. From Ottoman court 
records and other administrative archives, Mikhail has carefully recov-
ered sequences of orders, appeals, reports, inspections, and interventions 
through which courts, provincial officials, local notables, and ordinary 
farmers managed, co-opted, and contested the changing flow of the river, 
the alterations in its channel, the appearance and disappearance of fertile 
islands, the silting up of canals, and the collapse of embankments. From 
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these dispersed and intermittent records, the chapter pieces together what 
can be termed an Ottoman imaginary of the environment.
 It seems clear, however, from their dispersed and intermittent forms of 
reporting and instruction that those engaged in these processes were not 
concerned with constructing an environmental imaginary. Every dispute, 
intervention, and administrative decision involved modes of representa-
tion, which in turn formed parts of larger systems of administration and 
rule. However, the painstaking work of scholarship required to recover and 
assemble these reports and representations, compared to the relative ease 
with which scholars of the colonial and contemporary state reconstruct 
environmental imaginaries from published or widely circulated sources, 
is a measure of what has changed. Ottoman political practice was not de-
pendent on the gathering and circulation of an environmental imaginary, 
so the work of isolating, concentrating, reporting, and publishing repre-
sentations of nature had no regular place in administrative routines. In 
other words, Ottoman practice was not organized with sites of concentra-
tion and forms of difference or distance that attempted to produce and 
maintain the separation of an environment from its imagination, or of 
nature from politics. Writing accounts of precolonial practices is therefore 
a different kind of project from writing about the imaginative practices of 
twentieth-century government. This brings the peculiarity of more recent 
politics into sharper view.
 To understand the practices that gave rise to environmental imaginar-
ies, we need to understand the colonial and more contemporary modes 
of encountering, working with, and attempting to control a variety of 
forces, both human and nonhuman. It would be misleading to refer to 
these methods of isolation, concentration, making of worlds-in-miniature, 
separation, and reporting as the “cultural construction” of nature. It would 
be equally appropriate, or inappropriate, to talk about the “natural con-
struction” of nature.
 The essays in this book confirm the point Bruno Latour makes, in Sci-
ence in Action and elsewhere, about the recalcitrance of natural forces. The 
forces of nature, isolated in the laboratory, the glass house, or a gorge at 
Aswan, can be more easily observed, manipulated, harnessed, described, 
and represented. But their representation is not a mere cultural construc-
tion, for the same forces retain their enormous power to refute what is 
said about them, escape the mechanisms of control, or produce surpris-
ing and unanticipated actions. The desert terrain of Iraq turned out to 
be more opaque and less governable from the air than the proponents of 
British air power had assumed. The control of the Nile brought increased 
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supplies of water, but also rising levels of salinity in the irrigated soil and 
decreased levels of nutrients. The view that our ideas about nature are 
culturally constructed resolves prematurely something that should always 
be an empirical question: What combination of human and nonhuman 
forces, of the planned and the unintentional, of the freely imagined and 
the recalcitrant, makes possible the construction and strengthening of our 
knowledge about the common world?
 By asking this empirical question, the study of environmental imagi-
naries can take advantage of the promise of environmental history: that it 
provides a way of studying the past and present in which the protagonists 
are not limited to the merely human. Instead one can trace the shifting 
alliances and amalgamations of human and nonhuman agencies, organic 
and technical materials, recalcitrant and malleable forces, that have shaped 
the common worlds to which we belong.
 Take as a final example the history of Middle Eastern oil. This is inevi-
tably an environmental history. Oil is a natural resource that has reworked 
entire landscapes of the region, whether in the infrastructure required for 
its discovery, production, and transportation, the speculative urban de-
velopments into which its profits have been transformed, or the aquifers 
permanently depleted to pump the billions of gallons of groundwater 
required every day to irrigate petroleum-funded agricultural schemes or 
drive oil in depleted reservoirs toward the well.
 In the building of infrastructure, the playing out of speculation, or 
the pumping of fluids, methods of planning, measuring, valuing, esti-
mating, and other modes of representation and calculation are always at 
work. From this work the environmental imaginaries of oil are produced. 
These imaginaries are not limited to the clichés of camel-herding nomads 
transformed into plutocrats or skyscrapers replacing collections of mud 
huts, although Western oil companies devoted considerable resources to 
producing such images. They include, for example, complex methods for 
producing the varying price of oil; the racial imaginaries—as Robert Vi-
talis has traced—employed to organize the labor of oil production; and a 
discourse of international security that for decades transformed the prob-
lem of an overabundance of Middle Eastern oil into a threat of scarcity and 
into programs of arms purchase that recycled petrodollars to the West.
 The imaginative world of oil is still larger. As I explore in my work 
on “carbon democracy,” the plentiful, cheaply produced oil of the Middle 
East helped engineer, during the decades either side of World War II, ways 
of living and thinking in which material growth was assumed to have no 
limits. The flow of oil made possible a new object, “the economy,” through 
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which this apparently limitless growth could be managed and represented. 
It fueled in turn the growth of an expertise, economics, that became the 
dominant way of thinking about the satisfaction of material wants and 
needs. Thanks to oil and the apparently limitless low-cost energy it sup-
plied, the most abstract and dematerialized of our social imaginaries, 
neoclassical economics, became over several decades the most influential 
language for explaining the relationship between humans and nature.
 The history of oil, like the histories explored in this book, shows how 
one can trace the building of environmental imaginaries as much more 
than a work of cultural construction. The question is to understand what 
combinations of natural forces and technical skills, human effort and 
nonhuman devices, the real and the artificial, the freely imagined and the 
naturally recalcitrant, produce the worlds we inhabit.
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